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Chernyshev Views U.S. SDI Weapon Test
LD1807162189 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The United States carried out its first test of beam weapons, a 7-meter neutral particle accelerator, in the framework of the SDI programme, a recent news conference was told by the Pentagon spokesman. This fact alone probably would not have deserved special attention. But given some other circumstances this news leads to serious thoughts.

First of all, the experiment is one of the several planned by the Pentagon in the "Star Wars" programme this year to test special systems for detection and destruction of targets in space. For example, the "alpha" chemical laser designed for space basing was tested at a range in California on April 7, and a new antimissile to be deployed on low-altitude orbital platforms at Edwards Air Force Base a week later.

All this proves that the new U.S. Administration does not strive for precise and strict compliance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on ABM, using diplomatic terminology. Under Article 5 of this treaty the sides undertook not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are space-based. However contrary to this document, the U.S. continues not only to manufacture, but also to test the components of the future ABM system intended for deployment in space.

There is also another disquieting circumstance. The current tests serve as the material confirmation of the statements by representatives of the current U.S. Administration regarding the future fate of the ABM Treaty. It should be reminded that U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle bluntly reaffirmed at the American Defense Preparedness Association on June 29 the commitment to develop and deploy of strategic defenses when they are ready. U.S. Defense Secratary Richard Cheney was equally frank when he pledged to press for the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as soon as the United States approached the possibility of SDI deployment.

A question prompts itself: How should such statements and practical actions be reconciled with the promises of President George Bush to press for agreements at the Geneva Talks on nuclear and space weapons contributing to greater stability and lower danger of war? Even the danger of SDI deployment leads to destabilisation of the strategic situation and obviously does not ensure possibilities for significant cuts in the strategic offensive weapons.

The fate of a Soviet-U.S. agreement, reached at summit level earlier, to elaborate in Geneva Accords committing the sides to observe the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972 and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty during an agreed period, is also the cause of concern.

Chervov Addresses Seminar on Arms Control
LD1807200789 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The problems of strategy and military doctrine were in the focus of today's meeting of the international seminar "East-West: Comprehensive Security and Arms Control", currently under way at Moscow State Institute of International Affairs.

Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, a department head at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, set out the conceptual approach of the Soviet Union to the military doctrine notion, which includes political and military-technical aspects, the latter being subordinate to the former.

Replying to a question by one of the Western participants if the military had any objections to gearing the Soviet military doctrine to defense, General Chervov said: Many people in the West think that the practical realisation of new thinking in the USSR comes against opposition in the military. I have to disappoint them: there has never been such opposition. We are at one with our political leadership, including military matters."

"At the same time," Chervov continued, "we honestly and bluntly speak about the existing problems and difficulties caused, for example, by the current reduction of our Armed Forces by 500,000 men. This is a complex, painful process. All servicemen, who are to be retired in connection with the announced reductions, need to be rehoused and given jobs."

Speaking about the prospects for achieving agreements at the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks in Vienna, Nikolay Chervov said: "I believe that the timeframe proposed by President Bush is quite feasible. Of course, to this end all 23 participating nations should come to agreement on numerous technical aspects involved in the future accord."

Dwelling on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, the general said: "If NATO countries ae prepared to hold negotiations on this problem, the Soviet Union will immediately start further unilateral reductions of its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It is now the turn of the West."

Akhromeyev Interviewed on Results of Arms Talks
LD1707225989 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev in Moscow; and David Jones, former chief of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, on 15 July by unidentified reporters; Akhromeyev speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation; from the "Panorama" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] I hope that you allow me a personal question. Today is Saturday, it is going to be evening soon. How are you going to spend this weekend?

[Akhromeyev] I will travel to the United States on 20 July, on Thursday. I shall give a lecture in the U.S. Congress, or more precisely in the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The lecture is entitled: "The Evolution of the National Security Policy of the Soviet Union in the 1990s." Well, it is this lecture which I am preparing during the weekend, too. I think that this lecture will not be an easy task for me. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] It was a good month ago when we met and you said at the beginning of the Geneva negotiations that you did not see anything new in the U.S. proposals brought to the Strategic Arms Talks [START] negotiations. Is this still your opinion today?

[Akhromeyev] Since I met you, the negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons really did begin and the U.S. delegation has come forward with a few new proposals. These U.S. proposals primarily involve the verification of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Still, considering the essence, they have not brought anything new, i.e. regarding the reduction itself they have no new and concrete proposals. Well, now, it is for this reason that we cannot be entirely satisfied with the Geneva proposals of the U.S. side. They would even extend verification only to the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and they have no new proposal whatsoever regarding the verification of the cruise missiles launchable from aircraft or from the sea. [passage omitted]

[Akhromeyev] I do not deny the significance of verification; without reliable verification not only the U.S. but also the Soviet side would refuse to sign an agreement, and of course it is not willing to ratify it either. In other words, I do not want to minimize the significance of verification at all, but before we can verify we really must determine first what we want to verify. There is a need to conclude substantive disarmament agreements. If they do not submit new substantive proposals, then there will be no treaty and there will be nothing to verify.

[Reporter] The second round of the Vienna negotiations ended in the middle of the week and there the 23 member states of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO formulated a proposal about reducing conventional weapons, and at the same time the participating 35 countries coordinated their ideas on how to strengthen confidence. How do you evaluate this second round in the Vienna negotiations and what do you expect from the resumption in September?

[Akhromeyev] It is still difficult to give a detailed answer because we received these proposals in Vienna on the 12th and today is only 15 July. These proposals still need to be thoroughly analyzed. Of course, in general I could single out two or three important elements; first of all not only the land-based troops but the air forces also must be radically reduced. The way I see it, NATO is not planning a radical reduction of the air forces. [passage omitted]

[Akhromeyev] For some reason the reduction in the armed forces is considered compulsory only regarding the Soviet Union and the United States, whereas given that 23 states are participating in the negotiations, this is unjust and incomprehensible. It is obvious that all countries taking part in the negotiations should have to reduce their armed forces, even in proportion. I think that the Hungarians, too, would look with incomprehension if we in the Soviet Union reduced its army manpower while at the same time the Hungarian and the other states did not reduce their military forces. The same applies to NATO. We think that the levels of the armed forces of all the countries participating in the negotiations today must be reduced. It is another question as to what degree. [passage omitted]

[Akhromeyev] It has also been raised that troops stationed abroad should be withdrawn. However, for some reason, in the proposal yet again only the withdrawal of those armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States which are stationed on the territories of foreign countires is envisaged.

[Reporter] Because it is these which represent the largest forces and therefore it is precisely for this reason that there must be negotiations about them.

[Akhromeyev] Yes, but apart from them, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada also have troops deployed on territories of foreign countries and therefore we should negotiate the reduction of the armed strength of all the countries whose troops are stationed in foreign countries. [passage omitted]

[Akhromeyev] At the moment we are not yet negotiating about the total withdrawal of the troops stationed in the territories of foreign countries. Still, the levels must be reduced in any case, and this reduction must extend to all armed forces deployed abroad. The reduction may be affected in accordance with the particular military-political situation of the given period. In the present military-political situation, when the individual states belong to military alliances, they must bear the military costs necessary for this. If the military situation improves, if tension eases, then it will be possible to reduce the level of the armies and military expenditures as well.

As for what it depends on, well, it depends on the politics of the day, in a given case the NATO policy toward the Warsaw Pact. Today this policy is still determined to a significant degree by strength, military pressure. But today several positive changes may be observed. Most recently, when President Bush visited Poland or your country he made a statement of much promise. He announced that the former policy—or as they call it, nuclear deterrence—must be replaced with another, new policy. This is a very important statement and it will be followed by concrete steps and then we shall be able to speak about a reduction of the danger of war.

I would like to hope, and personally I do hope, that we live in a period when the threat of war is decreasing.

Further Comments on Geneva, Vienna Talks Reported

Aim of Geneva Talks Summed Up

LD1807142289 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Geneva July 18 TASS—The 11th round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments is continuing here. The talks aim to prepare a draft treaty on halving strategic offensive weapons.

Links between a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and observance of the anti-ballistic missile treaty are the focus of attention. As for the strategic weapons talks, the Soviet side is pressing for a solution of important issues which are still unresolved, including limitations on the deployment of sea-based long-range cruise missiles which are part of Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals.

The Soviet delegation proposed a procedure for limiting mobile launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and counting air-based long-range cruise missiles carried by heavy bombers. Verification issues are also being discussed.

The talks are taking place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere.

USSR, UK Delegates on Vienna Talks

PM1707111189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with O. Grinevskiy, chief of the Soviet delegation at the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, by own correspondent S. Tosunyan in Vienna, date unspecified, and with B. Cleghorn, deputy chief of the British delegation, by own correspondent A. Anichkin, in the Soviet Union, date unspecified, under the general heading "Two Views of the Second Round"]

[Text] Vienna—The second round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe has ended in Vienna's Hofburg palace. IZVESTIYA correspondents were told of the course of the talks and the results of the round that has just ended by the leader of the Soviet delegation and one of the Western representatives—the deputy chief of the British delegation, who recently visited the Soviet Union.

O. Grinevskiy: "More Could Have Been Achieved"

[Grinevskiy] The initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Moscow and by U.S. President G. Bush in Brussels have given powerful political impetus to the Vienna talks.

The Warsaw Pact's new proposals were officially submitted at the talks by the Soviet delegation on behalf of all allied countries 18 May. For the next 2 weeks the socialist countries put forward a number of working documents setting forth various aspects of the initial accords.

We welcome the fact that our Western partners have been making additional proposals to develop their Brussels initiatives, and we hope that this will promote speedy progress at the talks. I will not touch on their content just now, they require serious and thoughtful study.

On the results of the round that has just ended it can be said that, on the whole, we are happy with them. The discussion was typified by the businesslike approach of virtually all participants. A considerable degree of harmony and similarity among a number of the sides' fundamental positions was revealed, and tangible improvements in the negotiating process were achieved.

At the start of the round we only stated in general terms that initial reductions should concern those types of weapons which comprise the potential for inflicting a surprise attack and carrying out large-scale offensive operations. These can now be specifically named. They are the six most destabilizing categories of conventional armed forces: aircraft, helicopters, tanks, combat armored vehicles, artillery, and personnel.

Whereas the overall outlines of an initial accord were mapped our during the first round of the Vienna talks, the participants have now defined its structure. As a result of the initial accords identical quantitative levels of conventional armed forces for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been defined which would be considerably lower than existing levels. The problem of imbalances and asymmetries would thereby be resolved. Regions with corresponding sublevels are being spotlighted in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Quantitative levels for each of the allies are supplemented by the maximum levels for each state and ceilings for forces located outside national territories. This is the backbone of the initial agreement based on the enterprising proposals from the two alliances.

Needless to say, not all parameters in the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO coincide. It would probably be hard to count on this. The main thing is that they are comparable.

Thus, a considerable amount of work has been done. But more could have been achieved if the official NATO position on aircraft, helicopters, and personnel had been put forward by our Western partners not immediately before the second round of talks, but somewhat earlier.

It seems that even the West's new proposals do not make the NATO positions any more constructive. They continue to propose that we reduce all our land-based warplanes, including such purely defensive systems as air-defense fighter-interceptors that are unable to strike

ground targets. Moreover, the additional NATO proposals say nothing about setting maximum levels for personnel numbers in the armed forces of each alliance—either in Europe as a whole or in its individual regions.

The personnel problem again boils down merely to cutting to equal levels the forces of the two powers—the USSR and the United States—located on allied territory. This means that the forces of other states—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Canada—located on FRG territory are excluded from the balance of forces situated outside national territories.

While the NATO approach to categories that were "new" for it was being worked out, the talks focused on three categories of conventional arms—tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery—on which the Western position seems to be quite definite. However, there has been no major movement in this area. Why? Because NATO is striving to take light tanks out of the equation. But in the circumstances of an overall reduction in the two allies' tank pools to 20,000 units, the remaining 2,000 light tanks constitute a substantial force. Moreover, leaving light tanks out of the agreement would mean stimulating the arms race in precisely this direction. The picture with regard to armored vehicles is similar. The NATO countries are striving to protect a whole list of versions of them—reconnaissance vehicles, vehicles carrying heavy armaments, and certain other vehicles—from reduction on the strange pretext that they are allegedly hard to count. In the case of artillery the Western side is trying to draw a veil over its huge arsenal of antitank weapons on the grounds that allegedly they are exclusively defensive in nature. All these "exceptions" reveal a desire to leave a large gap [mnogochislennaya bresh] in any future agreement. But surely the aim of the talks is to ensure that this agreement is lasting, reliable, and rules out any possibility of variant interpretations. [Grinevskiy ends]

The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference that ended the other day in Bucharest reaffirmed the allied socialist countries' resolve to do everything possible to achieve positive results at the Vienna talks as quickly as possible. The statement stressed that a constructive approach by all participants would make it possible to reach initial accords in 1990. The Warsaw Pact states consider it entirely feasible—the NATO countries also advocate this—to substantially reduce arms levels in Europe in the course of 2-3 years, eliminating all asymmetries and imbalances, of course.

B. Cleghorn: "Progress Exceeds All Expectations"

[Cleghorn] I think that an unusually large amount of progress was achieved at the Vienna talks, particularly if you bear in mind that we had very little time. We can already talk of certain areas where there is widespread agreement. The most important thing, in my view, is our agreement that any agreement on conventional armed forces should include tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and artillery—and, as a result of NATO's latest initiative, this is being extended to aircraft, helicopters, and personnel. Certain specific details of the agreement have also been stipulated: Our overall figures for ceilings on tanks and infantry combat vehicles, as well as the figures on artillery, differ little.

We have also agreed to limitations on the troops based abroad. Overall limits on the forces within each alliance located outside national territories have been agreed. We have also agreed that a ceiling should be set on the number of arms each country can have: the number of tanks, for instance. There is also a very important stipulation at the talks: Differences in figures on arms should not be an obstacle in the negotiating process.

Of course, there are issues on which agreement still has to be reached. For instance, there is the need to agree on definitions to be used for tanks, artillery, and a number of other categories of arms. We need agreed rules for calculating them, and more ceilings that are elaborated in greater detail. But these are all questions which, in my view, can be resolved without any great effort.

At the same time, there are two more substantive problems. NATO, for instance, is concerned about three Soviet military districts: the Kiev, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts. In the Warsaw Pact proposals they are considered rear districts, whereas, in our opinion, the troops of these districts could directly participate in a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

The second complexity is that the Warsaw Pact is trying to divide aircraft into so-called front-line strike aircraft and air-defense aircraft. The Warsaw Pact countries are proposing to exclude air-defense aircraft from any agreement. In my opinion, it is impossible to differentiate between these two aircraft types in practice. Even the texts covering their performance submitted by the Warsaw Pact countries are identical, even though in one case they are fighters which should be excluded from an agreement, and in the other case included. We should include all land-based warplanes in an agreement.

[Anichkin] Can you say now how near we are to agreement? NATO has stated that it could be concluded in 6-12 months, and the reductions completed in 1992 or 1993....

[Cleghorn] No, that is a misunderstanding. Some time ago the Warsaw Pact participants in the talks hinted that they were striving for the speediest conclusion of such an agreement. We replied that we shared that desire. Our intention was given further impetus by the NATO government's 30 May initiative, but the 6-12 month timetable is not binding. It is merely an expression of a desire to attempt to move quickly toward the set target.

[Anichkin] What can you say about the actual process of the talks and their atmosphere? To what extent does it promote constructive dialogue?

[Cleghorn] From the very start of the talks both sides showed a desire to negotiate seriously, avoiding polemics and what is sometimes known in the West as "playing to the gallery"—in other words, propaganda. In this sense the prospects for the talks are very good.

[Anichkin] The mandate for the Vienna talks rules out any discussion of issues linked with nuclear weapons. But it seems to me that there is a quite obvious connection between conventional arms reduction and the creation of a Europe free from nuclear weapons. Can we expect any changes in NATO's position in this area?

[Cleghorn] I can only say that the 30 May NATO declaration speaks for itself. It clearly indicates that the overall position of all the NATO allies is that nuclear forces will be needed in Europe for the foreseeable future, and this leaves them outside the framework of any possible agreement on conventional armed forces. There can be absolutely no question of tactical nuclear arms cuts in Europe until the process of cutting conventional armed forces is completed.

[Anichkin] You are one of the direct participants in the talks. The following question interests me: When you are at the negotiating table do you feel any pressure from public opinion?

[Cleghorn] I think there is enormous public interest in the United Kingdom in the talks on reducing conventional armed forces and armaments. The mass media are also devoting a great deal of attention to what we are doing in Vienna, and members of parliament are interested too. Such attention can only be welcomed—it is wholly justified, bearing in mind the importance of the problems we are tackling. I think that the negotiators are always helped by the recognition that their work is of great interest at home.

Gorbachev's Letter to Mitterrand, G-7 Cited

PM1807155289 Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Jul 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Life Destroys the Old Artificial Barriers Between Economic Systems"]

[Text] In his 14 July letter to Mr Mitterrand, "chairman of the 15th annual economic conference of the leader of the seven states," Mr Gorbachev wanted to inform its members of "some ideas on key world economic problems which influence all countries without exception." He added: "Interdependence helps to overcome the world's division. But, at the same time, it radically increases the risk of clashes between interests and the explosion of conflicts..... The balance will be unstable if an attempt is made to place it on any other foundation than that of mankind's universal interests..... The objective process by which a single world economy is formed requires moving to a qualitatively new level of multilateral economic partnership.

"We are observing with interest the efforts made by the Western world's seven leading states to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. We think that, through coordination, it is possible to make the development of the world economy more predictable..... When we talk of economic security, we mean primarily laying the foundations for stable, nonideological, and mutually beneficial joint activity and joint development.....

"Our restructuring is inseparable from the policy of achieving full participation in the world economy..... The rest of the world is bound to benefit from a market such as the USSR being opened to the world market."

Mr Gorbachev then mentioned the results obtained in the framework of bilateral agreements, of the "second basket" (economic cooperation) of the Vienna CSCE conference, and the relations established between the EEC and CEMA, before adding: "However, multilateral cooperation between East and West on global economic problems is clearly lagging behind the development of bilateral and regional links. This situation is difficult to justify if you consider the influence of our states on the world economy..... We see points of similarity and complementarity in the way in which the sides are tackling global problems, particularly the Third World debt. The aim here is not to know which initiative should be credited with having been the first. The main thing is that there is a real possibility of jointly helping to make the practical measures to solve the debt problem effective. We are in favor of strengthening collective development aid, coordinating the actions of creditors and borrowers, and expanding forms of multilateral aid.

Toward a "Universal Partnership"

"There are signs that we can achieve a consensus on the means of ensuring stable development for all states, and this presupposes the establishment of sound ecological stabilizers for the building of a single world economy which is now under way.

"Another problem which we share is that of the growing trend toward integration in the various regions of the world. We hope that this development will take place within the framework of a universal partnership. Today life itself is laboriously but gradually destroying the old artificially erected barriers between the different economic systems. Although each of those systems maintains its specific characteristics, they have borrowed a great deal from each other and use similar management tools.

"It is becoming necessary to reach agreement on a universal method of measuring and harmonizing economic processes which is acceptable to all countries. In the long term, the aim is find methods which can bring together the various mechanisms of macroeconomic coordination on a global scale.

"We are ready for serious dialogue on these questions. To begin with, we could establish professional contacts in various spheres, for instance in the form of meetings between government experts. The important thing here is to find a common economic language from the start, to carry out a mutual exchange of information, notably on the basic indicators of economic development, and the settlement of credit and aid to the Third World to achieve the compatibility of statistical data which can serve as a starting point for cooperation."

'Top Priority' on Eastern Europe, Bush Visit

LD1507144389 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 14 Jul 89

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. I am Pavel Kuznetsov presenting "Top Priority" with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov.

On Thursday [13 July] President Bush concluded his visits to Poland and Hungary. I understand that it is not unusual when American Presidents travel abroad, but in this particular case, this particular trip, stands apart from all others, by George Bush, and not because this time it featured two socialist nations, but because, I think, Poland and Hungary are in transition from old style or orthodox socialism to a qualitativeiy new political structure which in the western eye is closer in their understanding, to their concept of democracy, than anything else. Well, suffice it to recall the existence of legal, political opposition, very visible and strong elements of a market economy, for instance a growing private sector, so what are in your view the results of this trip, its significance, what was the message if there was any message on the part of George Bush that he sent to Poland and Hungary, and perhaps to Eastern Europe at large? Who would like to begin? Dr Bogdanov:

[Bogdanov] Yes, Pavel, but I, I am a little bit puzzled. What do you mean by your questions? Why we should give an assessment to the American President's trip to

Eastern Europe? Why we should at all think over that? Wouldn't it be better if the Americans themselves they make their own assessment and they will signal to their own public opinion what it's all about?

[Kuznetsov] I think that the American public is informed about the trip of President Bush but since this program goes on the air not only to the United States but worldwide. [sentence as heard] So I think that our listeners abroad are interested in our own assessment of what has taken place, and it was a remarkable event in many ways.

[Bogdanov] Yes, I agree with you, it was a remarkable event and very interesting event, and very unconventional event.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, that's what I meant.

[Bogdanov] But I am little bit puzzled. Should I or should I not to give my assessment of that? Because this is the time of independent views. This is the time of independent actions. This is the time of pluralism.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, let's look into this....

[Bogdanov] This is the time [words indistinct]....

[Kuznetsov] That's what I invited you for....

[Bogdanov] Yes, now. If you are interested in my personal assessment and opinion, my first point is: that was a very unusual meeting. Maybe for the first time for so many decades both sides were not excited in the negative sense of that word about the American President's visit to [words indistinct], to Western, Eastern countries. They are, they were quiet, and why they were quiet? My answer is that we are more and more becoming responsible. We are becoming more and more understandable that we should not use each other's difficulties for the [word indistinct] benefits of one moment. We are becoming more and more, if you like, cooperative. Even cooperating without any formal cooperation. That's what I mean. If you judge by Bush's statements in Poland and in Budapest, in Hungary, you will see, and I'm not afraid of using that word, quite a responsible behaviour of American President.

[Kuznetsov] In the fact that he didn't try to incite anybody....

[Bogdanov] No, no, no. He didn't...let me....

[Kuznetsov] He didn't try to destabilize [words indistinct]. Rather he tried to bring more stability, according to him....

[Bogdanov] No, no, let me, let me remind you one very, very important point, which is in every important speech President Bush emphasized: I support your reforms and your leadership. Did you notice that? He was not separating the present leadership....

[Kuznetsov] That's a good point.

[Bogdanov] Yeah, this is a very important point. It was not (?separated)....

[Kuznetsov] Sergey, if we look at the message, and there was obviously a message he sent, what was it in your view? In my view, if you are interested, I think it was a firm but careful endorsement of those political reforms. There was a message that if you stay on the path of reforms you'll get more. So there was some political linkage. But basically would you agree with this assessment, or....

[Plekhanov] Yes, I think it's important that George Bush endorsed reforms in Poland and Hungary. Those two countries are undergoing profound transition from the obsolete model of socialism, bureaucratic socialism, to something new, much more dynamic, much more progressive, and it's amazing that both the Soviet Union and the United States right now at this moment of history are virtually, in the most general new, much more dynamic, much more progressive, and its's amazing that both the Soviet Union and the United States right now at this moment of history are virtually, in the most general sense, on the same side of the barricade, so to say, because both sides welcome this process, want it to succeed. Now, of course, when you look at the small print, when you look at the detail, you will see that the way the Americans view the reform processes in those countries differs from the way we view it from Moscow and, of course, that is reflected in the kinds of economic measures that George Bush was talking about, both in Poland and Hungary. He emphasized that they would like to contribute to the development of private enterprise—why not cooperative enterprise, why not independent state enterprise. I mean, why tie to a specific branch of the economy. But I mean it's American money and they are free to do, to give that money....

[Kuznetsov] I understand some of the Poles were disappointed with this modest aid package. I understand Solidarity leader Mr Walesa was asking for $10 billion.

[Plekhanov] It was not just Walesa. Solidarity for, for....

[Kuznetsov] But Mr Bush said that Poles should take the future of their nation to their own hands, I mean....

[Plekhanov] That's right, and I think it's healthy. I think its healthy, I think solidarity was unrealistic in expecting that George Bush would come like, you know, the kind and rich American Santa Claus, American uncle, the

proverbial American uncle, you know who lavishes American dollars, with the horn of abundance, and things like that. And that is a lesson for the Poles and it's also healthy because....

[Kuznetsov] Not only for the Poles, it's a lesson for other nations as well.

[Plekhanov] right, but I think in Poland there is a mythology about America. And I think that now the Poles are beginning to develop more realistic a picture of what Americans are all about and what the Russians are all about. I think we're witnessing a changing of the images and it's good. I think the best thing about this visit is that Poland and Hungary are emerging not just as members of somebody's bloc, but are emerging as independent powers in their own right. In the middle of Europe, very important nations which are free to deal with East and West on the terms that....

[Kuznetsov] Dr Bogdanov:

[Bogdanov] (?Still), I believe, I believe, they are independent, they are independent, they are very important countries, but we should not ever forget still at least at that stage that they belong to a different political system. That is another very important dimension. And just one comment before you put your question: when we say, you and I, Pavel, that he supported, he endorsed, we support, we endorse, does it mean that if we don't do that the reforms will not go ahead?

[Kuznetsov] [words indistinct] That's a very good question.

[Bogdanov] We should make it absolutely clear, this is an objective process and even without our endorsement or without our support they will go ahead. This is very important. I'm sorry, Pavel....

[Kuznetsov] That's okay. [words indistinct]

[Plekhanov] On the question of independence-...[Bogdanov interrupts indistinctly] No, no, let me finish. On the question of independence: can a country be independent and a member of an alliance? I think it can. And I think the importance of this, of these recent events is that these countries, while remaining in the alliance, are recognised as countries which have fates of their own. Because in the past it used to be viewed differently. Even if you are in the alliance with the Soviet Union that means you're not free.

[Kuznetsov] Gentlemen, in connection with the president's visit some Soviet officials were quoted as saying that there is some convergence, some bridging of U.S.-Soviet positions on Eastern Europe. Could you help me clarify this? Of course, if you support this point of view, what does this mean? Does it mean that Eastern Europe should play a greater role in shaping up that concept of a common European home, or does it mean that the Soviet Union and the United States should step aside a little bit, should stop looming large over their allies East and West and thus consequently allow them to establish direct ties and thus perhaps develop closer bilateral ties [words indistinct]....

[Bogdanov] I believe this is irrelevant now. What is relevant now is the problem of stability in Europe and if you look from that angle to what is happening in Eastern Europe you will see this is not the problem of convergence of the American and Soviet interests. This is the problem of common interests, if your like. And my question to you: if there is not formally endorsed Soviet-American common interest, that the transitional period of changes in Eastern Europe is going smoothly without any, any....

[Kuznetsov] Yes, this was...this is precisely what I mean....

[Bogdanov] This is [words indistinct]

[Kuznetsov] ...The convergence of Soviet and American interests, but in an area where more independence for European nations, East or West, is beneficial to both sides.

[Bogdanov] Yeah, that kind of convergence is there not formally endorsed....

[Kuznetsov] No [words indistinct]

[Bogdanov] Not formally discussed, but [words indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] I was not, I was not alluding to any superpower [words indistinct]....

[Bogdanov] No, no, no. I mean...I mean this is the very interesting case when you have all that in the [words indistinct]. This is the kind of a common interest. By the way, this is the common interest of eastern Europeans themselves. This is [words indistinct] common interests.

[Kuznetsov] This country is on the way out. We are withdrawing in a broad sense of the word, I understand that any comparison with Afghanistan would be exotic and perhaps even outlandish, but as far as Eastern Europe is concerned, we are on the way out. This time politically. Of course we, for instance, unilateral withdrawal of some Soviet troops underway now, but basically it is a political withdrawal. And the freedom of political choice which we undertook to respect while Mr Gorbachev was in France means that, in my view, that we seek to create a different socialist community in Eastern Europe. The one that would be based on equal partnership rather than on fear, domination, on servience. Is this true? If you believe that this is true, what would be the rallying point for a new partnership, a new community in Eastern Europe?

[Plekhanov] I think the basis, the primary basis, should be economic. I think that with reform proceeding in various socialist countries and hopefully going further

we would be able to redefine the terms of economic partnership. I think there is a lot of natural interaction involved in just the fact of geographical location, traditional economic ties which go back centuries in some cases. So I think that the economic base is very important. Then, there is another, and perhaps to some extent even more important thing: demilitarization of Europe. Eastern Europe is interested, each country is objectively interested, whether they realize it enough or not, in reducing the danger of military confrontation in Europe, reducing the burden of military spending, and other things, to free funds for domestic development and to provide for a more secure, peaceful life. So, that is another common interest.

[Kuznetsov] Yes.

[Plekhanov] That is something you can do only jointly.

[Kuznetsov] In front of me I have an interview with a high-level Soviet Communist Party official, Valentin Falin, and it was published in the national newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The interview deals with the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty heads of state. Responding to a question about whether there was consensus reached in Bucharest on the issues discussed Mr Falin said the following, and this is my own translation: There were shades of opinion, and even more than shades of opinion expressed. There were different views concerning both international relations and internal developments in certain nations. But I think that this is a positive feature. We must replace pseudo-unity with genuine unity. If we are friends we should tell each other only the truth. Now this is a rather vague....

[Plekhanov] And cryptic....

[Kuznetsov] And cryptic. But if we can read between the lines, and we still do read between the lines sometimes despite glasnost—Eastern Europe is a very sensitive area—what is the conclusion? Were there sharp differences, disagreements?

[Bogdanov] Your questions sounds very strange to me, I'm sorry. If you are a little bit informed about Romanian-Hungarian relations, how tense they are, and how they are, I'm sorry to say, hostile to each other, your question is becoming little bit, you know, you are just testing us or what? You don't....

[Kuznetsov] [words indistinct] No, I would, I just wanted to, wanted to see Romania and Hungary in that interview. I didn't see it. That is why I am asking this question, I'm putting this question to you. And, obviously the socialist community is split into conservative forces, conservative nations, and progressive, radical nations, and we have to face this reality. Is this true?

[Bogdanov] Right, right, this is, well, I would hate to answer this question. How it is serious. I would rather prefer to state the facts. This is the objective reality: conservatives, you called them progressive, I call them pragmatic, realistic, and this is, this is, that's it, you know that is the reality.

[Kuznetsov] Okay. As time is running out on us. This final question: There was a party shake-up in Leningrad where President Gorbachev, not only President, General Secretary Gorbachev, presided over the dismissal of Yuriy Solovyev, Leningrad's party leader and a non-voting member of the Politburo, who failed during the March elections to get elected despite the fact that he ran unopposed. We also know that these days Mikhail Gorbachev, other leaders, admit to there being a crisis within the party. Many local party organisations demand that there be an extraordinary meeting, a national meeting of the party to rethink its role in society and perhaps find a new place for it in this time of changes. What is your assessment of the situation and do you have any predictions or forecasts as to how the situation is going, is likely to develop in the near future?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think the replacement of Solovyev by another official, and it's interesting that Solovyev ran unopposed and lost. Gidaspov, the new secretary, newly elected, ran with 19 other candidates [words indistinct], and there were 20 in the field, and won. Now in choosing between the two who would any reasonable person choose as a political leader?

[Kuznetsov] Of course, that shows how different our Communist Party is. What kind of [words indistinct]

[Plekhanov] Yes, yes, and I think that these two figures symbolize the two elements in the party, and the two stages in the life of the party. Because in the past decades the party was, its main function was helping run this bureaucratic, administrative system. Now the function of the party, the main task of the party is to help perestroyka. Help this revolution, lead this revolution. And there are forces in the party which are already doing that. But too many party officials have not yet fit themselves into this new role. And this is, this change at the head of the Leningrad party organization, which is very influential, is a big step forward in transforming the party into a real vanguard of revolution.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you, gentlemen. Our time is up. I would like our listeners to tune in again to "Top Priority" next week at the same time and on the same wavelength. Thank you Dr Bogdanov, and you Dr Plekhanov for taking part in the show. I am your host Pavel Kuznetsov signing off. Goodbye.

EC Talks on Fisheries Cooperation Open

LD1807210189 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—Prospects of concluding an agreement between the European Communities and

the USSR on cooperation in fisheries are being discussed at the talks started at the Moscow headquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance today.

The EC delegation comprises representatives of Great Britain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany and France.

The talks will last three days.

Silayev Receives UNESCO Director-General

LD1807225389 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Silayev received today UNESCO Director-general Federico Mayor, in the USSR on an official visit.

They discussed issues related to the Soviet Union's participation in the work of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural organisation.

The Soviet official highly praised the UNESCO director-general's personal contribution to consolidating the efforts of leading world intellectuals to resolve global problems facing mankind.

The two sides stressed the importance of continued development of extensive cooperation within the UNESCO framework.

Special attention was given to prospects of expanding and broadening this cooperation in Europe with a view to implementing the idea of establishing a "common European home."

Aeroflot Asks To Join International Group

LD1807154389 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Geneva July 18 TASS—Aeroflot has officially requested membership of the International Air Transport Association [IATA]. Relevant documents were handed over in a ceremony that was held at the IATA's Geneva Headquarters today.

The Soviet side expressed the hope that this step would be of mutual benefit and promote stronger international cooperation in air transportation.

Reforms in Soviet Foreign Aid Suggested

18070328 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 27, 8-14 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by B. Sergeyev, candidate of economic sciences: "Help, But Within One's Means"]

[Text] **The idea that it is necessary to use part of the resources sent as aid to other countries for the resolution of our own urgent tasks was heard repeatedly in speeches made by people's deputies at the congress. What is the amount of these resources, where do they go, and how are they used?**

O. Kiryan, Serpukhov

The question about financial and material support for restructuring is now becoming a fundamental one. Many economists and managers give foreign economic relations a special role in its resolution. Under conditions where not only imported commodities but many domestic commodities as well have disappeared from store shelves, the most attention is being given to the import purchases of commodities that are received from abroad on credit. Another side of foreign economic activity—aid and foreign credits—is still outside the bounds of glasnost, as the congress showed, even for its deputies.

Is the Hand of the Giver Getting Impoverished?

Data on the scale of aid given by the Soviet Union to the developing countries is very scanty. Their sources are usually foreign journals or the speeches of Soviet delegations at international conferences. Thus, according to data cited at one of these conferences, economic aid given by the Soviet Union to the developing countries at the beginning of the 1980's was estimated to be 1.3 percent of the gross social product, which exceeds by 5.6 times the share of the gross national product (GNP) appropriated for these purposes by the United States; 2.3 times that appropriated by Great Britain, and 2.8 times that appropriated by the FRG. In 1986 this index for the USSR reached 1.7 percent of GNP. Export credits granted by the USSR to countries of the "Third World" for the payment of imports from the Soviet Union, according to data published by the English journal THE ECONOMIST, constitute about $60 billion, which, according to the same data, is more than double the sum of our indebtedness to Western banks.

A majority of the recipients of Soviet credits are experiencing serious economic difficulties. As a result, their debt obligations are quoted on the market at 30 to 50 percent of their nominal cost, and frequently even significantly lower. For this and other reasons, one cannot especially hope for a repayment of the debts. A significant part of the payments will have to be either postponed periodically or totally written off.

This kind of competition with the West over the scale of foreign aid could not help but evoke questions from a number of deputies at the congress, because in per capita consumption we rank between 50th and 60th in the world, bypassed not only by developed countries but also by many developing countries.

The index of the financial condition of the country—the state budget deficit—constitutes 11 to 14 percent of GNP, according to various estimates. For comparison, we note that the deficit of the U.S. state budget, which in the opinion of the American press is the most burdensome legacy of "Reaganomics," is equal to 3 percent of GNP. Thus, every ruble that is granted in aid is dearer for us. Meanwhile, whereas the higher organs of state authority in the United States and other developed

countries approve not only the aggregate volume of budget appropriations for these purposes but also sums for specific recipients and purposes, we still lack this kind of discussion and analysis.

When Aid Goes Into Sand

It should also be taken into account that, in contrast to us, the West transfers to the developing countries surpluses of industrial and agricultural products and financial resources that they cannot find an application or a market for at home. This makes it possible for the developed capitalist countries to operate at full production capacity and to increase employment—that is, to resolve their own social and economic problems.

USSR aid to the developing countries should, it seems, correspond to the ability of our country to grant it, and of the receiving countries to be able to apply it and to be highly efficient in doing so. All of these requirements, and also the progress of economic reforms in the USSR, demand a fundamental change in the mechanism of granting aid. A favorable element is put in the prices for commodities and services, credit rates and terms, subsequent write-off, etc. All of this is presented frequently as "fair" conditions of trade and cooperation.

Under the conditions of the new economic reform, which grants enterprises economic self-dependence and the opportunity to enter the foreign market directly, the existence of the former mechanism will prove to be simply impossible, because no enterprise will export at a loss. There will be a requirement for the creation of special state funds for the subsidy of deliveries within the framework of aid. Thus, whether we want it or not, a division of aid and commercial activity will occur.

This Is What Cooperation Is

For the time being, the amalgamation of these two concepts leads to paradoxical results. At currently existing prices, the cost of a ton of cement delivered from the USSR to the SRV turns out to be lower than the cost of one ton of sand obtained in that country. Naturally, given such "fair" prices, it is not economically expedient to produce cement in Vietnam, especially because it is supplied, as a rule, for credit, which will be repaid only after 20-30 years, if it is repaid at all. A housing construction combine built in Xuan Mai [as transliterated] (SRV) cannot operate because the model house was selected without taking the needs of the population into account, there are no resources for laying utility lines, and even the utility lines themselves have to be bought abroad. As a result, 12 percent of the house-building capacity is utilized.

Of course, one should not think that such examples characterize the entire spectrum of cooperation. However, under today's conditions such cases are intolerable. What also should become intolerable is the practice where, because of a departmental approach, the flow of industrial aid exceeds the capability of the recipient country to assimilate it, which was graphically demonstrated in the SRV.

It remains only to add that the formula for aid, apart from the aforementioned two constituents, the giver and the taker, also includes a third. This is the world community, and those countries that, by way of comparison, select their own path of socioeconomic development.

Where Is the Way Out?

In forming a new mechanism of cooperation with developing countries, it is not necessary to "reinvent the wheel." A generally accepted international practice by now been established. In our country it could take the following form:

—aid programs, their purposes, and the specific recipients should be examined and approved by the Supreme Soviet, taking into account capabilities, necessity, and specific results;

—appropriations for programs must be reflected in individual articles of the published state budget and also approved by higher organs of state authority;

—it is necessary to abandon hidden forms of subsidization in foreign economic relations and to differentiate strictly between aid and commercial activity;

—aid programs must be comprehensive and must perform specific tasks to satisfy vital needs of those countries participating in cooperation;

—it is necessary to combine bilateral aid with feasible participation in international programs, including those within the framework of the United Nations and other financial and economic organizations that have already proved to be profitable and highly effective in the projects they have implemented;

—involve developed and developing countries in projects that would reflect current economic and political trends in the world.

Such an approach to the problems of aid, it seems, would remove many of the problems of mutual cooperation.

United States & Canada

U.S. Generals Seen 'Saber-Rattling' in Panama

PM1907083589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jul 89 Second Edition p 5

[V. Korionov "Rejoinder": "Getting Edgy..."]

[Text] It is less than a month since General Mark Cisneros took up his key post in the U.S. Southern Command. But even during that short time the situation in the region has substantially deteriorated. I would remind you that the American troops in the Panama Canal Zone come primarily under the jurisdiction of the Southern Command.

Recently Gen Cisneros received a group of foreign journalists at his headquarters, located just 20 km from the center of the Panamanian capital, and openly announced: "I am increasingly thinking that military methods must be employed to solve the problem." The general went on vehemently to proclaim: "Nothing would be more to our soldiers' liking than the opportunity to fight..." Whom? The Panamanian National Defense Forces, of course. The Pentagon representative went so far as to describe Panama's defense forces as a "gang" and their officers as "nazis" and "criminals." Moreover, Cisneros charged the OAS was lacking "firmness."

At the same time, another American general, Frederik Woerner [name as transliterated], stated for his part that he does not rule out the possibility of direct armed intervention in Panama by American troops, describing such action as the only route to..."freedom and democracy" in Panama. The matter, however, is not limited to statements. Some days ago units of the Southern Command carried out military maneuvers in the area of the population center of Gamboa and the country's largest water-treatment works in Chilibre. As the Panamanian government states, the White House has classified the question of the Canal as an extremely acute political problem and has been sharply intensifying pressure on Panama as of late.

Then why are the Pentagon generals getting so anxious to act? It seems that there are two reasons. First, the date when Panama is supposed to establish its own jurisdiction over the canal under the Torrijos-Carter treaty is drawing closer. Moreover, under Article Three of that treaty a Panamanian citizen is to become administrator of the Canal as of 1 January 1990, replacing the U.S. representative in that post. Second, intensive discussion on the question of settling the internal political situation and overcoming the nationwide crisis is gathering pace in Panama—which reduces the scope for subversive activity by Washington circles and their "clients" in the country. The American generals would like to halt these processes by their saber-rattling.

Panama Protests U.S. Military Action

LD1307193089 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Text] New York July 13 TASS—Panama has called the attention of the U.N. Security Council to another U.S. military action aimed at undermining its sovereignty and territorial integrity—the invasion of the populated locality of Fuerte Amador by U.S. Army units supported by tanks and armoured vehicles on July 8.

A letter of Leonardo Cama, permanent representative of Panama at the U.N., to the U.N. Security Council chairman which was circulated at the U.N. Headquarters today says that this action is part of Washington's policy of provocations and military intimidation, the violation of the spirit and letter of the Panama Canal Treaty, and undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic.

"My country has serious grounds to fear for its safety, and we should like to warn that the latest U.S. military actions are evidence of the escalation of the U.S. government's plans for military intervention in Panama," the Panamanian diplomat said.

The incessant U.S. provocations, its provocative policy from the position of strength and the ignoring of international law standards pose a serious threat to world peace and security, the letter pointed out. In this connection the Panamanian Government requested the chairman of the Security Council to urge the United States to correct the erroneous course of its aggressive policy against Panama, to give up persistent attempts to whip up tension in relations between the two countries and to change its attitude to Panama, bringing it into line with commitments assumed by the U.S. when it had signed and ratified the U.N. Charter.

U.S. Latin America Policies Hit

PM1307115189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[Gennadiy Zafesov "View from Moscow": "Distance Increasing: United States-Latin America: Contradictions Growing"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It is my belief that the United States did not and does not intend to change the essence of its policy toward its Latin American neighbors. It is not a question of polite verbal gestures, of course. The United States flatly refuses to let go of the levers with which it intends to continue controlling the entire situation in the Western hemisphere from Washington. One of the most powerful means of "influence" was and still is that of economic diktat, with its roots in the distant past and bearing a poisonous fruit which Latin America is forced to eat today. Latin America's foreign debt (mainly to the United States) amounts to almost one-half of its gross domestic product. While paying back now one-third, now one-half of their foreign

currency earnings, the Latin American countries cannot even ease the noose of their debt. The international banks extract from Latin America more than $40 billion a year in interest payments alone.

What about the United States? Does it intend to loosen the economic lasso around Latin America's neck? Outwardly, yes. First it puts forward the "Baker plan," then the "Brady plan," but they both suffer from the same "shortcoming." They address only an insignificant reduction of the debt. They are like giving a seriously ill patient an oxygen bag instead of an effective remedy. Is there one? There is. At the UN General Assembly M.S. Gorbachev noted that the developing countries' accumulated debt "cannot be paid back or recovered on the original terms." The Soviet Union has expressed a readiness to set a long moratorium (up to 100 years) on the repayment of the debt of the least developed countries and in a whole series of cases to write the debt off entirely. That is in principle, as it were, and a whole series of concrete proposals have been put forward in development of it. Judging by the reaction in Latin America the Soviet initiatives were popular there and were given a positive reception. Of course, any idea needs time for consideration and implementation. But let us note anyway that an essential element of the new thinking is the ability to assess a situation realistically. In my view the situation now is such that the questions of Third World debt in general and of Latin America's debt in particular demand an accelerated solution so long as, of course, you proceed from the interests of the world community as a whole and the improvement of the international climate. I would like to believe that the U.S. administration will operate on those principles.

Unfortunately, recent events do not give particular cause for optimism. Primarily because in defending the broadest range of its own egoistic interests the United States is resorting to means which are clearly discredited. That is seen quite clearly, for instance, with regard to Nicaragua. Of course, the United States may like or dislike the Sandinist revolution. But why go all out to try to impose on a sovereign state the political system which suits Washington?

The contras by themselves do not represent a military or political force, but the United States has been using every means to galvanize the counterrevolution and is spending U.S. taxpayers' money on that. Now that a fragile and unstable peace has begun in Nicaragua and that the Central American countries' leadership is trying to resolve all its problems by political means, the United States is again adding fuel to the fire of an acute conflict. Quite recently the opposition was made legitimate in Nicaragua and equipped with mass media access. The country is preparing for elections. What reason is there than to interfere in these purely Nicaraguan internal affairs? But clearly Washington cannot renounce its imperial ambitions and is again using unseemly methods: Recently the public learned that the CIA has created a special fund for supporting the opposition. The secret plan has become public knowledge.

Furthermore, Washington sometimes gets so carried away that it tries to resolve its misunderstandings with its southern neighbors in the manner of a dispute between two cowboys in a Wild West saloon: As soon as something displeases it, it goes for its gun. An example? U.S.-Panamanian relations.

For decades the Panamanians struggled for their sovereign right to own the canal and be masters of their own territory. At last they achieved the signing of U.S.-Panamanian treaties, which envisage that by the year 2000 the Panama Canal will be placed entirely under Panamanian jurisdiction. They also envisage the possibility of the removal of the U.S. military bases on Panamanian territory. Washington disliked this so much that it could think of nothing better than threatening a military invasion of that tiny country with a population of little more than 2 million people.

Our country is committed to other principles. The Soviet Union does not seek any political or military strategic advantages for itself in the Western hemisphere. We proceed from the premise that that continent must not be an arena of East-West confrontation. Let us note that the USSR does not have and has no intention of having any naval, air, or missile bases in Latin America or of deploying nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction there. We advocate the strengthening of Latin America's non-nuclear status and we form our trade and economic relations with the Latin American countries on the basis of mutual benefit and justice. The Soviet Union also urges other states to help to transform Latin America into a zone of reliable and secure peace and cooperation.

It has long been well known that one little match can start a fire all out of proportion to the means needed to extinguish the flames. Circumspection in politics is one of the prime virtues. And it is very dangerous when people prefer threats and diktat instead. I say frankly that such an approach to the solution of complex situations causes unquestionable damage first and foremost to the one who prefers the language of force. It is inappropriate for dialogue, notably with those countries which are militarily and economically inferior to the great powers.

Commentary on Development of B-2 Bomber

LD1407124689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 14 Jul 89

[Commentary by Gennadiy Vedenyapin; first paragraph is introduction]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A stormy discussion is under way in the U.S. Congress on the Pentagon's program for the development and introduction into service of the latest B-2 bomber. Materials are used in the production of this aircraft which, it is claimed, make it invisible to enemy radar. The B-2 is due to carry out its maiden flight no later than 25 July in order to attempt to convince the

U.S. public of the expediency of this program, on which almost $23 billion has already been spent. Here is a Mayak commentary; Gennadiy Vedenyapin is at the microphone:

[Vedenyapin] The course of the debates in Congress about the B-2 confirms the recent prognosis of the NBC television network which claimed: There is a question mark hanging over the program of the development of the latest bomber. This is not, however, altogether unexpected, for if in the past the appearance of the B-2 was considered to be a major achievement of the U.S. military industry, then now, the aircraft, which they are having great difficulties trying to put into production, cannot be called anything else but a museum piece. And all this is caused by the fact that the so-called invisible aircraft has already become the most costly military aircraft in history. It was originally thought it would cost about $500 million. The cost gradually increased and the latest forecast of the authoritative DEFENSE NEWS newspaper says that each such combat aircraft will cost $700 million at the moment of its introduction into service. But it turns out that this is not the limit either. Taking into consideration inflation and a number of other causes, considers Democrat Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee, the sum of $1 billion could be a more realistic cost of one such aircraft.

In all, the U.S. Air Force plans to acquire 132 of these aircraft. The entire strategic air fleet is targeted—as you may have guessed—at a potential enemy. And so, not having yet begun to fly, the B-2, which has already cost a round sum, has taken even inveterate U.S. Congressmen aback. The fantastic cost of the aircraft has turned out to be unacceptable even for those who were earlier strving for endorsement of President Reagan's costly military programs. It is becoming clear to an ever-growing number of U.S. legislators that the Pentagon is planning to purchase in the new military budget more weapons than is permitted by the state of the country's economy. The example of the B-2 bomber demonstrates precisely the excessive appetite of the military department, which is out of proportion with the real state of affairs in the U.S. economy. [passage omitted]

The hearings in Congress have not ended yet. But a number of prominent legislators have already expressed their disagreement with the Pentagon's proposals. At the same time many of them are embarrassed not only by the fact that the B-2 Stealth program could become a technological and financial fiasco of the Pentagon due to its imperfections. There is also another aspect of this matter: the new invisible aircraft—which will nevertheless turn up in the U.S. Air Force armaments, will not fail to violate the process of achieving strategic stability in the world. The appearance of the so-called invisible aircraft is most likely to have a negative influence on the achievement of agreement in the sphere of reducing strategic offensive weapons between our countries. It is therefore perfectly obvious that the horizons of the new political thinking in international affairs should be free of new types of weapons.

Nuclear Society Receives U.S. Counterpart

PM1707142689 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[P. Kiselev report: "Discussion of the Atom"]

[Text] As already reported, the USSR Nuclear Society was formed in April of this year, and the founding conference elected Academician Ye.P. Velikhov president. On that day the head of the new social organization, speaking about the tasks and aims of the USSR Nuclear Society, particularly noted the need to extend international working contacts and improve information to the population on problems of nuclear science and technology.

The USSR Nuclear Society is now receiving its first guests—a delegation from the American Nuclear Society headed by its president, Walter Lovenshteyn [as transliterated]. The program for the visit is extremely intensive. The American specialists are to visit Obninsk, Leningrad, Chernobyl, Kiev, and Zaporozhye, and scientific debates and public meetings are planned.

The first such meeting took place the other day in the open discussion club at the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute.

Many of the speakers noted that the atmosphere of distrust that has grown up today around the nuclear power industry in the USSR is the consequence of years of unnecessary security. The public is no longer satisfied with the role of observer on the sidelines. The population seeks to establish social control over all sectors of the national economy, particularly technologies that have a negative effect on the ecology.

Unfortunately nuclear power is one such sector, although, the American specialists noted, given the normal functioning of all the components of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power is the most clean ecologically.

Concluding the meeting, Academician N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy said:

"The history of the American Nuclear Society goes back 35 years, and naturally in that time its members have accumulated rich experiences of collaborating with the public on questions of the social acceptability of nuclear power. Since one of the most important tasks facing the USSR Nuclear Society is to reorient public opinion on nuclear power in the direction of greater objectivity, we can learn from our American colleagues."

Norman Podhoretz on 'Death of Communism'

18070701 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with Norman Podhoretz, U.S. political scientist, by A. Vasilyev: "Anticommunist by Profession"]

[Text] **In any case this is how we defined the convictions of this political scientist quite recently. Let us listen to him today.**

There are people who think that communism is dead. Unfortunately, it is still living in some places: Southeast Asia, Ethiopia... It is still reducing millions of people to poverty and killing them by the thousands. But I am happy that it has apparently already died in Europe. Both as an idea and as a system.

Before me is an eminent ideologist for the conservative movement in the United States, Norman Podhoretz. The same Podhoretz who actively criticized R. Reagan's foreign policy (Grenada, the Near East, Nicaragua), demanding of the President "more consistent" anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, right down to rejecting any negotiations with the Soviet Union. The same N. Podhoretz whose name stands beside the names of Senator Jesse Helms, former U.S. representative at the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick, sovietologist Richard Pipes, and others whom we could only call "unbridled."

We are sitting and talking in the building of the Kinotsentr Association in Krasnaya Presna where N. Podhoretz and his conservative advisers have come to participate in a seminar entitled "Understanding the Values of Western Civilization."

[Vasilyev] How did you become a conservative?

[Podhoretz] It is hard to believe, but I began my political career with active participation in the radical left movement almost 30 years ago. True, I did not speak at meetings and did not participate in demonstrations, nor did I fight with the police. My weapons were the ideas I presented in my articles.

At that time we thought the left-wing radicals were capable of improving American society and making it freer. We did not work for revolution or disarmament. We thought American society was basically healthy.

But as the radical movement spread throughout the colleges and universities, it increasingly departed from these ideals. Many of its participants came under the influence of various versions of Marxism, Leninism, anarchism, and the ideas of Herbert Marcuse. All these tendencies were unified into one thing: a denial of the bourgeois freedoms which were previously so dear to me and to those who thought as I did. But the radicals were hostile to everything American and compared America to Nazi Germany. I did not like any of this and I began to wonder why these people were saying such terrible things and what they based their views on. These reflections became my second discovery of America. I began to respect our system and our values even more. I understood that these values were worth defending. So I became a confirmed anticommunist.

[Vasilyev] How American conservatives understand freedom and democracy was discussed in a lecture by N. Podhoretz' wife, the executive director of the Committee for a Free World, Midge Decter. Here are just a few of her statements:

"When I was young I believed in vulgar materialism; I believed that Stalin, Beria, and Zhdanov could change human nature, that they could create a new type—the 'homo soveticus.' Pasternak's 'Dr Zhivago' and Solzhenitsyn's 'Gulag Archipelago' proved that this was impossible."

"The source of freedom is religion, the recognition of the equality of all people before God, an understanding that He values each person."

"Real democracy protects the minority from the power of the majority with the help of the law. It is built on three principles: 1) the products of man's labor cannot be taken away from him; 2) he must not be oppressed by the power of the majority; 3) he must be guaranteed freedom to speak, to assemble, and to pray."

Mr Podhoretz, how many years have you been married? Is your marriage based on love or ideology?

[Podhoretz] We have been married for 33 years. Of course, we were married out of love. We met when I was 16 years old and after that life sent us in different directions. Midge married someone else, but I did not. Finally she was divorced and we were married. Midge has two daughters from her first marriage and each of them has three children. She and I also have two children. Of course, we are ideologically close as well. During all these years we have done a lot of talking. In general I think it is difficult to keep a marriage together for so long if the people disagree on certain fundamental issues. It is possible and I have seen people who have done it, but I do not understand them.

[Vasilyev] What, in your view, is the difference between conservatives and liberals? Many people think that conservatives are for the rich and liberals are for the poor.

[Podhoretz] That is not true. That is all liberal propaganda. They think that the problem of poverty should be resolved through state regulation. But we are in favor of having the state intervene as little as possible in the economy and the life of the society. A strengthening of government power and its monopoly in any area are a threat to freedom. The more developed market relations are the richer the country will be and the more jobs there will be; the country's prosperity will extend to a greater number of people. Therefore we do not like it when in

your country the "nomenklatura," the defenders of Stalin's legacy, are called conservatives; that is, the same name used for us anticommunists. I would call them the old guard or reactionaries.

How everything has shifted! So would our current economists, the proponents of the market in America, be called conservatives?

In general we must recognize that we know little about conservative America. Having justly reproached the conservatives as anticommunists and anti-Soviets (but for them this reproach was the best praise and recognition of their merit), it is as though we had hung a plaque on the gate with the inscription "Beware of the Dog." But we do not see what is behind that gate—we are afraid to look.

And yet interesting things are happening there. The "unbridled," while calling for respect for the fundamental social institutions—family, religion, and the community—are waging a daily and uncompromising struggle against pornography, drug addiction, and alcoholism. And the readership of PLAYBOY magazine is decreasing significantly...

Hard work, thrift, rejection of immediate pleasures for the sake of future reward which cannot always be expected to come in this world—these comprise another postulate of conservative thinking. And only through hard work have the conservatives been able to change America's image and make it believe once again that such concepts as God, patriotism, moral values, and traditional virtues are not just empty words.

And another thing. I read the following in a booklet: "The conservative is more passive in political and social issues because he prefers the evil he knows to the one he does not know but can easily imagine. He has no confidence that changes will be for the better." To some extent these lines help us understand why the Bush administration is not reaching rapprochement with the Soviet Union as quickly as we would like.

[Vasilyev] But still Mr Podhoretz, why do you hate the Soviet Union so much?

[Podhoretz] I hate your ideology. Communism is worse than Nazism because Nazism does not poison one's consciousness. It kills people and that is all. But communism both kills and poisons the consciousness of millions of people throughout the world. Having become a great military power, the Soviet Union used its tanks to bring communist ideology to other countries.

At the very beginning of the Vietnam War I actively participated in the antiwar movement, but when I began to revise my views I understood that the antiwar movement was worse than the war itself. Radicals speaking out against the war defended the Vietnamese Communists, but I thought that support for the Viet Cong was a betrayal of our ideals.

The Vietnam War showed that the United States has no aggressive intentions, that our only goal is to halt the spread of communism. The tragedy is that in Vietnam American military power was discredited in the eyes of many Americans. We began to cut the military budget and disarm unilaterally. This was all the liberals with their detente! Thank God things changed under Reagan! America had to restore its military power in order to prevent the spread of communism.

[Vasilyev] No, of course, it would have been possible to be offended and get up and leave. Or to give a rebuttal using the words of G. Orwell, "an ideologically strong quacker [rechekryak]." But it would be useless to argue with N. Podhoretz. But if one does not listen to him one will never understand what is happening in the United States today.

There is no doubt that N. Podhoretz and those who think as he does do not represent all of America. He himself told me that he is bothered by the "shortsightedness" of the American society, which has been "taken in by the clever tricks" of Gorbachev and is demanding that the White House take more decisive steps to meet the Kremlin halfway. But one must not forget that there are conservatives in the White House at the present time—of different colors and hues, of course, but still conservatives. And this means that we must not deceive ourselves, that now it is very important to maintain a sober view of the character of the relations between our countries and the prospects for their development.

China

PRC Delegation Leaves Leningrad for Novosibirsk

LD1807163889 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Leningrad July 18 TASS—A government delegation from the People's Republic of China, led by Song Jian, member of the State Council and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, visited the Elektrosila Association today, thus rounding off its visit to Leningrad today.

The Elektrosila Association, one of the leading Soviet firms, specialises in the production of equipment for thermal, hydro and nuclear power stations.

Elektrosila Chief Engineer Yuriy Abashidze told the guests about the development of Soviet power engineering now that an economic reform is being carried out and management of the national economy is being perfected. That exactly prompted the establishment of the Soviet Union's inter-industrial state associations. One of them, Energomash, was formed on the Elektrosila basis. The concern amalgamates all large Leningrad engineering enterprises—the Izhorskiy Zavod, the Leningradskiy Metallicheskiy Zavod, the Turbine Blade Plant and

many others well-known by their products, specifically in China. Energomash acts independently in realisation of production assignments and is not accountable to the Industrial Ministry.

The guests have learned that the Elektrosila personnel supplies 300,000 kilowatt turbo-generators to China; 500,000 kilowatt turbo-generators will be shipped to that country in the near future. Negotiations are underway on delivery of 800,000 kilowatt turbo-generators.

A cryogenic generator, designed by Elektrosila specialists in cooperation with scientists, was demonstrated at a test stand for the Chinese representatives to see. This fundamentally new energy unit specimen has no analogue in the world practice.

"What we have seen illustrates the indisputable progress and outstanding accomplishments of Soviet science and technology in power engineering. Elektrosila-made equipment is being successfully exploited in China. But the situation now is such that we do not have enough generated electric energy. We are interested in bigger deliveries of Leningrad-made turbo-generators, just as in the development of science and technology relations", Song Jian said.

The Chinese laid wreaths at the Piskarevskoye Memorial Cemetery and at the monument to the heroic defenders of Leningrad on the Victory Square.

The delegation left for Novosibirsk this afternoon.

USSR, PRC Reach Educational Exchange Accord

LD1807101789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Report from Beijing by corespondent Albert Papayan, with recording of interview with Zhu Kaixuan, vice minister of the PRC State Education Commission; date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction—recorded]

[Text] The first session of the working group for cooperation in the sphere of education of the Soviet-Chinese committee for economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation has taken place in Beijing.

Our correspondent Albert Papayan reports from Beijing:

[Papayan] The protocol of the session notes in particular that over the past few years contacts and links of the two countries in the sphere of education have been substantially developed. An accord has been reached to the effect that China next year, as in 1989, will send 600 students, probationers, and postgraduate students to our country for probationary language studies and also for a full course of study.

Correspondingly, in 1990 the Soviet Union will send to China 320 students and probationers.

As the document stresses, the sides will encourage the higher educational establishments of both sides to develop direct links in the event of the possible conclusion of cooperation agreements guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and effectiveness.

Immediately after the signing of the protocol, I asked Zhu Kaixuan [vice minister of the PRC State Education Commission] to say a few words.

[Begin Kaixuan recording in Mandarin fading to Papayan translation in Russian] Contacts between our two countries in the sphere of education, Kaixuan says, were reestablished in 1983. However, they have begun to develop particularly intensively over the past 2 or 3 years. China and the Soviet Union, as two socialist countries, have a great deal in common also in the educational system. However, there are things which they could copy from each other. The higher educational establishments of our country, he continues, possess quite a high scientific potential, good possibilities for carrying out modern, joint scientific research. That is why the cooperating educational establishments of both countries should expand their joint scientific research work and further the development of new forms of cooperation.

Prospects are also good in our country in the sphere of professional and technical, and, in general, of secondary education. We are interested in cooperation with the Soviet side in the sphere of education, he says, and we consider that this cooperation is in the interests of the peoples of both our countries and ultimately in the interests of strengthening socialism in China and the Soviet Union. [end recording]

CPC's Jiang Cited on Education 'Neglect'

PM1907083789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Conference Ends"]

[Text] Beijing, 16 Jul—CPC Central Committee General Secretary Jiang Zemin has appealed to the leadership of Chinese higher educational establishments to launch a struggle against "bourgeois liberalism" and step up students' ideological and political education.

Addressing a Chinese national conference on education, which finished here at the end of the week, he noted that in recent years a considerable proportion of Chinese young people have been strongly influenced by Western culture and ideology. At the same time, the Communist Party has relaxed work on the ideological education of this section of the population.

While expressing deep regret in connection with the recent student unrest, Jiang Zemin said: "They were essentially bad events, but they enabled us to take a sober view of things." The most serious mistake in recent years was the neglect of educational matters, the Chinese leader stressed.

Song Jian Interviewed on Scientific Cooperation

OW1807105889 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 16 Jul 89

[Interview by special correspondent Gladov with Song Jian, PRC State Councillor and minister in charge of the State Science and Technology Commission, on 15 July 1989; place not specified; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program—recorded]

[Text] [Begin Song Jian recording] Our delegation has been in Moscow for 2 days. The achievements during the last 2 days have been very great. We have held discussions with the USSR State Commission for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and other relevant departments, mainly on issues concerning the strengthening of scientific and technological cooperation between China and the USSR.

The China Science and Technology Day exhibition has opened at the Moscow Exhibition Hall. With the assistance of Soviet comrades, I think the results have been good. Although we could not bring a lot of things with us, I hope that, through this exhibition, we will be able to let the Soviet scientific circles and people know about some of China's achievements in the field of science and technology during the last 10 years since the implementation of the policy of reform and opening to the outside world.

The Chinese and Soviet scientific and technological circles have achieved great success in the realm of scientific and technological cooperation for many years.

In May of this year, Comrade Gorbachev visited China and held official meetings at the highest level with Comrade Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders, resulting in the restoration of normal relations between the two parties and the two nations. The leaders of the two nations jointly decided that after normalization we should begin by working hard to expand economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. During our visit in the past 2 days, we have held very good discussions with leaders of many Soviet government and academic departments. This morning we were very pleased to have met with Comrade Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. We had a very good discussion. Our common desire is to carry out scientific and technological cooperation in every field, and to take concrete measures to promote it further. In particular, I pointed out three areas: First, there is a lot of potential for cooperation in the field of research in basic sciences. This is very important for training the young generation of scientists. Second, there are many things in the area of new technology where we can cooperate and satisfy the needs of our two peoples and benefit social development. Third, we need to cooperate in the field of traditional industries. China especially needs to cooperate with Soviet comrades to develop its communications, transportation, power, and raw material industries. These are issues that need to be resolved most during the current process of socialism construction in China. In line with the wishes of the two nations' paramount leaders, we must strive to open up a new future. Thank you.

In addition, through this station, I would like to convey the delegation's heartfelt thanks and regards to all comrades and friends in the Soviet scientific and technological circles. [end recording]

Sinologist Views Recent Events in China

PM1807122089 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 28, 9 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by Sergey Goncharov, head of department for the study of Soviet-Chinese relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute: "After Tiananmen. Soviet Sinologist on the Results of Recent Events in Beijing"]

[Text] The study of Chinese reality is my professional work. In 1984-1985 I studied in Beijing University and later repeatedly visited China on business. Recent tragic events in that country aroused in me great pain and bitterness. It is very hard to imagine Beijing with tanks in the streets, burning trucks, and blood stains on the pavement.

Nevertheless, it happened and caused the whole world to grieve, the Soviet public included. The people's response to the events in China, perhaps for the first time in the history of the Soviet state and its diplomacy, clearly differed from the official reaction. What are we to expect from this? For a start, let's go into the Soviet response to events in China. Here we can distinguish two different levels.

The first is the level of official documents. The stand is clearly expressed in the well-known statement of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The obvious aim was to preserve and consolidate the results of the recent normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, and to observe the letter and the spirit of the joint communique agreed upon during the summit meeting. Therefore, in the first place the statement emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of China and expressed the wish that the Chinese people stabilize the situation in their country.

In my opinion this official approach is also based on the considerations of reciprocity: Earlier the Chinese government had responded with exceptional propriety and understanding to the tragic events that took place in the USSR (Sumgait, Tbilisi).

But it appears to me that the stand of the USSR does not consist at all of "winning over to its side" the People's Republic of China to the detriment of the interests of the US and other advanced capitalist countries, by taking advantage of the current deterioration of relations between China and Western countries. I believe that the USSR and China will in the future proceed from the fact that the restoration of the military-political alliance of the 1950s in one form or another doesn't correspond to their own interests, or to the interests of world peace and stability.

It is quite possible that sanctions by the US and other Western countries will prompt China to expand trade and economic contacts with the Soviet Union. But this is only a natural response to the circumstances, and not a step towards the formation of a certain bilateral "strategic alliance". I am sure that our country wants Chinese-Western relations to be normal and stable.

The second, unofficial, level of Soviet response to Chinese events is also highly important. The first steps in the forming in the USSR of a civic society with an independent stand on various international events, as distinct from the official stand, are significant here.

The response to Chinese events varies very much and reflects different opinions in Soviet society. On the one hand, at crowded meetings in cities throughout the country, and in the statements by radically-minded people's deputies, there resounded a sharp condemnation of the actions of the Chinese authorities, and demands to stop the executions of participants in mass movement in China. Such views are evidence that the process of democratization is absolutely independent and it is absolutely unacceptable to use armed forces against one's own people.

Along with such opinions, conservative views are widespread in Soviet society. Their exponents fully approve of the actions of the Chinese government, and believe that it is high time to "straighten things out" in the USSR too with an "iron hand" and authoritarian methods.

The supporters of both views are concerned about the same phenomena of our present-day reality - the worsening situation in the consumers' market, the rise in crime, outbreaks of violence on interethnic grounds, and so on. From the viewpoint of "radicals" all these phenomena are inevitable, though unpleasant, and can be overcome only by moving further along the road of profound reforms. For "conservatives" social cataclysms are direct consequences of current transformations, hence the troubles must be eradicated by an "iron hand", since in the years when the "iron hand" enjoyed absolute power nothing of this kind was observed.

The causes of events in China (inflation, lower standards of living among the poorer sections of the population, corruption and nepotism in the state apparatus, a log in political reforms) and their lessons deserve the closest attention in the Soviet Union. It is necessary to prevent the rise of negative tendencies, eliminating the causes in advance, because the price which has to be paid for subsequent solutions requiring force turns out to be too high.

It seems that the Chinese leadership will continue the policy of economic reforms and the expansion of contacts with the outside world. In light of what has happened, the feasibility of such a policy will largely depend on how able the renewed Chinese leadership is to solve and overcome the problems which contributed to the beginning and development of the recent events.

For this, Chinese leaders will have to start the implementation of a number of rather difficult and painful measures, as, for instance, a resolute removal from the state apparatus of bribe-takers, stricter control over the birthrate, the continuation of the policy of reducing capital construction, and so on. It seems to me that at the same time urgent measures must be taken to stabilize prices, to maintain the living standards of the poor, to stimulate grain production, etc.

It may be presumed that henceforth China will pursue a more rigid policy in the ideological sphere; for example, in intensifying the struggle against the "pernicious influence of the West", putting stress on the propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas. However, with all that, Chinese society will face the complicated search for the optimal combination of economic, political and ideological policies with the vital need for preserving an open atmosphere in the economic and ideological spheres, and a policy of continuing political reforms.

Today China is greatly in need of an effective and authoritative central power. One of the main concerns of the leadership, judging by information coming from China, is the prestige of power, and the healing of wounds inflicted on it by recent events. It seems to me that this factor will moderate the scale of repressive measures, and prevent excessively rigid steps in the ideological and political spheres.

I don't share the forecasts of some Western analysts to the effect that China is possibly "sliding into a state of civil war", or that "strict dictatorship will be established". However, I would like to repeat that the situation will really stabilize only if the causes that brought about the instability are removed.

Today people throughout the world derive diametrically opposite conclusions from the tragedy on Tiananmen Square. Some believe that the events prove that successful reforms within the framework of a socialist system are impossible in principle. They allege that the way out of the crisis may be found only if this system is rejected. Others, on the contrary, emphasize that the Stalinist command-and-administer socialism is the ideal and any attempt to reform or "revise" it will only lead to bloodshed and chaos.

I don't share either view. The forces of restructuring have just started eliminating the most serious distortions of socialism. They are just beginning to make the social, political, and economic structures truly socialist, and therefore there are no grounds to make conclusions about the hopelessness of scientific socialism. It is quite a different thing to claim that practice has proved the hopelessness of totalitarian socialism. The alternative to its transformation is not stability and prosperity, but decay and depression, and eventually, bloody rebellions and terrible upheavals.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Leader's Talk With CPC's Zhu Noted

PM1807093589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting in Ulaanbaatar"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 14 Jul—J. Batmonh, general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] and chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium, met today with a CPC delegation headed by Zhu Liang, director of the CPC Central Committee's International Liaison Department, which is paying an official visit to Ulaanbaatar. J. Batmonh expressed satisfaction at the recent accord on the full normalization of relations between the MPRP and the CPC.

J. Batmonh described the processes of renewal and change in Mongolia and expressed gratitude for the greetings conveyed to him by Zhu Liang from the PRC's party and state leadership.

MPRP, CPC Agree To Normalize Relations

PM1707102589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 89 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Normalization of Relations"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 12 Jul—Talks between a Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] delegation led by L. Rinchin [name as transliterated], member of the MPRP Central Committee and chief of the MPRP Central Committee Foreign Relations Department, and a CPC delegation led by Zhu Lian, member of the CPC Central Committee and chief of the CPC Central Committee Foreign Relations Department, took place here in Government House.

During the talks, which were held in a comradely atmosphere, a MONTSAME report notes, the delegation heads briefed each other on the situation in their countries and on the tasks of implementing restructuring in Mongolia and China.

The two parties' delegations, guided by the desire to develop friendly relations and good-neighborly cooperation in the interests of the Mongolian and Chinese peoples, agreed unanimously to restore and normalize relations between the MPRP and the CPC. Both sides confirmed their willingness to develop interparty relations while adhering to the principles of equal rights and independence.

The sides stressed that the restoration of normal relations between the MPRP and the CPC is of great significance for the comprehensive development and expansion of relations between Mongolia and China.

Deputy Premier Belousov at Mongolian Fete

PM1207134189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In Honor of Our Friends' Holiday"]

[Text] A ceremonial meeting of representatives of the capital's working people was held 10 July to mark Mongolia's national holiday—the 68th anniversary of the people's revolution.

USSR Pilot Cosmonaut V.V. Gorbatko, chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Society Central Board, and other speakers pointed out that Soviet people are sincerely glad at the Mongolian people's achievements. It was noted with satisfaction that the Soviet-Mongolian friendship initiated by V.I. Lenin and D. Suhe Baatar is steadily growing stronger.

T. Gurbadam, Mongolian ambassador to the USSR, stressed in his speech that his country's historic achievements in the years since the victory of the people's revolution are indissolubly linked with fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the USSR.

Speaking about the processes of renewal in Mongolia, he pointed out that restructuring in the Soviet Union is an inspiration to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Mongolian people. Despite the indisputable commonality of our ultimate aims, there are also differences of approach to the resolution of tasks linked with the country's realities and historical experience, the ambassador said.

The following took part in the meeting: I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; a delegation of the Federation of Mongolian Peace and Friendship Organizations and the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society headed by Mongolian minister U. Mablet; and Soviet officials.

ROK Trade With Socialist Countries Outlined

18070330 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Jul 89 Second Edition p 5

[Article by V. Osipov: "Outlines of Partnership"]

[Text] Yesterday, on 7 July, the "Week of the Republic of Korea" was inaugurated at exhibition hall no 3 at Krasnaya Presnya. Famous South Korean companies, such as

Samsung, Gold Star, (Daewoo), Hyundai, and other companies, are displaying their products, primarily household appliances and consumer goods. Also, the opening of a representative office of the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) in Moscow took place yesterday. Its main goal is to promote the expansion of economic contacts between South Korea and the Soviet Union.

The Seoul Olympic Games opened to us South Korea (the official name of the country is Republic of Korea) from a new angle, virtually unknown to us previously. By now, the south of the Korean Peninsula has turned into a highly developed modern state, which successfully competes in many most up-to-date technological products with the United States, Japan, and other countries of the West. Prior to the Olympics, South Korea was better known as the country of the Chun Doo Hwan dictatorial regime, which severely suppressed all dissent. Chun was the one to drown in blood in the uprising of the inhabitants of the city of Kwangju in 1980.

After Chun Doo Hwan left the political arena, South Korea has been transformed. Roh Tae Woo, a democratically elected president, has come to head the administration. Positive changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Korea have emerged. However, as the latest events have shown, the process of democratic transformations carried out by the Roh Tae Woo administration is inconsistent. The governing regime, subjected to pressure from both the right-wing neoconservative forces (which are mainly concentrated in the army circles) and the radical elements, from time to time cracks down on strikers, and disperses student demonstrations using night sticks and tear gas. All of this is South Korean reality just as much as the impressive economic accomplishments of this country. Let us not make unsubstantiated statements, and quote some facts. The gross national product of the Republic of Korea amounted to almost $170 billion last year. Income per capita amounts to $4,000; the turnover of foreign trade is $113.2 billion (of which exports $60.7 billion and imports $52.5 billion). The average annual rate of growth of the gross national product in recent years came to 8 percent. South Korea ranks 11th in the world in terms of the turnover of goods. It exports large-capacity vessels, passenger cars, color TV sets, and electronics. The United States takes in 35 percent of South Korean exports.

The economic factor has definitely played the main role in the current South Korean regime reconsidering its foreign policy course. Without calling into doubt extensive military-political and economic links with the United States and other allies, the Roh Tae Woo administration advanced in July 1988 a so-called "northern policy" providing for the development of multifaceted links with socialist countries, including the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Almost a year has now passed since the declaration on the new political course, and some of its results may be now mentioned. Firstly, the commercial and economic ties between the Republic of Korea and the socialist countries are growing (in 1988, $3.65 million). The turnover of trade with the PRC amounts to $3.2 billion, with the Soviet Union to more than $200 million (in the first 4 months of this year, this statistic amounted to $254 million), with the People's Republic of Poland $35 million, with the People's Republic of Hungary $34.2 million. Several socialist countries—Bulgaria, Poland, the USSR and Yugoslavia—have set up representative offices of non-government chambers of industry and commerce in Seoul; in turn, South Korea has opened in these countries representative offices of the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA). The offices of several South Korean companies have been opened in China.

Second, Hungary and South Korea have gone further, establishing full diplomatic relations, and signing several agreements on developing economic and scientific-technical links. Choi Ho Joon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, paid an official visit to Budapest in March of this year.

Third, cultural, scientific, and athletic exchanges between the socialist states and South Korea have been established, and exhibitions, fairs, and seminars have been held. Recently, leader of the opposition Democratic Unification Party (DUP) Kim Yen Sam visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the IMEMO [World Economics and International Relations Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences. At a press conference in Moscow, the DUP chairman came out in favor of broader contacts between South Korea and the Soviet Union, as well as other socialist countries. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Choi Ho Joon believes that relations of his country with the USSR and the PRC in the non-political areas are improving faster than expected in Seoul.

Fourth, the "northern policy" of Roh Tae Woo has also affected relations with the DPRK. Seoul has announced the discontinuation of opposition to Pyongyang in the international arena, as well as its readiness to establish comprehensive links and exchanges with the DPRK.

The plans of the Roh Tae Woo government to bring about the expansion of contacts with the socialist states causes ambiguous reaction in South Korea itself, as well as in the United States and Japan. The conservative circles of South Korea come out against such links. Washington and Tokyo, which initially encouraged the process of establishing contacts between Seoul and the socialist countries, now perceive this as the intention of the South to become more independent in determining its international policy.

Under the influence of domestic and external factors, Roh Tae Woo has recently somewhat "adjusted" the course of "northern policy." A special body, the International Private Economic Council, has been created under the government which is charged with monitoring economic contacts with the socialist countries. The United States and South Korea have signed an agreement which actually prohibits the exports of most up-to-date technologies to

these countries. With regard to Pyongyang, Seoul has taken measures which place all contacts with the DPRK under the control of the government. At the same time, Seoul has begun to demand persistently that, as a condition for developing commercial and economic links with the socialist countries, consular relations be established, and intergovernmental agreements be signed which guarantee South Korean investment in the economy of socialist countries. In other words, the Roh Tae Woo government is striving for interstate cooperation on an equal footing. These intentions of Seoul can hardly be ignored if one is to proceed from the generally accepted principles of mutual benefit and equal rights in commercial and economic contacts.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Further Reportage on Philippine Minister's Visit

Comments on U.S. Bases Phaseout

HK1907053589 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 19 Jul 89 p 6

[By staffmember Tess Villanueva]

[Text] Moscow—Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus raised the tempo for the negotiations on the US bases when he told Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union's goal of eliminating foreign military bases such as Clark and Subic by the year 2000 is "realistic" and "does not contradict" the Philippine Government's attitude.

An official who attended the five-hour, closed-door meeting between the two foreign ministers also said Manglapus pointed out that some elements in the Philippine Government in fact believe that the US bases can be phased out earlier than the year 2000.

Talks on the future of the bases after the 1991 expiration of the Military Bases Agreement are scheduled to begin late this year.

"We should be prepared. In other words, the time may come when technology has developed in such a way that the bases may no longer be as important as they are today," Manglapus later told reporters.

Visits Lenin's Mausoleum

LD1807163189 Moscow TASS in English 1540 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—Philippine foreign Minister Raul Manglapus, on an official trip to the Soviet Union, today visited Lenin's Mausoleum and placed a wreath.

He also laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier near the Kremlin Wall.

The Philippine official had a meeting with Konstantin Katushev, minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR, on the same day.

They exchanged views on issues of developing Soviet-Philippine trade and economic cooperation. Both officials stressed the mutual interest in the concerted search for new forms and directions of that cooperation.

In the afternoon, the Philippine minister met with Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuriyev, and other Russian Orthodox Church figures.

Manglapus-Shevardnadze Talks Discussed

HK1907061789 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Announcer read commentary by Yuriy Solton on talks between Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Philippines Foreign Affairs Minister Raul Manglapus on 17 July in Moscow]

[Text] First, I would like to note the high level of understanding in the talks. The ministers gave their opinions regarding all aspects of the continued development of Soviet-Philippine relations. They hold common views on the Asia Pacific security issue. According to [Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister] Shevardnadze, the Soviet Union is greatly interested that reforms in this region continue. There are many new perspectives and the political situation is improving. Relations between the nations are being enhanced. Although there are misunderstandings between different regions, solutions will come. The normalization of ties between China and the Soviet Union, the dynamic political environment in India, and peace in other countries have contributed to the improvement of security in the region. The partial reduction of the Soviet Union's war arsenal is another factor. During the next 2 years, the number of Soviet soldiers and marines will be reduced to 200,000. A large part of the Soviet forces will be withrawn from Mongolia. The removal of intermediate and short-range missiles, including those at the border between the Soviet Union and China, will be effected.

But this is just one aspect; the situation in the Asia Pacific region remains complicated. Many weapons, especially nuclear arms, are still being retained. The war in Afghanistan persists. Forces advocating disunity are active. Some want to grab power and be the sole guarantee of strategic, economic, and social security in the Asia Pacific region. But this cannot take place, even in the most powerful countries.

It was proven in Moscow that genuine and overall security in the Asia Pacific region can be attained by the unified efforts of all the countries belonging to the region, no matter how big or small they are, depending on their balance of interests. There is still no structure of agreement in the region, no mechanism for regular and varied consultations. The time has come, through the

help and support of the United Nations, for the many interested countries to be able to set up this practical mechanism. [end announcer read commentary]

Yuriy Solton ends by saying that the atmosphere for this is very favorable.

Military Exercise in Philippines Described

PM1707143989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 89 First Edition p 3

[V. Oksanin report under the rubric "Militarist Rehearsals": " 'Cope Thunder' Over the Philippines"]

[Text] An exercise code-named "Cope Thunder" takes place 7 times a year over the territory of the Philippines in the area of the Crow Valley testing range (25 km north of Clark Airbase). According to the Americans themselves, it is the Pacific equivalent of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command "Red Flag" exercise, which is held regularly at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada in a conditions approximating as closely to real life as possible.

This exercise was held for the first time in mid-1976. Aircraft from the Australian, New Zealand, Singapore, Thai, and Philippine Air Forces have taken part in it since the beginning of the 1980's; moreover, it is attended by observers from the air forces of Malaysia, South Korea, and other countries in the region.

According to established rules, each exercise lasts no longer than 2 weeks, that is, 9-10 flying days (there are no flights on Saturday and Sunday). The composition of the participants in each exercise changes according to the specific tasks scheduled for the exercise. Crews of F-15, F-16, and F-4 tactical fighters, RF-4S reconnaissance planes, OV-10 control and guidance aircraft, and F-4G "Wild Weasel" air defense suppression aircraft from the U.S. Air Force Pacific Ocean Command's 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Armies usually take part in the exercise without fail. The U.S. Navy Marine and deck-borne aircraft taking part in the exercise resolve the same tasks as the tactical aviation. Strategic aviation is periodically involved in the exercises, as is the U.S. National Guard Air Force.

The participants in the exercises arrive at Clark Air Base a few days before the exercise begins. They have previously been divided into two groups, which take turns to play the role of friendly aircraft ("Blues") and enemy aircraft ("Reds"). Moreover, ground-based air defense systems at Crow Valley testing range play on the side of the "Reds."

F-5 aircraft from the "Aggressor" training squadron (based at Clark Air Base), whose flight personnel, it is stressed, have a perfect knowledge of the air combat methods used by the air forces of the USSR and other socialist countries in this region, are used to familiarize the U.S. pilots with the tactics adopted by air forces from the aforementioned countries when rehearsing air combat.

Realism in the combat environment is also achieved via the extensive use at Crow Valley testing range of equipment and apparatus that simulates the work of the ground-based air defense systems used by the ground forces of the socialist countries in the Far East region (the USSR included). These include acquisition, guidance, and target designation radar; surface-to-air missile guidance stations and antiaircraft artillery fire direction units; and stations for jamming aircraft control communications and also on-board fire control radars.

While the "Blues" are in the air above the testing range, dummy surface-to-air missiles are launched, producing a psychological effect on pilots since they leave a smoke trail behind when they are launched and the crew has to make a competent and timely decision to maneuver. Moreover, other light and smoke signals are used at the testing range to simulate the actions of ground-based air-attack systems.

In general the Crow Valley testing range is a whole complex with a diverse target configuration enabling U.S. pilots to rehearse their tasks of striking targets under conditions close to real combat conditions.

Observer Views SRV Sincerity on Troop Withdrawal

BK1807075189 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Station observer's commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, in line with the agreement between the Cambodian and Vietnamese parties, the first stage of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia took place on 17 July 1982. An observer of Radio Moscow had this to say:

In preparation for this article, I perused page-by-page several newspapers from 1982. I wanted to know what reaction the Western media had to the peace initiative of the Indochinese countries.

For example, the observer of an influential newspaper in Paris, LE MONDE, said that it was hard to fully believe the announcement of the Vietnamese leaders that they were going to pull their troops from Cambodia.

The commentator of the U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST said: All statements made by the Vietnamese aggressors concerning troop withdrawal are misleading propaganda meant to fool the world community.

It is regrettable that these journalists in the West were not alone in drawing such arbitrary conclusions. Anyway, let us leave such assessments to the personal consciences of those who made them. We should instead talk about the truth behind this issue as some statistics have already been compiled and added up.

Over the past 7 years, many changes have taken place in the region. The international atmosphere in general has improved in addition to the consistent efforts of the Indochinese countries to restore stability in Southeast Asia. All this has brought to the Cambodian people a strong hope that peace will soon be rebuilt. The process toward normalizing the conflict was greatly boosted last May when the SRV announced its decision to withdraw half of its troops from Cambodia during 1988. This initiative met with broad support of the countries in the region and the rest of the world. It should be noted that even then there were calls for us to disbelieve the Indochinese countries. Nevertheless, the first informal meeting between the Cambodian factions concerned, and talks between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Sihanouk, were held in Indonesia.

In general, the normalization of the Cambodian problem has reached the stage in which the factions concerned met in the search for specific ways to solve the dispute. Firmly grasping the line toward rapidly normalizing the situation in Cambodia, the fraternal Indochinese countries put forth another initiative on 5 April 1989. In a move independent from the results of the negotiations and consultations on the internal and external political aspects of the solution to the conflict, the Vietnamese volunteer troops will completely withdraw from Cambodian territory by the end of September 1989. Recently, the SRV National Assembly session adopted a special decision concerning the retirement plan for the Vietnamese volunteer troops.

Certainly the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia will not automatically solve the problem. Equally vital is the question of ceasing military aid to the armed opposition groups. The issues concerning the internal aspect of the solution also remain open for discussion. These issues will be the objects of discussion during the fifth informal meeting on Cambodia scheduled for Paris this August [month as heard].

As far as the fraternal Indochinese countries are concerned, they have already met the opposition parties half way, and in doing so have been true to their words. The presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia has long been used by the opposition groups as a pretext, saying it has been a major obstacle to a peaceful solution. Apparently, this obstacle will be eliminated within the next 2 months.

The observer of Radio Moscow went on: I started my article by citing the views of some Western newspapers in 1982, and I would like to end it by citing the present views of these same newspapers. For instance, LE MONDE now writes: Hanoi's decision shows the desire to solve the problem as soon as possible and to open the way for negotiations by involving as many parties as possible.

THE WASHINGTON POST has this comment: The frenzied activities of Vietnam and Cambodia aimed at quickly solving the problem and, in addition, the number of measures taken for this purpose should be a reminder for the world community to take a different look at the initiative of these countries and to believe in the sincerity of their intentions.

I believe there is no need for any more comments on these views, the observer of Radio Moscow wrote in conclusion.

SRV, Lao Delegations Stop Over in Moscow

PM1807152389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Stopover in Moscow"]

[Text] On 16 July an SRV delegation led by Vo Chi Cong, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Vietnamese State Council, stopped over in Moscow from Hanoi en route to Managua; it is going to Nicaragua on an official friendly visit and for the celebrations to mark the 10th anniversary of the Sandinist people's revolution.

Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Lao Supreme People's Assembly, stopped over in Moscow on 16 July en route to Nicaragua.

President of Laos Greeted on 80th Birthday

PM1707135589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 89 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium birthday greetings message to Lao President Souphanouvong]

[Text] To Comrade Souphanouvong, member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

Dear Comrade Souphanouvong!

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium send you cordial congratulations on your 80th birthday.

Embarking from your youth on the path of a revolutionary, you have devoted yourself to the struggle for the Lao people's national and social liberation and for the triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

The Soviet Union highly values your great contribution to the comprehensive development of relations of fraternal friendship and cooperation between our parties, countries, and peoples, to consolidating the socialist community, and to strengthening peace throughout the world.

With all our hearts we wish you, dear Comrade Souphanouvong, good health and creative energy in your noble labor.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

U.S. Aid to Khmer Opposition Groups Criticized

BK1807084589 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Station observer Boris Durov's commentary]

[Text] The struggle between the U.S. Administration and Congress on arms supply to the Khmer opposition groups has been going on for the past 3-4 months.

The cause of the difference of views is very obvious. The U.S. Administration intends to provide direct military aid to the pro-West Khmer opposition groups—that is, the group of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and that of Son Sann. This aid package is worth $10 million. So far, the two groups which have their bases outside Cambodia have received only humanitarian aid from the United States.

Congress has resolutely opposed the supply of arms to Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann. Members of the U.S. Congress said that the weapons supplied to the pro-West Khmer opposition groups through Thailand might fall into the hands of the Polpotist Khmer Rouge. This idea is correct. Such a case has already happened, and there is no guarantee that the Polpotists would not again intercept the new arms shipment from the United States. One can predict the consequences on the assumption that Pol Pot and his associates have not given up their efforts to recapture the power they lost in 1979. It is all of this that makes up the dispute between the U.S. Congress and the White House. The dispute is going on, and no one knows how it will end. However, there are quite a few signals, and I am going to talk about them.

Changes have been announced, although they may cause some weakening in the U.S. Administration's position regarding the Cambodian problem. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who met with ASEAN foreign ministers recently, proclaimed that for Washington, the initiator of the Cambodian solution is Hun Sen, chief of Cambodia's legitimate government.

For years, the United States has not recognized the Phnom Penh regime. This U.S. statement seems to be very meaningful. Baker talked about the need to coordinate the activities of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the Hun Sen government by recognizing the Phnom Penh government as an important factor for national reconciliation in Cambodia.

One can assume that Washington, by paying attention to the agreement between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, will not arouse the anger of Phnom Penh when it provides arms to one of the sides in the talks. But this is only my personal opinion. What kind of activities will the United States undertake? We will have to wait and see.

Another important signal was Baker's statement on the need to do something to prevent the Pol Pot gang from returning to power in Cambodia. Following this statement, those in Washington will think hard before creating a situation in which U.S. weapons might fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. I cannot predict the outcome, but it is obvious that the position of the members of the U.S. Congress on the possible consequences of the steps taken by the administration is firm and convincing.

There is still another point. The current state of affairs is moving toward the international conference on Cambodia to open in Paris later this month. If the White House managed to persuade Congress to agree with its aid package, the resolution might ruin the solution of the problem, for it can be said that this turn of events would benefit only Washington.

Commentary Views Burmese Elections

BK1407124589 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1430 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Yevgeniy Mikhaylov commentary: "With Whom Will the Myanma Farmers March?"]

[Text] There is a question emerging on the current plight of farmers in Myanma [Burma] and whom they will support in the forthcoming elections. There have been many views on the question. Yevgeniy Mikhaylov presents his views as follow.

It is very difficult to accurately comment on and judge the political sympathy of the agricultural workers in Myanma. It is a difficult undertaking as there are no sufficient data and records collected on social issues in Myanma. Therefore, the judgement will have to be based on what the Myanma are saying.

The TASS correspondent in Rangoon interviewed U Chit Hlaing, former member of the Central Executive Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party [BSPP] on 4 July—the 27th founding anniversary of the BSPP. U Chit Hlaing is now the head of the political department of the Central Committee of the National Unity Party [NUP] which is the new name of the BSPP. In replying to the questions of the correspondent, U Chit Hlaing optimistically said his party has the good prospects of winning at the elections.

He said his optimism is based on the belief of the NUP, the renamed BSPP, that it enjoys the support of the Myanma peasantry. According to U Chit Hlaing, 75 percent of Burma's population is composed of peasants and that the peasants love and support his party.

According to the spokesman of the BSPP, the economic crisis and deterioration in the 1980's in the country were not solely due to the mistakes of the leadership. He said declining rice prices and turmoil in the world market played a role as well. U Chit Hlaing also insinuated that the NUP believes that the events would not have been so

tumultuous had the emergency congress of the BSPP Central Committee been able to systematically reform Myanma's economic system with the approval of the congress delegates and hold the national referendum on whether or not to maintain the one-party system as proposed by the party leadership. He added that it is also necessary to admit that the events did not take place without cause.

Peasants did enjoy some privileges after 1962 such as the right to farm a sufficient amount of tenured land, focus on rural development, and make constructive undertakings by cooperatives. However, on the other hand, the peasants were subjected to the brutal suppression of the administrative machinery. Instructions were issued in advance as to what they were to grow, how to grow it, whom to sell it to, and at which price. U Chit Hlaing said the NUP had studied the lessons from the past.

According to those who drafted the NUP election platforms, they include points which would be of interest to farmers such as the right to own land, right to inheritance, freedom of choice as to what and where to grow, and freedom to sell the produce. U Chit Hlaing did not hide the fact that it is the major duty of the NUP to gain the sympathy of the farmers.

What the position of the NUP and other parties indicates before the elections is that the extent of success of any party at the elections will depend on the level of support from the farmers. In another word, it will depend on the mind of the farmers. Leaders of other opposition parties are likely to argue against U Chit Hlaing's claim that the NUP is sure of winning in the rural areas and of obtaining farmers votes. Arguments on this issue and other important issues will have to contain the essence of the political struggle in the period prior to the elections in Myanma. Yevgeniy Mikhaylov said political observers are saying that the holding of just and democratic elections will be difficult or impossible under the current situation in Burma in which there are restrictions imposed on freedom of speech, freedom of writing, and freedom of organizations.

South Pacific Forum Session in Kiribati Assessed

PM1807152589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Mikheyev dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "Oceania: Exotic Islands' Concerns"]

[Text] Sydney—The 3-day session—the 20th—of the South Pacific Forum [SPF], which includes, along with Australia and New Zealand, 13 island states of the region, has been held in Tarawa, capital of the Republic of Kiribati. The session was to answer the SOS signals put out by a number of the participants, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Cook Islands.

The point is that the Gilbert Islands, which took the name Kiribati after winning independence from Britain in 1979, are coral atolls scattered over an area of 3 million square km. The highest point or, more correctly, strip of land is 3 meters above sea level and in places is only 50 meters wide. The islands are on average 2 meters above sea level. According to forecasts, the sea level will rise 1-4 meters over the next 50 years as a result of the "greenhouse effect" and the melting of the ice caps.

If the worst-case scenario becomes reality, Kiribati, with its population of 68,000, Tuvalu (10,000), and the Cook Islands (17,000) will share the fate of Atlantis.

The forum approved a proposal submitted by Australia's prime minister to deploy a network of meteorological stations in the region to track the frequency and intensity of cyclones and changes in precipitation. The stations will record changes in pressure and temperature and, above all, fluctuations in the water level. Australia is allocating $6.25 million for this purpose.

The second series of problems was linked with the devastation of the region's fish stocks as a result of the use of drift nets or single-walled gill nets. These nylon nets 15 meters deep and 50-60 km (!) wide swallow up everything indiscriminately: fish, turtles, seabirds, dolphins, seals, and even whales. The main commercial catch which attracts the attention of the three main advocates of drift nets—albacore, long-finned tuna—is threatened. Two of these advocates—Japan and South Korea—have promised not to exceed the level of their catch of the last few years and to comply with the prescribed dates of the fishing season. The third—Taiwan—which has already caught approximately 40,000 tonnes of tuna, has not yet made any concessions. The session adopted the "Tarawa Declaration," which is to be the first step toward the complete cessation of drift net fishing.

Australia's prime minister initiated the declaration, stating that the destructive practice undermines the basis of many island states' existence and their economic prosperity. Along with his hospitable gesture toward potential refugees from Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Cook Islands, this reflects the significance that Canberra attaches to its role as a "medium power" and "patron" of the community of minuscule Pacific states. It is not impossible that Australia feels a special need to reassert its position in the region in that Japan has recently stepped up its infiltration here, using "checkbook diplomacy" for these purposes, as was the session put it.

The results of the session show the SPF states' growing independence and confidence in their own strength. Their ability to agree on acute subjects and also their decision to establish political and economic contacts with the ASEAN grouping are evidence of this.

The 20th session convinces us that the voice of the SPF is gaining strength.

Rogachev Receives Singapore Trade Union Delegation
BK1407143389 Singapore Domestic Service in English 1400 GMT 14 Jul 89

[Text] A delegation from the NTUC [National Trade Union Congress] led by its secretary general, Mr Ong Teng Cheong, has met the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Mr Igor Rogachev, in Moscow. Both sides stressed the need for more contacts between Singapore and the Soviet Union at all levels so as to (?improve) mutual understanding and expand economic and trade relations.

Mr Ong, who is also the second deputy prime minister, expressed Singapore's hope that the Soviets will succeed in their political and economic reforms. Other subjects discussed were Cambodia, China, and regional developments.

The NTUC delegation is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the All Union [words indistinct] of the USSR.

Near East & South Asia

More Reported on 15 Jul Kabul Car Bomb Attack
PM1807081789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA press service report under the rubric "Afghanistan": "New Victims of Extremists"]

[Text] Nine people killed and more than 50 injured. This is the bloody outcome of the latest crime by the hard-line opposition in Kabul.

According to information agencies, there was a powerful explosion last Saturday [15 July] in a densely populated region of the Afghan capital. An explosive device of great destructive force had been planted in a car. Nearby private houses and state institutions were hit. The terrorist action was carried out by so-called "fighters for the faith" on the last day of the Muslim holiday.

"Tell the truth about what is happening here. Tell people what America is doing in Afghanistan. This is the latest tragedy. A normal person could not have done this," one of the victims said to a REUTER correspondent at the scene of the tragedy.

Following a major military defeat at Jalalabad and an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Samar Kheyl, recently taken by government troops, the "hard-liners" have once again stepped up their terrorist activities in the Kabul area. We have already reported the barbarous shelling of the Afghan capital which resulted in dozens of innocent casualties.

As before, the leaders of the armed opposition are gambling on force of arms and, not without help from their Western patrons, drawing up plans for new operations against government troops. According to an AFP correspondent in Islamabad, Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani, head of the "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan," has admitted that the mujahidin "suffered defeat" at Jalalabad and claims that in the forthcoming weeks they will be launching major operations against military bases and airfields. "We are just waiting for the weapons we have been promised to arrive," Gaylani said.

In turn, THE WASHINGTON POST reported Sunday [16 July] the White House decision to increase U.S. military supplies to Afghan opposition forces. In particular, they will be supplying long-range artillery capable of destroying runways and aircraft standing on them.

Conflicts Within Afghan Opposition Reported
LD1807223889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1845 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "International Diary" program with Vladimir Pasko and Aleksandr Malikov]

[Text] [Pasko] The United States is seriously concerned about the worsening contradictions among the Afghan opposition groups. A State Department spokesman in Washington made an appeal to the rebels to restore their unity and start cooperating. As previously reported, the State Department spokesman assured the opposition of a continuation of military aid from the United States. What does my colleague Aleksandr Malikov think about this?

[Malikov] I think there is some sense in establishing the chronology of the latest conflict between the rebels, which in fact provoked this nervous reaction from the State Department. On 9 July, in the Afghan province of Takhar, members of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan led by Ahmad Shah Mas'ud were ambushed by cutthroats of the rival group, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Thirty rebels were killed in the clash, which was organized, according to AFP, by the foreign minister in the so-called provisional government of Afghanistan, Hikmatyar. It is claimed that Hikmatyar wanted to punish Mas'ud's group for passivity in the struggle against the Kabul regime.

Forgoing an explanation of the motives for the clash, we should note that U.S. State Department, which normally persists in keeping silent about the killing of civilians of Kabul and other Afghan towns, this time came out with condemnation of this "tragic and cruel act" as its spokesman called it. But I think it would be misleading to think that a chord of sympathy was struck for those who, for U.S. money and bearing U.S. arms, are fighting, in the final analysis, for U.S. interests in Afghanistan. The State Department, it seems, was alarmed by something else. Its official statement directly states that the clashes may consequently undermine the developing campaign against the Kabul regime. For it is a question of a season of strategic battles in which the Pentagon, the State Department, and the CIA have given the opposition groups the next 4 months for victory.

But if one is to speak more broadly, evidently the fate of a military solution of the Afghan question is at stake, along with the entire Afghan policy, or rather the anti-Afghan policy of the United States in the past decade. At the same time, U.S. strategists must realize that the longstanding and acute contradictions between the political ringleaders of the opposition established in Pakistan are now compounded by tension on a different level, that is, between them and the field commanders operating inside Afghanistan.

Of course, the United States must also realize that these are all early symptoms of a fierce power struggle which may spill into a new stage of civil war even if the opposition wins a military victory. This point of view is cited by the New York Times. The paper speaks of the ineffectiveness of the rebels' combat operations, stressing that their commanders want to keep as many forces as possible for a successful power struggle even after the supposed fall of the present Afghan Government. Of course, these calculations are illusory, since the government troops are strongly entrenched in the country's main towns and attempts to dislodge them from there, as the siege of Jalalabad shows, will hardly be successful.

This means there is no military solution to the Afghan problem. That is why the statement of Peter Tomsen, the U.S. envoy to the Afghan opposition, about Washington's intention to supply antigovernment groups with new types of modern armaments only adds fuel to the fire of the civil war with tormentous consequences for the Afghans. Incidentally, the impermissibility of such actions was also mentioned in a recent letter from Najibullah to U.S. President Bush.

In any case, it is obvious that with its actions, the U.S. Administration is not bringing a political settlement any closer but is only pushing it further away. It is complicating for the whole international community the solution to the problem of settling a regional conflict which, figuratively speaking, possesses a high degree of seismic activity.

Divisions in Afghan Opposition Examined

LD1907051389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] The contradictions between the basic Islamic parties which are members of the so-called Alliance of Seven have intensified as never before. Aleksandr Shkirando, our correspondent in Kabul, reports.

[Begin Shkirando recording] The series of new contradictions in the camp of the Afghan armed opposition were provoked, in my view, by the failures in combat activities around Jalalabad, Khowst, and Qandahar where the activities of Pashtuns from the groupings of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Sayyaf, and Khalis are arousing dissatisfaction and criticism from Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hozaras who are members of other formations of the armed opposition. It is not coincidental, therefore, that the representatives of these formations refused Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, who recently arrived from Peshawar, in the Lowgar and Vardak Provinces, to send his people to the Jalalabad area. Many field commanders who are active on the territory of Afghanistan are coming out categorically against the further strengthening of dependency on Saudi Arabia and the Wahabis orders, which are alien to several regions of Afghanistan which are controlled by the opposition and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

The events of recent days show that in a number of regions, the contradictions are developing into genuine battles. The major skirmish between the detachments of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan which took place last week in the province of Takhar may serve as a specific example. Here a detachment of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan under the command of Zayd Jamal arranged an ambush on Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, general commander of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, who was returning from a meeting, and the field commanders and the fighters accompanying them. Seven gang leaders and 30 members of the detachments of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan were killed. It is interesting that the next day, this event was already at the center of attention of the U.S. State Department. Richard Boucher, its representative, the radio station Voice of America reported, declared that the United States is continuing its investigations into this incident. The representative of the State Department called upon the mujahidin to strengthen their unity to overthrow the Kabul government. This declaration shows convincingly that the United States has ceased to hide its interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But is it taking account of the fact that such interference leads not only to a continuation of the senseless bloodshed in the country but also aids the kindling of national, tribal, and religious contradictions in Afghanistan? [end recording]

Afghan Army Said To Be on 'Eve of Breakthrough'

PM1907090189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 89 First Edition p 5

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Opinions": "On the Eve of a Breakthrough"]

[Text] "An Afghan Stalingrad?"—it was under this headline that the Indian newspaper NATIONAL HERALD offered an article analyzing the military-political situation developing in Afghanistan, and specifically around Jalalabad. Indeed, the analogy is appropriate to a certain extent. Way back then it was the unequaled staunchness of the defenders of the city on the Volga that marked a breakthrough in the course of the war and largely determined our motherland's future.

Today it is already obvious that in the fighting for Jalalabad which is already in its 5th month, the republic's Armed Forces have demonstrated high combat

spirits and their ability to fight. On the other hand, these battles have shown how unrealistic the armed opposition's expectation of a quick victory was. Having exhausted the enemy during the 5 months of defensive fighting since the withdrawal of Soviet forces (the armed opposition has lost over 22,000 men killed or wounded), the Afghan Army has moved on to the offensive. It has been successful. Samar Kheyl was liberated. According to Britain's THE GUARDIAN this small town, lying 5 miles outside Jalalabad, is of major political importance. It was from there that the attacks on Jalalabad had been launched for several months past.

Nonetheless, it is true that every analogy is unsatisfactory. The distinguishing feature of the war now being fought in Afghanistan is that its end cannot be achieved by military means. The political meaning of victories won on the battlefield lies primarily in the fact that they bring the leaders of the armed opposition and their backers face to face with the total hopelessness of the strongarm, military path. Events at Jalalabad indicate the limitations of a purely military solution. A breakthrough in the war can be achieved only as a result of changed approaches by those who are fighting against the republic today.

I do not think that there is any need to emphasize the way the government's prestige is boosted by its consistent pursuit of the national reconciliation policy. A few days ago President Najibullah again issued a call to battlefield commanders of armed opposition formations to embark on talks with the government. The government is prepared, as ever, to examine without preconditions any initiative aimed at ending the war. Many field commanders established contacts with the government a long time ago. They are now being joined by dozens of new ones.

Proof of the sincerity of Kabul's intentions was also offered by the decision on a unilateral cease-fire by the Afghan forces on the occasion of the Muslim feast of 'Id al-Adha. "If the cease-fire is observed by the opposition," the government communique emphasized, "it may be extended. In the event of cease-fire terms being violated, the armed forces reserve their right to deliver counterstrikes."

This reservation proved far from superfluous. Unfortunately, the opposition leaders and those in Islamabad and Washington who egg them on still dream of military victory. In the meantime all they will admit to are miscalculations in the tactical sphere. Judging by news reports from Peshawar, for example, they are urgently elaborating combat action plans which will use new forms in parallel with the insurgents' "traditional" forms for conducting combat operations—ambush and sabotage. These are to take the form of operations by newly established formations, and attempts are being made to shape these units into the semblance of a regular army. A regrouping of forces is under way in parallel. Without finally abandoning its plans to capture Jalalabad, the opposition is preparing to deliver strikes against a number of the country's other vital centers.

Confirmation of these intentions has been provided by the continuous, barbaric shelling of Kabul. Dozens of rocket-propelled shells were launched against the city's busiest districts both on the eve of and during the religious holiday. The international airport was also shelled. The result was more casualties and new tragedies.

All this was preceded by a lightning tour of Vardak and Lowgar Provinces by Hikmatyar, one of the insurgents' leaders. While there, he made good use of U.S. advisers—and mainly of U.S. dollars—to persuade field commanders to step up the shelling of the capital. By all accounts the bribes and threats did have an effect on some of them.

But the terror and missile barrage produce results which are the direct opposite of what the armed opposition's leaders expect. "The insurgents lose support among Afghans with every day that passes. This is the conclusion drawn by officials, foreign diplomats, and inhabitants of Kabul," according to a THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent's report from the Afghan capital. One worker declared in an interview that "the shelling has neither political nor military importance; it just kills ordinary people."

A few days ago the council of the country's ulema and clergy advocated the adoption of most resolute measures aimed at ending the missile shelling of cities. If it does continue, the Supreme Council of Ulema and Clergy will ask President Najibullah for the use of weapons which have hitherto not been used by the Afghan Armed Forces. You must agree that the clergymen's call for resolute counteraction to the missile terror is indicative of the mood of the people's masses.

As regards the insurgents' combat spirit, it is not very high. There have been press reports that in the course of their meeting with Hikmatyar, commanders operating outside Qandahar refused to march on that city. Some of them declared: "Let Hikmatyar send his relatives here first, and then we shall storm Qandahar." Let me mention that the fruit of the government's policy of national reconciliation is most noticeable in Qandahar.

And this policy would have produced even better results all over the country had people in neighboring Pakistan heeded the Afghan people's voice. Of course, it cannot be said that there has been absolutely no change in Islamabad's approaches in the last few months. Observers draw attention to the fact that, first during her U.S. visit and then during her trip to Britain, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto showed more interest than before in the possibility of a political settlement. So far, it is true, this interest has been expressed only in words. The calls for political solutions are devalued by the simultaneous ultimatum demands that the present government surrender power.

The prime minister cannot fail to realize the inconsistency of this approach. It looks like an attempt to turn a bitter defeat into victory, to achieve at all possible costs what has proved impossible to achieve in the course of combat operations.

True enough, an analysis of Bhutto's stance would show that she has to constantly keep an eye on Pakistan's generals. Those who settled accounts with her father. Those who, for 10 years now, have been making sizeable profits from the Afghan people's tragedy. Today they are banking on a further expansion of interference. After all, a free and nonaligned Afghanistan does not in any way fit in with their plan to establish some sort of "regional consensus," as they call it. To put it more simply, their plan to create a regional military bloc in the Middle East. Pakistan is now regrouping its troops and bringing fresh forces to the border. Specifically, artillery is being concentrated near the city of Quetta, some 120 miles away from Qandahar. Some 200 tanks and 40 fighter-bombers are also concentrated in Quetta. Governor General Ulumi of Qandahar told journalists that Pakistan is preparing to render large-scale assistance to the offensive now being prepared by the insurgents.

People in Washington are also clearly alarmed by the insurgents' failures. Thus two high-ranking emissaries have been sent virtually simultaneously to Pakistan. One of them is P. Tomsen, recently appointed U.S. presidential special envoy to the armed opposition camp. Immediately on his arrival he hastened to express confidence that "the resistance movement will win military and political victory." How, if one may ask? Thanks to U.S. arms, of course—deliveries of which increased sharply just before the summer battles. "The situation is changing and there will be sufficient arms," Tomsen assured the insurgent leaders, warning them at the same time that there is no deadline for making these deliveries.

The U.S. military department was not to be left out. It is striving to ensure the most effective utilization of the arms being supplied. This job was taken on by General Schwarzkopf, commander of Central Command, and his officers. They met field commanders operating near Kabul and Qandahar and helped them work out effective tactics. That same goal of whipping up tension in the region is also pursued by the forthcoming U.S.-Pakistani maneuvers and the sale of a further 60 F-16 fighters to Islamabad.

This stance taken by the United States cannot fail to cause amazement, to say the least. Could it be that the only lesson learned by the United States is contained in the "Lessons of Afghanistan" report prepared by the Pentagon? This report is almost entirely devoted to the efficiency of "Stinger" antiaircraft missiles...

The coming weeks and months will be difficult for the republic. The armed opposition, egged on by Islamabad and Washington, will make further attempts to win a military victory. But it looks as if the situation is on the eve of a breakthrough. "This will be a hot summer for us," Afghanistan's Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil said. "It will be followed by the onset of a long cold winter for the opposition." Given another defeat like the one in Jalalabad, the men in Peshawar will find it not just difficult but simply impossible to build up field commanders' enthusiasm for combat operations. The insurgents' failure to win victories also undermines the position of Pakistan's militarist circles. Even the U.S. Congress is expressing doubts as to whether it is worth financing a measure which is doomed to failure.

Of course, a lot now depends on the Afghan Armed Forces' will and courage. And they are becoming more and more aware of their responsibility.

'Foreign Interference' in Afghanistan Viewed

LD1907011689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1714 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 18 July—TASS political observer Vladimir Matyash writes:

According to a report from Islamabad, a U.S. representative attached to the Afghan armed opposition has declared at a press conference in the Pakistani capital that Washington will supply the opposition with a detachment of "better quality arms". Following this, U.S. Secretary of State Baker declared in the Hague that U.S. policy regarding the Afghan armed opposition has not undergone any changes. In his words, it consists of attaining and supporting the self-determination of the Afghan people by various means. The nature of American support in this matter has not changed, Baker emphasized.

These declarations were made at a time when the world community was decisively demanding an end to massed foreign interference supporting the forces of the irreconcilable Afghan opposition. The world community cannot be unconcerned in a situation where the conditions of an agreement, which was drawn up with the participation and under the aegis of the United Nations and guaranteed by the authority of the two great powers, are being violated. The conduct of Pakistan and its patrons devalues the force of law and international obligations and undermines the belief in the possibility of political means to resolve regional conflicts. It is important to bear in mind one of the opinions expressed by the U.S. secretary of state when he said that the United States would like to see Afghanistan a sovereign, neutral, nonaligned state which would not be hostile in its relations with the Soviet Union. But this is a general statement. Yet here are specific Soviet proposals on the development of an inter-Afghan dialogue and the convocation of an international conference, with the participation of those countries neighboring Afghanistan, on a settlement of the Afghan problem. They have not, unfortunately, met with a constructive reaction from the U.S. side.

Today, the true value of the declarations made by the leaders of the United States, Pakistan, and other countries supporting the opposition, which have for all these years been shedding crocodile tears over the "sufferings of the Afghan people," can be seen. Now, none of them is calling on the opposition to cease fire and resolve the quarrel at the conference table. On the contrary, having assumed the right to decide who in Afghanistan represents its people, the protectors of the mujahidin exclude the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan from being partners in the talks. They exclude the party which headed the April revolution and which has ruled the country for over 10 years in the most difficult conditions of war. They urge the irreconcilables to use combat operations, increase arms supplies, and send their military advisers and even soldiers of the regular forces. As a result, the bloodshed is intensifying and turning into a large-scale civil war and the conflict is threatening to spread into neighboring countries.

The stake that is being made by the United States and its NATO allies on a military victory by the Afghan opposition shows the shortage of realism in their approach to a settlement of the Afghan problem.

The solving of the Afghan conflict is a touchstone for the whole world community. And the Geneva agreements are called upon to play an extremely important role in this. Therefore, their implementation must not be allowed to be ruined. Let us hope that a constructive approach will prevail.

USSR Embassy in Islamabad POW Efforts Viewed
PM1907102389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent Ye. Aleksandrov "specially for IZVESTIYA": "Embassy Leading the Search"]

[Text] Islamabad—The other day IZVESTIYA reported on a visit to Pakistan by a delegation from the "Nadezhda" people's committee. Representatives of the Soviet public met and had talks with mujahidin leaders on the fate of our military servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan.

This problem began to be highlighted in our press only comparatively recently. But it arose immediately after Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan, thereby seriously raising the question of the need for urgent measures to free officers and men who found themselves in trouble. For many years this difficult job has been done by the small collective of the Soviet embassy in Pakistan.

In the initial stages, the embassy conducted a meticulous, painstaking search for any information at all on the whereabouts of Soviet servicemen in mujahidin hands. They learned that the Afghan rebels had dispatched some of them to Pakistan, where they were often used as unpaid labor at camps and training centers. It was extremely difficult for Soviet diplomats to find them in the western provinces of Pakistan bordering on Afghanistan, to which they were denied access. The matter was complicated still further by the fact that the Pakistani side totally denied the presence of Soviet soldiers and officers on its territory, and their release could only be secured by completely accurate, irrefutable proof.

The first success came in February 1981, when Captain Zaikin, a military pilot shot down by mujahidin over Afghanistan, was handed over to the Soviet embassy from the Pakistani city of Quetta. The work continued, and the list of our servicemen returned home through the Soviet embassy in Pakistan gradually grew. Korchinskiy, Dzhurayev, Yazkuliyev, and others were sent to the Soviet Union.

Many Soviet servicemen taken prisoner began to look for ways to escape as soon as they were taken across the Pakistani border. Several of them succeeded—overcoming numerous obstacles, not knowing the language and customs of Pakistan, having no money, and looking different from the local inhabitants—in getting to the Soviet embassy in Islamabad. It sometimes took several months to get them back to the Soviet Union, because the Pakistani authorities refused to admit that prisoners of war had been on their territory and had escaped to freedom.

The latest Soviet serviceman released through the efforts of the embassy was Colonel A.V. Rutskoy, whose aircraft had been brought down over Afghan territory by a missile fired from a Pakistani F-16 fighter-bomber. Remaining in the aircraft, now out of control, A.V. Rutskoy crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border and ejected over Pakistani territory. He was captured by a mujahidin detachment. After some brief haggling, they handed the pilot over to the Pakistani authorities. The battle for his release began as soon as the embassy obtained information about the incident and was ultimately crowned with success. On 20 August 1988 Colonel A.V. Rutskoy flew home from Islamabad.

With the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, when it became clear that our troops would be leaving within the deadline agreed by the accords, a new stage began in work to free Soviet servicemen taken prisoner by Afghan antigovernment forces. Now it was no longer just a question of finding and securing the release of individual soldiers and officers but of establishing the fate of all Soviet people missing in action and returning the survivors to their own country. At the Soviet side's request, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry organized meetings between representatives of the Soviet embassy and the Afghan armed opposition.

Direct talks between delegations began at the Pakistani Foreign Ministry at the end of last year. Senior diplomats are involved on the Soviet side, while the delegation of representatives of the armed opposition includes advisers to the leaders of various opposition groupings.

The first two rounds were held while the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was still in progress.

During the second round of negotiations, the sides specifically discussed the terms for exchanging four of our soldiers for a group of mujahidin prisoners. However, the matter was resolved quite unexpectedly: The commander of a detachment from the G. Hikmatyar group, which was holding the Soviet servicemen, exchanged them for their own arrested supporters.

The talks were continued in June this year. At the third round, the armed opposition delegation proposed a so-called "collective exchange of prisoners." Their proposal envisaged the exchange of all Soviet servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan for all mujahidin and their supporters missing in action. In this connection the opposition representatives were claiming that some of the rebels taken prisoner are on Soviet territory and demanding their release.

The latest, fourth round of talks saw the achievement of the first agreements between the sides. In particular, the leaders of Afghan antigovernment forces have given their consent to representatives of the International Red Cross Committee visiting Soviet prisoners of war and talking to them without mujahidin present. They also have not ruled out the possibility of our men being allowed to write letters to their families, on certain conditions. It is true, however, that the opposition delegation made the proviso that such meetings could not be organized with all the Soviet servicemen in their hands.

In its turn, the Soviet side informed its partners in the negotiations that the proposal for a collective exchange has been taken into consideration. At the same time, our representatives made it quite clear that there are no Afghan mujahidin prisoners on Soviet territory and that any discussion of the question of an exchange could only deal with rebels in jails in Afghanistan. In this respect our diplomats stressed that the decision to release the rebels would naturally be taken by the government of the Republic of Afghanistan, with which the Soviet Union will hold appropriate consultations.

Work to secure the release of Soviet prisoners of war continues. New meetings between the delegations of the Soviet embassy and armed opposition representatives lie ahead.

Hope Seen for Captured, Missing USSR Soldiers

PM1907091789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy dispatch: "Hopes Can Be Realized"]

[Text] Geneva—The word "hope," having appeared in IZVESTIYA articles about the fate of Soviet servicemen captured or missing in Afghanistan, has become a fixture in the vocabulary of those writing on this subject.

Nor could the article "There Is Hope, We Need Time" published a year ago, make do without it. And, although a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since then and I have repeatedly called the International Red Cross Committee Headquarters in Geneva in an attempt to get hopeful information to allow us to say something new about the fate of our soldiers who disappeared or are being held captive by the mujahidin, the reply was, if not silence, a proposal to postpone discussion of this subject until better times.

As a result the International Red Cross has lost the confidence of the parties to the Afghan conflict and contacts that were established with difficulty have broken down, making it necessary to start all the work virtually from scratch. At times International Red Cross activity has been blocked in the most unexpected manner: as a result of efforts and attempts to help it. In particular, by starting direct talks with the mujahidin and representatives of the group of "seven" in Peshawar in an attempt to accelerate the return home of its POW's, the Soviet side complicated the work of the International Red Cross which found itself, albeit temporarily, an unnecessary intermediate component rather than a prestigious go-between. And, although these efforts by the Soviet side to resolve the fate of its POW's as quickly as possible are entirely understandable, they were not coordinated with International Red Cross activity. But it seems that lessons nonetheless have been learned from these and other mistakes and shortcomings, and a number of hopeful signs of progress are finally appearing in the resolution of the POW issue.

The global or universal principle proposed from the outset for exchanging POW's is being asserted in the interested parties' approach to this unresolved problem: Not only Soviet POW's but all POW's without exception—including representatives of the Afghan Army and the resistance forces (mujahidin)—should be released. Agreement was also reached to reject the linking of POW exchanges with the state of the military-political situation in Afghanistan, an unforeseeable change in which could undermine and block this process at any time. Henceforth talks and exchanges will be subordinate to the International Red Cross on the humanitarian and humane basis that is the core of its activity. A positive turn toward active participation in resolving the POW problem can be seen in the position of the Pakistani Government and of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto personally, who set forth her views on this issue during her recent meeting in Islamabad with members of the "Nadezhda" Soviet People's Committee to Rescue Soviet POW's in Afghanistan. Agreement has finally been reached with the mujahidin to allow International Red Cross representatives to meet with POW's at their places of confinement.

Thus, it seems that this time all the factors needed for a successful outcome have been brought together, but, on the other hand, bearing in mind the position in the

opposition camp and the state of relations between various mujahidin factions, we cannot as yet, unfortunately, guarantee 100-percent success.

Vorontsov, Petrovskiy Meet 'Nadezhda' Members

LD1807060889 Moscow TASS in English 1842 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS—Yuliy Vorontsov, Soviet first deputy foreign minister, and Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister, met representatives of the People's Committee Nadezhda (Hope) today. Members of this organisation will depart for Kabul in the next few days to discuss with the Afghan leaders possible ways of releasing Soviet soldiers captured by the Afghan opposition.

During the meeting, its participants discussed a possible programme of the delegation's trip to Kabul and specific questions which could come under discussion with the Afghan side in the light of the delegation's recent talks in Islamabad.

Representatives of the people's committee received assurances that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul will give the delegation adequate assistance in its work.

USSR Committee for POW Release Arrives in Kabul

LD1807061789 Moscow TASS in English 0613 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Kabul July 18 TASS—A delegation of the Coordinating Committee of the Soviet Public arrived here on Monday [17 July]. The committee is working for the release of Soviet servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani Views Iran's Economic Problems

NC1707172089 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Andrey Krasnov commentary from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] On Sunday [16 July], Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani spoke about the outlook for Iran's economic development. His remarks have once again attracted everyone's attention to the severe problems of the Iranian economy. Our commentator Andrey Krasnov writes on this:

It seems that the economic difficulties which Iran is currently experiencing have become the most pressing problem faced by the Iranian Government. According to the Iranian press, the country's economic situation is getting worse each day and immediate steps are required in order to improve this situation.

Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani gave an interview to the JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI on Sunday in which he discussed the Iranian leadership's programs in this regard. As you know, this religious personality is currently a presidential candidate and many observers considered his interview as his pre-election statement on economic matters.

Let us see what specific proposals the Iranian Majlis speaker is making. Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that the most important duty of the government is to ensure Iran's economic independence. Meanwhile, he asserted that special attention should be paid to progress in agricultural production. We wish to recall that the shortage in foodstuffs in the country today is nearly 30 percent. The great poverty of the majority of farmers makes the situation even worse. The average monthly income of 72 percent of rural families is lower than the official minimum. Moreover, today only 6 to 7 million of the 16 million hectares of usable agricultural land are being cultivated.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani's remarks do not make it clear whether he is willing to remove the major obstacles to an increase in agricultural production or not. The fact that the land issue is in abeyance and the great lack of organization in the rural economy continue to be among these obstacles.

The Majlis speaker also stated that it is necessary to increase the output of the oil, chemical, and gas industries. He supported long-term plans for gas-fired energy production. As we know, Iran ranks second in the world as far as natural gas resources are concerned; these resources are estimated at about 13.4 trillion cubic meters. Iran's gas company intends to install 15,000 meters of gas pipelines in the near future. Much of this gas will be delivered to the Soviet Union. According to Iranian officials, Iranian gas exports to the Soviet Union will reach 4 million cubic meters in 1990.

Meanwhile, Hashemi-Rafsanjani pointed to the need to develop all energy producing fields. He paid special attention to the development of systems which generate energy from water. The presidential candidate assessed Iran's economic problems and pointed out that about 40 percent of Iran's industrial enterprises are facing serious problems due to shortages of energy and spare parts. However, he did not give any details of the government's plans to fight inflation and unemployment. These continue to be the most serious economic problems faced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran's Ties With Socialist Countries Praised

NC1707154989 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Andrey Krasnov commentary]

[Text] Prospects for the full normalization of relations between Iran and the socialist countries have recently improved very considerably. Extensive economic and

political cooperation with the socialist countries on the part of Tehran is the new trend in the Iranian Government's foreign policy. Our commentator Andrey Krasnov writes:

Today there is no doubt that serious and basically significant changes are taking place in Iran's foreign policy. The definition of priorities—this may be the way to describe the Iranian Government's recent steps on the international scene. It seems that Iran has made a final major political choice which will be of long-term regional and international importance.

The recent visit by Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Moscow and the outcome of his talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev show that the Iranian leaders are really ready to ignore old patterns and start searching for serious partners on the international scene.

The adoption of this stand is an indication of favorable conditions for cooperation between Tehran and socialist countries. Furthermore, the relations between Iran and socialist countries are changing before our very eyes. Until recently, bilateral relations and economic and political contacts had reached a certain limit; now, howver, the trend of reviving dialogue and entering into constructive negotiations is progressing rapidly. For example, last month a protocol on economic cooperation was signed between Iran and Czechoslovakia. Under the terms of this document, Czechoslovakia is to help Iran in the construction of six petrochemical plants and two plants to manufacture rubber products, in the modernization of several sugar factories, and in the establishment of joint cement manufacturing plants. Iran will purchase technical equipment for its textile plants. Meanwhile, Iran's exports to Czechoslovakia will include automobiles, ambulances, color television sets, fertilizers,and other products. Iran has also agreed to supply gas to Czechoslovakia via the Soviet Union. This year the volume of trade between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Czechoslovakia is expected to reach $300 million.

Moreover, on the basis of reports received from Tehran, the sixth session of the Iranian-Bulgarian commercial and economic cooperation committee ended in mid-June. During the talks, the two countries expressed readiness to expand cooperation in various fields. As part of the committee's work, documents on cooperation until the year 2000 were prepared. These documents are to be signed during the upcoming visit to Bulgaria by Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

The joint subcommittee on matters pertaining to transportation and (?cities) signed a protocol on cooperation in transportation and freight. Under this protocol, provision is made for the transportation of cargo by sea and air between Iran and Bulgaria, as well as by road through the Soviet Union. The document also states that Iran is to purchase two ships from Bulgaria.

The formation of the joint Iranian-Cuban economic committee was a serious step toward the consolidation of Iran's relations with socialist countries. The first session of this committee was held in June this year. During this session, three subcomittees on trade, agriculture, housing, and architecture were formed. According to Iranian officials, the Islamic Republic is interested in the purchase of 100,000 tonnes of sugar from Cuba annually. Meanwhile, Cuba has expressed interest in buying oil and a series of industrial products, such as buses and minibuses, from Iran. Recently Iran's Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi pointed to the need to expand and strengthen Iranian-Cuban cooperation and called for all existing possibilities to be utilized in order to attain this goal.

The strengthening of Iran's economic cooperation with the GDR continues. East Germany provides technical equipment for electricity generators—transformers and cables—and participates in the construction of cement plants and in the development of the chemical, machine-building, and energy industries.

A vast program for cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yugoslavia has been prepared. About 400 Yugoslav experts are working in Iran.

The Iranian Government is establishing strong friendly relations with Romania, Poland, and Hungary. The volume of trade is increasing rapidly and trade between Tehran and these countries is expected to reach $1 billion this year.

Thus, generally speaking, we can say that there has been a serious expansion of Iran's relations with the socialist countries. This trend definitely serves the vital interests of the Iranian people. This cooperation will primarily make it possible for Iran to withstand the economic and political pressures inflicted by the West and the United States, which do not benefit from the further development of the Iranian revolution. Moreover, Tehran will find reliable partners, who will cooperate with it on the basis of equal rights, in the socialist countries, and this will help it to strengthen its positions on the international scene. In addition, the socialist countries will be able to give Iran real assistance in its postwar social and economic reconstruction.

In short, the bridge has been built and it should now be used.

Commentary Examines Iran's New Constitution

NC1407100389 Moscow in Persian to Iran
1100 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Andrey Krasnov commentary]

[Excerpts] On 9 July, the Committee for the Reappraisal of the Constitution ended its work after its 38th session. This committee proposed that numerous amendments be made in the country's Constitution. Our commentator Andrey Krasnov writes on this:

The Committee for the Reappraisal of the Constitution was formed on 26 April this year on orders of Imam Khomeyni. The committee consisted of 25 members and was headed by Ayatollah Meshkini. Even very recently, the chairman of the committee feared that it would not be able to complete its work on time. Thus, in early July he asked Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i to extend the time given the committee since its work was interrupted by the mourning period for Imam Khomeyni. However, at any rate the committee was able to complete its work on time. Our commentator then writes: An analysis of the amendments to the Constitution by the committee shows that the governmental structure of Iran will be subject to serious changes. These amendments first and foremost, intend to divide power among the political heads of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Previously, all state power was concentrated in the hands of Imam Khomeyni, who enjoyed absolute power and influence. His decisions had to be implemented by everyone, and the 1979 Constitution was also (?aimed) at this direction. [passage omitted]

The amendment of the Constitution also focuses on strengthening the authority of the majlis. For example, on the basis of the amended text of the Constitution, the entire governent and all cabinet members are responsible to the majlis. The majlis should be informed of any accusation against the president, the deputy president, or the ministers, and these accusations should be studied by the legal organs. The majlis will also have the right to subject the cabinet to a vote of non-confidence. In relation to this it is necessary to point out that some time ago, Iran's leader Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i rejected the proposed amendment on granting the right for dissolving of the majlis to the religious ruler. Reports indicate that this took place after some opposition from majlis deputies who stated that even Imam Khomeyni did not grant himself the right to dissolve the majlis.

The omission of this proposal has certainly considerably strengthened the credibility of and respect for the majlis as a legislative organ.

Our commentator then writes: Apparently all the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been able, in the critical situation after the death of Imam Khomeyni, to reach agreement on unified action. Iran's leader Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i has spoken in favor of the election of Majlis Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani as president. Ahmad Khomeyni, Imam Khomeyni's son, has also adopted a similar stand. Iran's Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi has also endorsed the committee's proposals on amendments to the Constitution and on the concentration of all the executive powers in the hands of the president. Recently, in an interview with ETTELA'AT he stated that he is not going to withdraw from the political life. He said: I hope that the president and the new government will use the experiences that I have gained over the years.

'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's stand on his colleagues in the country's leadership is filled with goodwill. He supported 'Ali Khamene'i's candidacy in the election for the religious leader of the country and unlike to the other majlis deputies, he does not resort to overt criticism of the activities of the Musavi Government. Some 220 majlis deputies sent a letter to Ahmad Khomeyni, asking him to join them and to take the position of majlis speaker. This definitely took place with the support of 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

In short, on the basis of the analysis of the draft amendment of the Iranian Constitution, one can conclude that the various sources of authority in Iran have reached a wise compromise for the sake of strengthening the country's bases of political stability. However, at any rate, the final decision will be made by the Iranian people, who will either reject or approve the committee's proposals on 28 July during a general referendum on the draft amendment of the country's Constitution.

Possible Outcome of Iranian Elections Highlighted
NC1507194489 Moscow in Persian to Iran
1500 GMT 14 Jul 89

[Andrey Krasnov commentary]

[Text] Dear Listeners. The pre-election campaign continues in Iran. The two men contesting the presidential elections are Speaker of the Islamic Majlis 'Ali Akhbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and 'Abbas Sheybani, former agriculture minister of Iran.

Our commentator Andrey Krasnov assessed the pre-election campaign and writes: The pre-election activity commenced officially in Iran on 27 June this year. However, a special commission comprised of 100 people was set up in the Interior Ministry to register the names of those who wished to apply as candidates for the post of president in the elections. There were 150 applicants, 80 of whom were chosen by the Interior Ministry commission whose names were submitted for approval to the Council of Guardians. The names of these 80 candidates were not divulged, but it was announced that a student, a university professor, a commercial storekeeper, and some retired Army officers wanted to run for the post of president. The pre-election regulations endorsed by the relevant article of the Constitution prohibits participation of women in presidential elections. The Council of Guardians selected only two people from among the 80 who applied, namely, Speaker of the Islamic Majlis of Iran Hashemi-Rafsanjani and a former agriculture minister, 'Abbas Sheybani. Official sources stated that other candidates were not registered due to lack of proper documentation.

Whatever the case may be, Hashemi-Rafsanjani's rival in the presidential elections is a representative of the overt grouping of the factions of the Freedom Movement of Iran headed by former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan. According to the latter, a political atmosphere

conducive to participation of his party in the presidential elections has been created. Meanwhile, Bazargan's deputy, Ebrahim Yazdi, has said that serious restrictions still exist on the activities of the Freedom Movement of Iran. He said that the government has not given permission to the movement's organ, the MIZAN newspaper, to resume publication after it was banned in 1981. In present circumstances, Bazargan's party is actively engaged in lobbying for support of 'Abbas Sheybani's candidacy with all the resources it can muster but it cannot gain access to the country's radio, television, or newspapers.

According to the results of a poll of Iranian social circles, 86 percent of the voters are prepared to vote for 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. 'Abbas Sheybani has thus been able to attract only 11 percent of the voters. Three percent of those questioned said they were not inclined to participate in the presidential elections. Therefore, the poll results indicate that 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani will probably be elected the new president of the country.

In this regard, it may be mentioned that 'Ali Khamene'i, the country's spiritual leader, and Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the late imam, as well as some of Iran's notable political personalities, have spoken out in favor of 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In any case, the 28 July elections will clarify this issue.

'Mutual Trust' Marks USSR-Kuwaiti Talks

LD1807222989 Moscow TASS in English 1925 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Kuwait July 18 TASS—The Kuwaiti defence minister, Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, received today the Soviet First Deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Konstantin Kochetov, here on an official visit.

In a conversation marked by an atmosphere of candour and mutual trust, the Kuwaiti official highly assessed the present state of cooperation of Soviet-Kuwait relations and development of bilateral cooperation.

He pointed out that Kuwait was closely watching perestroyka in the USSR, sincerely backed this process and wished the Soviet people success in their undertakings.

Indian Papers Praise Gandhi's USSR Visit

PM1807153189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Second Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent V. Baykov: "Important Contribution"]

[Text] Delhi, 16 Jul—Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi's visit to Moscow and his meeting and talks with M. Gorbachev have prompted a broad response from the Indian public and extensive comment in the local press. This is understandable, because Soviet-Indian relations play a priority role in Indian and Soviet foreign policy and they are, as the paper ECONOMIC TIMES writes, an important factor in world politics.

The influential paper THE TIMES OF INDIA writes that the traditional meetings are a confirmation of our country's evident mutual interest and the close and confidential summit contacts are an effective mechanism for the fruitful development of Soviet-Indian relations.

INDIAN EXPRESS, noting that a wide range of issues of Soviet-Indian relations and international problems was discussed at the Moscow talks, stresses that M. Gorbachev took a "sympathetic" view of India's efforts to improve its relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka and shared R. Gandhi's initiative on resuming the North-South dialogue. The two leaders agreed that it is senseless to try to solve the Afghan problem by military means and that all the parties to the Geneva agreements must respect and implement the accords that were reached.

PATRIOT points out that the coincidence of the two sides' positions was particularly evident on the question of China. Both leaders stressed the need to improve and normalize relations with that country and confirmed their readiness to continue efforts in that direction, despite the recent domestic political events in China.

These first reactions enable one to say that the Indian public rates highly the meeting between M. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi and sees it as yet another important contribution to the strengthening of friendship between the USSR and India and to international detente.

USSR Leaders Congratulate Husayn on Iraqi Holiday

JN1607121389 Baghdad INA in English 1130 GMT 16 Jul 89

[Text] Baghdad, July 16, INA—President Saddam Husayn received a telegram of congratulations from the Soviet Union Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Council on the 21st anniversary of July 17 revolution in Iraq.

The telegram said "We send you and to the Iraqi friendly people our heartfelt congratulations and best wishes, and the Soviet Union expresses satisfaction over the successful development in relations with the Iraqi Republic in all fields, which are founded on the solid base of the friendship and cooperation agreement."

In its telegram, the Soviet leadership added "We are sure that the steady enhancing and expansion of the multi-field cooperation, based on mutual benefit, and giving it more activity and dynamism, serves not only the radical interests of the Soviet and Iraqi peoples, but also serves interests of security and stability in both Middle and Near Easts, and contributes to enhancing world peace and keeping away danger of nuclear disaster."

The telegram concluded, "We wish you and the Iraqi people happiness, peace and success in reconstruction and development of economy and culture and achievement of prosperity under the umbrella of peace."

The president also received a congratulatory telegram from the Yugoslav President Dr. Janez Drnovsek on the 21st anniversary of July 17 Revolution.

President Drnovsek wished happiness to President Saddam Husayn and prosperity and comprehensive development for the Iraqi people under the umbrella of peace.

The Yugoslav president expressed his confidence that the existing relations between the two countries would continue in development in service of joint interest and mutual benefit of the two countries and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Kovalev Meets Arab Envoys To Discuss Lebanon

PM1807102189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversation at USSR Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] On 13 July, A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received M. Hamud, ambassador of Lebanon, R. al-Haddaoui, ambassador of Morocco, amd R. Suibes [name as transliterated], charge d'affaires of Algeria, at their request.

A conversation took place during which the situation in and around Lebanon was discussed. A.G. Kovalev expressed concern at the dangerous tension persisting in that country and talked about the Soviet Union's efforts in the interest of normalizing the Lebanese situation and preserving Lebanon as a single, sovereign, and territorially integral Arab state. The point of these efforts, he noted, is to give effective assistance to the peacemaking mission of the Arab League's three-nation committee on Lebanon.

The Arab side expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its energetic efforts to achieve the earliest possible end to the Lebanese people's sufferings. The great significance of the Soviet-French statement for achieving reconciliation in that country was stressed. The Arab representatives also described the actions of the three-nation committee aimed at resolving the Lebanese problem.

Lebanese Paper Rebutted on Bus Attack Stance

PM1807162389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Ostalskiy "Rejoinder": "Imprisoned by the Past"]

[Text] "It looks as if Moscow has extirpated the expression 'national struggle' from its vocabulary, replacing it with the word 'terrorism'.... Palestinians and all Arabs have a right to ask Moscow the reasons for this change of position on their holy war for their rights...and what is behind its recent flirtation with Israel."

The quotation could be continued further, but I think that these few sentences suffice to get an idea of both the tone and substance of the commentary published recently by Beirut's AL-SAFIR. This newspaper is quite widely known outside Lebanon, but that is not the point; the point is that this article is quite typical: Similar opinions have recently begun to appear in some of the Arab press. I am, of course, talking about those (people, newspapers, forces) who are frankly dissatisfied with the changes in Soviet foreign policy over the last few years and in the international situation as a whole.

Of course, current Soviet policy in the Near East can be criticized and its merits and shortcomings disputed. But when the author of the commentary in a Beirut newspaper, a certain Hasan Mukahhal, suddenly announced that the USSR was offering "support to the Jewish colonialization" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that this support was "one of the main barriers to Israeli agreement to peace," that is, of course, not argument and criticism but merely lies. Just as his hints that the USSR has allegedly abandoned its support for the Palestinian movement are incorrect and dishonest.

But Mukahhal was particularly indignant that the Soviet Union, according to him, described the actions of the Palestinian from the Al-Nusayrat camp, who seized the wheel of a bus from the driver and drove it and its passengers into an abyss on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem Highway, as a "terrorist act." (He is, obviously, referring to a "Peace and Progress" Radio broadcast in Hebrew of 7 July, which has received extensive commentary in the Near East press).

I am prepared to agree that there may be disputes as to how precisely to describe this tragic incident—as a "terrorist act," "a senseless act of violence," or something else. But I am convinced that it must not be glorified as a "partisan operation," an "act in the holy war," or a heroic deed, as the Lebanese observer is describing it, demanding the same from the Soviet mass media. Leaving aside the moral aspect of the matter, what is the practical result of such actions? There is no need to rack your brains over the answer: Everyone is aware of what is happening in Israel now. There has been an unprecedented upsurge in chauvinist sentiments and the police are having difficulty restraining the pogromists and killers, who employ stones, knives, and firearms. The raging mobs declaim: "Death to the Arabs!" All this was most opportune for Israeli rightists: at the height of a most acute government crisis.

If the most reactionary forces wanted to undermine the positive changes in Israeli public sentiments they could not have thought up a better reason than the bus incident. I am convinced that this incident damaged the Palestinians themselves, yet the youth who grabbed the

bus wheel obviously acted under stress and may have been in a state of dulled consciousness under the influence of the Israeli authorities' brutality.

I fully agree with the stance of the PLO, which has dissociated itself from such actions but has at the same time stressed that they are the result of the desperate position to which many Palestinians are foredoomed by the merciless occupation. Violence begets violence and injustice gives rise to further injustice, and so on ad infinitum.... This law was proved long ago by the tragic realities in the Near East and other conflict zones. Is it not time to break the vicious circle? Not at all, Mukahhal believes. He is angry that he has not found support in the USSR.

Of course, a transition to what we describe as the "policy of new thinking," like any other major change of policy, cannot fail to offend someone's interests: military, political, or economic. It cannot be otherwise. One can even sympathize with the "victims," especially since we ourselves have spent decades inculcating such approaches directly or indirectly. But I think that those who cannot imagine the Near East without bitter confrontation between two irreconcilably hostile camps should not rely on a return to the past. It is not worth wasting time and effort in vain.

USSR Officials Condemn Bombings in Mecca

PM1907102489 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 13 Jul 89 p 1

[Sami 'Amarah report: "Two Soviet Officials Tell AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Mecca Explosions a Terrorist Act To Be Strongly Condemned"]

[Text] Moscow—Two Soviet officials have condemned the crime of the two explosions near the Mecca holy mosque, describing it as an act of terrorism meant to shed the blood of innocent people.

The two Soviet officials stressed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the explosions targeted on the holy places should be strongly condemned.

Soviet assistant official spokesman Karel Kastiken has told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Moscow that the Soviet Government's position on terrorism of any kind is clear and has been frequently stated, adding that the Soviet Government condemns all acts of terrorism and calls for international cooperation in combating it.

Kastiken said that the bombing in holy Mecca was against all human values and its condemnation should be firm and clear because it is a matter affecting the holy places of special importance to millions of world Muslims.

Aleksandr Karasnov, APN's Middle East desk chief, said that he condemns all acts of terrorism, regardless of the motives and pretexts cited by their perpetrators. In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, he also said: "What happened in holy Mecca was intended to harm as many people as possible and to shed innocent blood. That is why it has been received with resentment, condemnation, and contempt by all honest people everywhere."

Karasnov emphasized: "The choice this time of holy Mecca, which is dear to all Muslims everywhere, and the commission of acts of terrorism makes everyone even more resentful, because conflicts of watever kind should be kept out of such holy places, which should remain a symbol of love, peace, and amity and a qibla for all Muslims, and should not be used as an arena for settling scores."

USSR Cooperative Seeks Israeli Participation

TA1707195589 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1630 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Unattributed "Advertisement"]

[Text] Here is an advertisement. The Aktziya cooperative, which was set up as part of the (Dniyesh Stroy complex) association for cooperation, offers firms in Israel a wide range of services in carrying out various projects in participation with USSR firms and companies, in construction and the manufacture of building materials in the USSR.

The cooperative has already set up a joint company with entrepreneurs in the West to manufacture computers and a marble quarry works. It is prepared to consider any proposal by Israeli entrepreneurs in these fields, including leasing deals. The Aktziya cooperative has top-class experts in computerization, planning, and banking. It can carry out projects at the request of businessmen from abroad; offers advisory services in marketing in the USSR; and brokerage services with Soviet companies, firms, and cooperatives. Aktziya publishes an advertising bulletin (DEVAVOYI VALUTNI KURIERA), disseminated in plants, companies, and Soviet cooperatives which have foreign currency and want to operate in the international market place.

Paid advertisements are offered to any interested party abroad. The Aktziya cooperative is also prepared to serve as an authorized representative of foreign firms in the USSR. [Words indistinct] and Armenia, which was destroyed, gave the Aktziya cooperative a workshop to manufacture woolen products, which are high standard hand-made goods. We invite entrepreneurs to invest in this plant or to set up a joint plant, thereby contributing to the international aid effort for Armenia.

The Aktziya cooperative can be reached through our station, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, or by writing to Aktziya Cooperative, 125284 Bodkinskiy the First, House No 6, Moscow; Telex: VSK 411740; Telephone: 2070074. It is advisable to contact both channels simultaneously by writing to the radio station and writing or telexing the cooperative. Write, telex, and telephone. We believe that cooperation with the Aktziya cooperative will pave new horizons for you in the USSR.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Reasons Behind Riots in Mogadishu Cited

EA1807111089 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Commentary by Vladimir Borisov]

[Text] Our commentator Vladimir Borisov says that according to a report from Mogadishu, 23 people died and 59 others were injured in the riots in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, during the Id al-Adha celebrations. The report did not elaborate on the names of those behind the riots or the numbers involved. Somalia's Interior Ministry said that the organizers of the disturbances pretended to be defenders of religion. But the number of dead and injured and the need for the government to impose an emergency there show that the riots were big. This is a very saddening affair.

I do not think, said the commentator, that a few riffraffs shouting religious slogans can rouse the population of such a big city. There are major reasons for the riots. I am ready to believe that the recent arrest of four Muslim clergymen was the cause of disturbances among some of the people of Mogadishu, as stated: But I do not think this was the major cause. The fall in the value of money, and unemployment, are big problems in Somalia's capital. The main cause of popular dissatisfaction is the property owned by some corrupt officials, and the luxury in which they live. The government has not fulfilled yet its innumerable promises. Corruption has not been eradicated. Hopes of an end to fighting in the north and normalization of relations with Ethiopia have so far not been met.

All these are reasons for the increase in the number of people who are opposed to the regime, says our commentator. And these include not only those who love the [word indistinct] of independence, but also reactionaries. A few months ago, we received reports on a mutiny by soldiers seeking the resumption of the fight against Ethiopia and for strong steps to be taken against the rebels in the north of the country.

It may be some of these factors, and others, that have led some diplomats to voice their doubts over the ability of the emergency order to quell the riots which have broken out in Mogadishu. By the same token, neither the diplomats nor the officials of the Somali regime are sure whether the riots in Mogadishu are attempts to overthrow the government.

President Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia, in a radio address to the nation, has sent a message of condolence to the bereaved families. He has also called on the people to be calm, counter instability and assist the security forces.

New USSR Ambassador to Ghana Appointed

LD1807130389 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Yevgeniy Ostrovenko the Soviet Union's ambassador to Ghana.

He will replace Vyacheslav Semenov who has retired.

Ostrovenko was born in 1940. He graduated from Moscow's State Institute of International Relations and has the degree of candidate of sciences in history.

He has held diplomatic posts since 1963. In 1980-1985, Ostrovenko was minister-counsellor of the USSR Embassy in Iran, and then worked at the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Ostrovenko has a diplomatic rank of envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, first class.

Commentary Praises Mozambican Peace Efforts

MB1807110189 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Mikhail Tsirolov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] For very many years Mozambicans have endured a war that has left thousands dead, and played havoc with Mozambique's economy. A penetrating look at the Mozambican situation makes it obvious that the use of arms is not the answer, even if South Africa were to stop its support of Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance], support which has somewhat helped the movement to continue its war against the legal government in Maputo.

All this has been discussed in Maputo, and peaceful resolution of the country's problems has won favor. There is no need to continue with the civil war in Mozambique, says President Joaquim Chissano. He had invited all Mozambicans of goodwill to put down their weapons and end confrontation. Renamo's response can be explained in many ways. A member of this movement, Manuel Frank, has told a news conference in Lisbon that Renamo is prepared to put down its arms if the government troops do the same. He described President Chissano's request for assistance from President Mobutu of Zaire as very commendable. Without a mediator in the situation, there will be no progress. There are currently no direct contacts between the Mozambican government and Renamo. However, there is concerted effort in many quarters to resolve Mozambique's problems. Solutions in this direction would be welcomed not only in Mozambique, but in the southern African region as a whole. Solutions to these problems have recently been discussed by the presidents of Mozambique and Zimbabwe in (?Beira), and by the OAU foreign ministers in Arusha, Tanzania.

The Mozambican situation was at the forefront of discussions during Herman Cohen's, American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recent visit to Mozambique. At a news conference on Thursday [13 July] Mr Cohen urged Renamo to lay down its arms and consider President Chissano's proposals for peace talks. It is expected that ending South Africa's assistance to Renamo will be discussed next week during South African National Party leader Mr F.W de Klerk's visit to Mozambique.

Following the historic cease-fire agreement signed in Gbadolite between the Angolan government and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] movement, prospects for talks between the factions in Mozambique are bright. The road to peace is not strewn with flowers, but requires dedication to peace, tolerance, and hard bargaining. Mozambique has to follow this road. There is no other way.

East Europe

Jaruzelski Candidacy for President Reported

LD1807125389 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw July 18 TASS—Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and president of the Polish Council of State, finally agreed to run for president at the deputies' club meeting today.

According to the PAP news agency, Jaruzelski said he had given consent to his nomination for presidential candidate taking account of new facts and circumstances, the position of the coalition and simply his own sense of duty.

Polish President's Support for Jaruzelski Viewed

PM1907092789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jul 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Making a Choice"]

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Jul—TRYBUNA LUDU has published today a report on a press conference given by Roman Malinowski, president of the United Peasant Party [ZSL] Supreme Committee.

In response to a question on the ZSL's position regarding Wojciech Jaruzelski's candidacy for the presidency of Poland, R. Malinowski observed that a presidential candidate should possess great international authority and considerable state and political experience. General Jaruzelski is such a candidate. The ZSL Supreme Committee president stressed that initially more than 10 ZSL deputies were opposed to this candidacy, but that the number had now fallen substantially.

General Jaruzelski's personality serves to guarantee the evolutionary course of reforms and the continuity of the great processes under way in the country, the consequences of which are felt not just in Poland but across Europe, too. We are convinced that this candidacy will best serve the changes taking place. Support for this candidacy from Western figures who have visited Poland, including recently President Bush, is also marked. There is also support from the Vatican and the Polish episcopacy.

In response to another question, Malinowski stated that the ZSL favors a government which includes representatives of participants in the roundtable discussions and all forces represented in parliament. Another formula for creating the new cabinet and government program should be drawn up. The candidate for the premiership nominated by the president should be chosen from the circle of people who are acceptable to all or the majority of the sides. He should not be nominated by the Sejm until talks have been held with all forces and factions in parliament. Only after this should the candidate for the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, if consensus regarding the makeup of the government and its programs is achieved, appear before parliament.

Jaruzelski Appeal to Group of Seven Cited

PM1707093989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS, REUTER, and AFP report: "Message to 'Seven'"]

[Text] W. Jaruzelski has appealed to the leaders of the seven most highly developed states of the West requesting aid for the implementation of more rapid structural changes and the undertaking of a fundamental reform of the national economy in Poland. In connection with the fact that the meeting of the "seven" will take place in Paris, W. Jaruzelski asks French President F. Mitterrand to acquaint the participants in the summit with this message.

The appeal says in particular: "Poland has embarked on the path of profound transformations making it possible to use the vital energy of all forces of society. The practical implementation of the policy of dialogue, national consensus, and profound changes is being accelerated in the country. The opposition is extensively represented in the new bicameral Polish parliament. The reforms which are being implemented are laying the foundation to a new democratic order in the state, an order guaranteed by law, and to a new economic model based on the laws of the market. All political forces which took part in the "roundtable" talks displayed the desire to continue this policy line. They are convinced that the reforms should be implemented by evolutionary means. That is required not only by state interests but also by the sense of joint responsibility for the stability of East-West relations.

"A danger is created by the situation in the Polish economy. There is a real threat that the economic crisis will be intensified, with all its consequences. Poland is trying to overcome this crisis through the radical reform of state structures and the economic system. The halting and reversal of adverse trends, primarily the inflationary growth of incomes and prices, is an urgent task.

"The Polish sociopolitical and economic reforms will have chances of success only when the country succeeds in a relatively brief period in overcoming its present difficult economic position and rapidly attaining substantial progress in the field of the restoration of the internal economic balance. Outside economic aid for Poland is of fundamental importance for the implementation of this goal. That is the coordinated position of the authorities and the opposition.

"Outside aid should not replace reform and market mechanisms, it should intensify them."

Hungary's Nyers Discusses Reform Program

PM1807122489 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 28, 9 Jul 89 p 1

[Interview with Rezso Nyers, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party chairman by Vladimir Brodetskiy: "HSWP—A Party of Renewal"; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] The plenary meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP] Central Committee elected Rezso Nyers, member of the Politburo of the HSWP, state minister of the HPR [Hungarian People's Republic], chairman of the HSWP at the end of June. Here he gives his first interview to the Soviet press at the request of Vladimir Brodetskiy, an MN correspondent.

Q.: What are the most urgent tasks that you see as chairman of the HSWP?

A.: At the present stage of renewal of socialism, the HSWP must become a new political force which enjoys the confidence of the majority of people, and is capable of securing for itself the right to govern through free democratic elections. That's why we should look to the best traditions of Lenin– we must be united by a convincing, realistic programme. The significance of collective leadership is growing.

I'm sure that the new four-member presidium will satisfy the demands which face the party's leadership. I see the task of the chairman of the party—as the first among equals there—to be the creation of an equilibrium in the party, recognizing the pluralism of opinions there. My daily duties include representing the HSWP in discussions with representatives of other trends in Hungarian political life. I also consider participation in setting the foreign policy of the HSWP and establishing its international relations to be an important task for myself, I place special significance on cooperation, based on trust, with the CPSU, which is moving along the road of renewal of socialism.

Q.: What do you think should be the role of the HSWP in the reforms that are taking place in Hungary?

A.: The HSWP is the initiator and the guarantor of changes in the country. The party recognized that the people's well-being demands a complete replacement of the model of development, within the framework of socialism. The HSWP initiated the reforms several decades ago. The party's programme is democratic socialism, based on a multimode market economy and on representative parliamentarism, which is a vital guarantee that reforms will be carried out in a consistent fashion. We realise the seriousness of our responsibility because today the HSWP is the only political force in Hungary which is capable of making the changes.

In our national aspirations we are inspired and stimulated by the new political thinking which is inseparable from the CPSU and the name of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Hungary Introduces Military Service Alternatives

PM1707101189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Hungary: Alternative for Draftees"]

[Text] Budapest—During the work of the Hungarian Parliament's session amendments to the law on national defense were put to the vote three times before the deputies, having finally worked out a compromise solution, voted for the introduction in the country of alternative 28-month civilian military service by a majority of votes, with 1 "against" and 11 "abstentions."

Certain agreements between the authorities and the churches representing the interests of draftees who for religious reasons refused to do military service involving the use of weapons have admittedly existed before. As Defense Minister F. Karpati noted in his speech at the session, the first steps were taken in 1977 when believers such as Adventists, Nazarenes, and Jehovah's Witnesses were released from the obligation to do military service involving the use of weapons and received the right not to undergo military preparation but to serve the specified period of 18 months in the construction troops.

The Hungarian Catholic Church and also the Hungarian Peace Council advocated that the right to alternative service be granted for reasons of freedom of conscience not only in the ranks of the Army but also, for example, in health protection, in environmental conservation work, and in charitable social organizations. Alternative civilian service, in their opinion, must not be like a punishment, but at the same time must not be easier

than military service. The latter point is important as everyone agreed that the alternative civilian service must not become a loophole for the children of high-ranking parents, for instance. And at the same time to deliberately make alternative service more difficult than ordinary military service would scarcely meet the requirements for more humane legislation. Especially as in 1988 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights acknowledged that the possibility of carrying out an alternative civilian service on ground of freedom of conscience is a legitimate human right.

As for the question of the length of the alternative civilian service, which provoked serious arguments, this is resolved in different ways in different countries. For example, in France, the period of ordinary service in the Army is 12 months, while the civilian service is 24 months.

After the Hungarian Parliament advocated in principle at the beginning of this year the introduction of alternative civilian service in the country, several options for the modification of the law on national defense appeared. While the two official options submitted for examination by the National Assembly envisaged the length of the alternative civilian service as 36 and 30 months respectively, various youth organizations, including opposition ones, proposed 24 or even 18 months, citing other European countries. As a result, the deputies voted for a compromise option, for a period of alternative civilian service of 28 months.

The supporters of a more radical reduction were obviously encouraged by the Hungarian defense minister's promise that reforms which will make it possible to create the conditions for reducing the period of active military service to 14 or even 12 months and reduce the length of the alternative service accordingly will be carried out in the Hungarian Army in the next 2-3 years.

All the same, how is it now going to be decided who can make use of the possibility of alternative civilian service and will it really not become a loophole for the "gilded youth"? First, in accepting this plan the deputies supposed, not without reason, that a longer period of alternative civilian service, even in a hospital or an environmental conservation service, is no picnic. And second, the question of alternative civilian service, as in other countries, will be decided not by the draftee himself but by a special authoritative commission made up of civilians and military men to whom drafted believers will have to submit a petition from the priest and the congregation. As Hungarian Defense Minister F. Karpati stated, where it is a question of a refusal to do military service on the grounds of freedom of conscience, the commission will evidently be in a more complex situation, since "freedom of conscience" is purely a moral and ethical matter. In this case the whole way of life of the person applying for alternative civilian service will have to be taken into account: Does he observe all the standards and commandments to which he refers, or is he merely using them as a pretext to avoid the draft? The law also stipulates that rejection of the country's constitutional and political system cannot be a reason for a draftee to expect alternative civilian service.

Romanian Party Notes Importance of Pact Conference

PM1707102189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Important Documents"]

[Text] Bucharest, 15 Jul—The Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact States was an event of great significance for the further development of cooperation among those countries both on the international plane and in building socialism. This was stressed at a session held here of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Political Executive Committee chaired by RCP Secretary General N. Ceausescu.

The session noted the importance of the documents signed, which reflect the general position of all Warsaw Pact states and their resolve to consistently make a contribution to carrying out disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and ensuring peace in Europe and throughout the world. These documents constitute an appeal to NATO countries and other states to jointly pursue a policy of peace, cooperation, and equitability which will ensure the free and independent development of all the peoples.

The Political Executive Commitee noted the importance of further enhancing the Political Consultative Committee's activity and intensifying its political character in order to develop mutual cooperation and consultations on fundamental questions concerning the building of socialism. It expressed Romania's desire to expand and strengthen collaboration with all socialist countries in building a new society based on respect for the right of every state and party to make an independent choice of political line. Romania is fully resolved to continue to contribute to the cause of disarmament, eliminating the threat of war, solving all interstate conflicts by political means, and establishing a climate of mutual understanding and broad cooperation.

'Pungent' Criticism at Yugoslav Plenum Noted

PM1907093789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[Report by own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev: "Escaping From the Crisis. League of Communist of Yugoslavia Central Committee Plenum on Preparations for the 14th Party Congress"]

[Text] If you were to put together all the media commentaries published prior to the opening of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] Central Committee plenum in Belgrade, what you would have is as follows: What concerns the party public above all at the moment is the fact that the preparations for the 14th LCY Congress,

on which great hopes are pinned, are making unsatisfactory progress. There are 5 months to go before the congress, but its platform has not yet been elaborated.

Now a plenum has been held with an agenda dealing with preparation of the LCY central organs' report on the party's activity in the period since the 13th Congress.

LCY Central Committee Presidium Secretary S. Korosec's speech was detailed and self-critical. The speaker noted that despite many resolutions the contradictions in Yugoslov society have worsened. The crisis is a threat to the country's achievements and to its stability. The essence of the problem, S. Korosec noted, is the fact that members of the leadership still disagree about the further development of democracy and the running of a market economy. Since the LCY has spent too long looking for answers to questions connected with the crisis, a variety of versions and variants of the country's social development have appeared in the country. And besides progressive forces there are those here who are applying the brake, calling for a return to command-and-administer methods and a party unity existing only on the basis of directions from on high.

The situation is aggravated by nationalism, which, accord ng to the keynote speaker, the LCY is not combating properly. If we do not succeed before the 14th LCY Congress in elaborating a common decision on what kind of socialism and self-management we are to have in Yugoslavia, there could be far-reaching consequences, S. Korosec noted.

Indeed, the report was self-critical. But the speeches during the debate were even more pungent. They contained serious criticism of the draft report on the LCY's activity in the 3 years since the 13th congress. Perhaps the fiercest was the speech by Z. Grebo, recently elected member of the LCY Central Committee from Bosnia-Hercegovina. In particular, he said that in his view the party was one of the generators of the crisis in Yugoslav society and that the only way was to establish political pluralism as a permanent institution. During his speech Z. Grebo resigned his Central Committee membership for personal reasons. It was decided to consider this at the next plenum.

In his closing speech, LCY Central Committee Presidium Chairman M. Pancevski noted that the country and the party are now faced with having to make radical changes to the earlier model for developing a socialist society in Yugoslavia. The way out of the crisis is to firmly and consistently follow the course of the three projected reforms: political, economic, and reform of the LCY, since it is reforms that will open up new prospects for the development of society. A worn-out model of social development, M. Pancevski noted, can no longer meet the demands of the times. We all need, he said, to confront the new social processes based on the achievements of science and technology and further democratization of society.

The LCY Central Committee plenum approved the draft LCY report as a basis for further discussion in primary party organizations, which will continue until the 14th congress planned, as is known, for December.

The date was set for a plenum on interethnic relations. It will be held on 31 July-1 August. The plenum ended with the consideration of an organizational matter: A new LCY Central Committee Presidium member, Croatian Communists' representative M. Lolic, was elected.

Croatian Delegation Received at Supreme Soviet

PM1807155389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] There was a meeting at the USSR Supreme Soviet 13 July with a delegation from the Croatian (SFRY) Sabor (parliament) delegation headed by its chairman A. Runic. It is in the USSR at the invitation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet.

Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, told the guests about the nature of the USSR Supreme Soviet's work under the new conditions when the process of shaping the people's power is under way in the country.

Taking part in the meeting were V.S. Shevchenko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; and M. Veres, SFRY ambassador to the USSR.

West's Reactions to Kosovo Developments Seen

PM1707102789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Ye Vostrukhov dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "Yugoslavia: They Are Playing the 'Kosovo Card'"]

[Text] Belgrade—TANJUG has reported that a SFRY presidency sitting examined the sociopolitical situation in Kosovo Autonomous Province and the fulfillment of the presidency's decision to introduce special measures on the province's territory. On the basis of an assessment of the current political situation, the SFRY presidency decided to abrogate those of the measures introduced in Kosovo 27 February still in operation. In particular, labor service (with certain exceptions) and restrictions on vacations and trips abroad. The SFRY presidency thought it necessary to leave in force only the ban on demonstrations.

This decision once again convincingly disproves the claims made by certain foreign press organs and representatives of a number of international organizations, which were mainly founded on rumors, that human rights are being systematically violated in Yugoslavia, notably in Kosovo, and a policy of discrimination and

oppression implemented against Albanian nationals. Members of a European parliament delegation, who were given full opportunity to obtain the requisite information "at first hand" during their recent trip around Yugoslavia, approached their assessment of events in Kosovo and the current situation in the province in an extremely subjective and one-sided fashion. The Yugoslav public was surprised when it became acquainted with the delegation's conclusions, which are far-removed from actual reality. The delegation members, BORBA writes, tried to justify the actions of the separatists and nationalists, who have embarked on the path of extremism and employed unlawful methods in their struggle for their splittist aims. The special measures which the SFRY presidency was forced to employ were necessary.

Yugoslav mass media reports that U.S. congressmen also decided to make their contribution to the misinformation of the world public. Deputies from both chambers of the U.S. Congress recently discussed a draft resolution on human rights in Yugoslavia, which sharply criticizes the SFRY Government for imaginary violations of these rights in Kosovo. The resolution emerged in connection with the discussion of a draft law on assistance to foreign states.

Incidentally, the Belgrade press published the text of the resolution. The newspapers unanimously described it as "anti-Yugoslav." The press stresses that it is a question of an unexpected unilateral act which damages the years-long relations between the United States and the SFRY. The SFRY Federal Executive Assembly issued a special statement on the subject of the resolution, pointing out that it is not founded on real fact and conflicts with the actual position in the country, the practice of international relations, and the well-tried principles of cooperation between the two states. The statement was given to U.S. Congressman S. Solarz, who is visiting Belgrade.

TANJUG reports that B. Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, invited the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade and conveyed to the latter his government's concern. The federal secretary said that this step signifies objective support for the nationalist and separatist elements in Kosovo, which contravenes the U.S. side's statement of support for Yugoslavia's sovereignty and independence. The Yugoslav Government is also greatly concerned because the United States has taken this step at a time when Yugoslavia is applying tremendous effects to implement profound reforms on a democratic basis.

The U.S. ambassador said that the U.S. Government was not directly involved in the adoption of this document and the ratification procedure is still not over. That is in fact the case. But in the wake of the House of Representatives the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee confirmed the anti-Yugoslav resolution without discussion. So, whom does it pay to play the "Kosovo card"?

USSR-GDR Military Exercises End 18 Jul

LD1807153189 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Berlin July 18 TASS—A joint command and staff exercise of the Western Group of Soviet troops and the National People's Army of the GDR ended on the GDR's territory today.

It was held since July 11 in accordance with a plan of joint activities of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member- states.

The exercise, which illustrated the enhanced level of training of the allied armies' staffs, practically realised the main provisions of the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member- states, said Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, who was in charge of the exercise.

The exercise in which the minister of the GDR national defence Army General Heintz Kessler participated, promoted perfection of the interaction of the staffs of the two fraternal armies and made an appreciable contribution to consolidation of cooperation between the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces and the National People's Army of the GDR, Lushev told TASS.

Turkmen Party Second Secretary Visits Bulgaria

PM1807093189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Familiarization With Experience"]

[Text] A CPSU delegation headed by S.M. Nesterenko, second secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, has paid a visit to Bulgaria during which it was familiarized with the Bulgarian Communist Party's experience of cadre policy in contemporary conditions and was received by D. Stoyanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee.

CSSR Nuclear Plant Safety System Described

PM1807102989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jul 89 Second Edition p 5

[A. Rudenko report: "So That the Alarm Bells Need Not Ring"]

[Text] At the "Electrification" pavilion at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements in Moscow recently there was an exhibition called "Interatomkontrol-89." Specialists' attention was drawn to "SOS," a nuclear power station control system unparalleled in the world. It is presented by the Czechoslovak concern Skoda.

"What is the reason for its success?" I asked Stanislav Cichon, the system's designer.

[Cichon] Nuclear power stations in Czechoslovakia already generate one kilowatt-hour in every four and by the end of the century our nuclear power stations will generate one-half of our electricity. There is no alternative, and therefore the CSSR is investing great material resources and intellectual potential in the sector's development. The question of nuclear power station safety is especially important for a small country like Czechoslovakia. So it is no coincidence that we aimed for the best world standard with the "SOS" control system.

[Rudenko] Incidentally, where did that thought-provoking name come from?

[Cichon] It is simply an abbreviation of the Czech expression "special protection system." The distinguishing feature of "SOS" is the continuous testing of the sensors, that is, the most vulnerable link of such systems. That removes the need for preventive checks. I would point out that a mechanic carries out a check once a shift, a whole team of specialists conducts a survey once every 2 months, and once every 6 months.... And so on and infinitum. If anything happens to the "SOS" sensor the system itself immediately decides what to do: For example, it will allow 10 minutes for a repair and, if necessary, it will shut the reactor down. At the same time this reduces the scope for those who like to tinker with technology to the detriment of people's safety.

Meanwhile, thanks to the use of continuous automatic testing and artificial intelligence components it has been possible to reduce the instrument's size—the electronic unit is housed in two small wall cupboards—and to keep costs to an acceptable level—several tens of thousands of rubles.

[Rudenko] What is the system's future now?

[Cichon] It has been installed at two electric power stations in Czechoslovakia. Industrialists from the FRG and Denmark wanted to buy a production license for "SOS" but at the moment the system has no equivalent and it is more advantageous for us to export ready-made instruments, so we refused. Soon the first instruments will be sent to Finland and China. Talks are being held on a sale to the Soviet Union as well.

West Europe

FRG Minister's 'Outburst' on German Borders Hit

PM1807100189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev "Correspondent's Comment": "Finishing Touches Not Applied"]

[Text] Bonn, 14 Jul—The recent speech by FRG Finance Minister T. Waigel, chairman of the Christian Social Union [CSU], at the Hannover rally of the "Association of Silesian Germans" stirred up great waves of criticism. There was indignation and protest among political and public circles at Waigel's statement that the German Reich still exists "within the 1937 borders" and that the fate of the areas "across the Oder and the Neisse," that is, lands which have been Polish from time immemorial, is still an "open German question."

The FRG Finance Minister's outburst was sharply criticized by the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Communists, numerous social organizations, and press organs. Within the ruling coalition of the Christian Democratic Union/CSU and the Free Democratic Party [FDP], the Free Democrats immediately dissociated themselves from it.

In an interview in STERN magazine H.-D. Genscher, deputy federal chancellor and FRG foreign minister, made the following comment: "I must state with all seriousness that the responsible approach to the building of German-Polish relations and the unconditional observance of the letter and sense of the Polish treaty between the FRG and the Polish People's Republic are the foundation and core of cooperation in a government involving the FDP."

T. Waigel is now trying to justify himself by claiming that he was merely repeating a "legal position" formulated by the federal constitutional court. However, it is probably clear to him, too, what kind of a domestic and foreign policy mistake he made in Hannover. In any event, the federal chancellor was forced to intervene in the affair. In the context of the political row which has developed, his statement on the approaching 50th anniversary of the "attack by the National-Socialist criminal aggressors on Poland which launched World War II" looks significant. He called it the duty of the FRG to work for mutual understanding with Poland and stated that the time has come for reconciliation between Germans and Poles.

But have the necessary final touches been applied in this case? I think not. After all, the statement also contains a claim about the legal and political "openness of the German question."

One would like to believe that the FRG government will take as its guideline the principle which it has recognized, namely that the primacy of international law must be ensured.

Electromagnetic Cannon Test in UK Fails

18070690 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Ye. Piskunov: "Farce at Testing Grounds"]

[Text] England laughed when the results of a test of an "electromagnetic cannon" conducted in Kent became public. This is a new type of offensive weapon on which work has been carried out in strictest secrecy for 5 years

now. The cannon was termed "a miracle weapon" ahead of time, and it had been identified to take its place in the "star wars" program implemented by the Pentagon.

Its creators have calculated that a hit on the target by a small-size—only several centimeters long—projectile of the weapon should be equivalent to a hit by a round weighing 1 tonne, due to the tremendous velocity. This would make it possible to destroy nuclear ballistic missiles and tanks with the strongest armor.

At the Kent testing grounds, the cannon was loaded with a plastic projectile. However, it flew out through the side assembly rather than the muzzle, striking one of the fathers of this miracle weapon, David Rayburn, in the head. The victim got away with barely a scare because the power of the projectile hit turned out to be no more than...that of a cricket ball.

The leadership of the British Ministry of Defense was not laughing. Their depression was exacerbated by an inquiry by a group of members of Parliament who demanded exact information on the true scale of the country's participation in the "star wars" program and on the amount already spent by Great Britain for the "electromagnetic cannon."

Political & Social

Gorbachev's Report to Central Committee 18 Jul

PM1907100189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 89 Second Edition pp 1-3

[Report delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at 18 July CPSU Central Committee conference: "The Restructuring of the Party's Work Is a Most Important Key Task of the Day. M.S. Gorbachev's Report at CPSU Central Committee Conference"]

[Text] Comrades!

The Politburo deemed it necessary to hold this meeting in order to discuss urgent problems connected with the party's activity at the present stage of restructuring. The entire course of events has brought these problems to the fore. They are at the center of debate not only in the party but also in society.

The lively discussion of all questions connected with the party's activity is an indicator of the tremendous importance that our people attach to the CPSU's role, realizing that their hopes for the success of restructuring, the renewal of society, and a better life are linked to a decisive extent with the party's policy and practical activity. It is to this above all that the serious turnaround in the public mind toward a sharply critical attitude to the work of party organs, party organizations, and Communists can be attributed.

In general, we need a thorough discussion today. We must provide answers to the questions about the party that particularly perturb Communists and all Soviet people today. Our people must be confident that the CPSU remains utterly faithful to its choice, to its policy of restructuring, and will firmly occupy positions of revolutionary transformations in society in the people's interests.

I.

Comrades! We must approach the assessment of the party's activity at the present stage in the context of the contemporary political situation in the country. It should be said that this situation is extremely complex and ambiguous. The country is essentially experiencing a critical period of restructuring. And we can all keenly feel this. It was also sharply displayed at the Congress of People's Deputies.

The congress deepened our knowledge of the processes taking place in society and provided a pitiless analysis of our sore points, contradictions, and difficulties. We now realize still more clearly just how serious the crisis in which the country found itself by the early eighties was—a crisis from which we still have not extricated ourselves. Moreover, certain processes in economic and sociopolitical life have even deteriorated. This applies to the situation in the consumer market, to the country's financial state, to certain problems of social justice, and to interethnic relations.

The congress revealed Soviet people's great concern at the level of discipline and public order and at the way in which the struggle against crime and mismanagement is being waged. In supporting the line of further developing democracy, glasnost, and humanization, the public is resolutely opposed to any cases of a lack of respect for the individual, the law, and justice, of manifestations of the cult of force and total license, and of rampant uncontrolled passions and emotions.

The work of the congress and the Supreme Soviet is essentially opening up a new period in the development of socialism's social system. Each of us, indeed, I think each Soviet person, realizes the extraordinary nature of these events and their crucial significance. The point here is not only that for the first time the supreme organs of state power and management have been formed and the basic guidelines for the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy defined on a democratic basis. Both these points are extremely important in themselves. But probably the main thing is that a practical start has been made to the real transfer of the whole panoply of state power into the hands of the soviets and to the creation of a new democratic model for including the people's masses in the resolution of statewide questions. Thus the political reform is being transferred from the sphere of ideas, studies, and plans to the dimension of practice and is becoming a reality of life. The country is changing, and our views and actions must be updated accordingly.

I think that in order to assess the political situation in its dynamism we need to more carefully analyze **the prevailing disposition of social forces.**

The congress reflected and gave fresh impetus to the process of the further politicization of the masses and their involvement in the social processes taking place in the country. It demonstrated once again the commitment of our society's main social forces to the ideas of restructuring put forward by the party. But it is also a fact that within society there is mounting criticism and dissatisfaction with restructuring's results and the polarization and differentiation of opinions and sentiments are accelerating.

What specific sentiments and phenomena are we encountering here?

Restructuring continues to experience strong resistance from dogmatic, conservative forces, many of which regard democratic steps as a deviation from socialist principles. Today it is clearly already possible to say—it is self-evident—that psychological uncertainty and irritation sometimes arise among those who have been unable to restructure themselves and a desire emerges to move on to

a strong-arm solution of today's political problems and to regain their lost prestige by using sanctions against anyone who disagrees and voices criticism.

These sentiments on the part of a certain section of personnel, of our cadres, and their hankering for authoritarian methods are supported and shared by a certain section of the country's population. We must perceive this if we want to continue to adopt a realistic standpoint.

I think that the dogmatic positions are bolstered not only by conservatism in thinking and mentality but also to some extent by a misunderstanding of the essence of the processes that are under way and by confused reference points, and this also must be taken into account.

Lately a growth in the social strata under the influence of radical left-wing sentiments has emerged quite clearly. They are in favor of more resolute action and of forcing the pace of transformations. Populist ideas and leftist speculations on the demands for social justice in a spirit of universal leveling have gained wide currency here. There is a real basis for such sentiments. Not everything in our country is okay with regard to progress along the path of restructuring. In some respects we are lagging behind and marking time, and in some places there is even something of a backlash. On the basis of our present ideas, which presuppose diversity of opinions and approaches, different positions, and the submission of alternative options for solving pressing problems on a principled socialist basis, the existence of such forces and sentiments is in general a natural phenomenon. And it would be incorrect to try to separate them from the general processes of restructuring. In our work we must take into account all the diversity of opinions and sentiments that really exist in society.

To ensure a clear and full picture of the present political situation, we must also note the intensifying manifestations of extremism in the most diverse forms and the most diverse social spheres. Almost open calls to borrow values alien to socialism from the arsenal of bourgeois democracy and private enterprise are being foisted on society. The task is to firmly steer matters along the path of socialist renewal while consolidating all healthy forces advocating restructuring and persistently overcoming extremist tendencies.

The CPSU retains hold of the initiative and relies on broad support from the working class, the peasantry, and creative forces in the intelligentsia. At the same time, as I have already said, a debate about the party's activity is vigorously proceeding within society. There is a logic in this, for restructuring the political system, sovereignty for the soviets to which the congress made a practical start, and the very renewal of society are inconceivable without renewing the party.

Ours is a ruling party and it cannot evade political responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. Moreover, this responsibility is becoming still greater in view of the scale of transformations taking place in society.

You and I know that not everything is fine in the activity of various links of our party and our cadres at the present very crucial stage of restructuring. There are many problems here. We cannot duck them, and they require that we analyze them in a party fashion, from a principled standpoint, and assess just what is going on without panic and excessive drama. Indeed, this is the chief task of our meeting at the party Central Committee today.

You hear the opinion expressed that the critical attitude within society toward the activity of party organs and party cadres stems from the exposure of past mistakes and distortions, the wave of criticism and one-sided articles in the press, attacks on party leaders, the identification of party leaders with bureaucrats, and so on. Clearly, there is a certain amount of truth in all this.

Unquestionably, another factor is the unfavorable socioeconomic background to the present moment, especially the lack of balance in the consumer market, the growing shortage of goods and services, the acuteness of the food and housing problems, the neglect of health care, the difficulties in the life of low-income families, the distortions in the cooperative movement, and a number of other factors. Moreover, if people can see that a particular party committee does not want change, this is bound to prompt dissatisfaction with the activity of party organizations.

Here we are getting close to what I think is the heart of the matter—**restructuring within the party is lagging substantially behind the processes taking place in society.** On this basis there is a real danger of weakening the CPSU's leading role in restructuring and therefore in society. And this is causing mounting concern over the prestige of the party and its leading organs at the center and at the local level not only among Communists but also among broad strata of working people.

A question arises. What is this—a crisis of the party? No, not of the party, but of its former functions, of its obsolete methods and style of work. For a long period the party was built into the administrative edict system for the management of society and lived according to the laws of that system. And it was not merely built into it, but in essence it towered over everything and controlled all processes in state, economic, and ideological life, supplanting and trampling down all and sundry and issuing peremptory directives and edicts to state and economic organs and social organizations. In a certain sense it was easier and simpler to lead under those conditions. But the most important thing in the party's work was lost—its role as society's political vanguard and its living link with the masses. Party committees and party personnel, relying on the force of decisions and

instructions, in the meantime forgot how to conduct dialogue with people, to win their trust, and to carry them along by force, persuasion and arguments.

A different social situation prevails now. The party cannot and must not issue edicts to state economic organs and social organizations. Our duty is to conduct political work among the masses, to put forward bold ideas and explain them to people, to act openly, to prevent the growth of negative phenomena, to vigorously promote everything new and progressive, and to make an effective contribution to solving problems associated with people's lives. This is especially important in the contemporary sociopolitical situation, a complex situation characterized by divergent opinions, by the growth of people's political activeness, by a turbulent surge of public initiative, and by the development of organizations' spontaneous activity and the emergence of new movements.

The most important thing now is to extricate the party from what I would describe as a state of siege and to bring it into a state of dynamism. And to this end every party organization, proceeding from the common tasks, must have its own action program—its own program according to the specific conditions in which it works. These action programs must be open to any initiative that is to the people's benefit.

II.

In the present situation, Comrades, we cannot manage without **rethinking the party's functions and role in society** and determining its coordinates within the political system of socialism as it undergoes renewal.

Recently it has been possible to hear certain "superradicals" saying that the party should virtually leave the general political arena, limiting its functions exclusively to its own internal affairs or educational matters. Namely, it is essentially a question of turning the party either into a sect or into some kind of debating-cum-educational club. Neither option is suitable for the CPSU, which is a ruling party and a political organization.

Parties everywhere and always have been created and have operated as an instrument of the struggle for power and as a mechanism for transforming the interests and aspirations of various classes, social groups and forces, and ideological and political currents into real state policy. And Lenin's party, the bolshevik party, has been and remains no exception in this respect. Expressing the interests of the working people's classes, above all the working class, and integrating within itself society's most progressive forces, it constitutes the political vanguard of the people.

The party's basic functions stem from this. These are the constant development and enrichment of social thought, the elaboration of the basic principles of domestic and foreign policy on a scientific Marxist-Leninist basis, in light of pressing needs of social development and the masses' interests and sentiments, and the conduct of ideological and organizational work in order to make the party's course the property of the minds and practical actions of the broad people's masses. And, finally, cadres have been and remain the party's unfailing concern.

The party's functions also determine what the party itself must be like, what its contemporary political complexion should be, and the forms in which its activity should be implemented within the genuine democratization of society. Above all, it is clear to us all that in a democratic society the party itself must be an expression of the highest and most consistent form of democratism and set an example of democratic development to the whole society. And to achieve this it must resolutely rid itself once and for all of the deformations caused by the personality cult and the period of stagnation.

All the conditions should be created within the party—including statutory conditions—to fearlessly compare views and put forward alternatives and different approaches to resolve a given problem while preserving unity on questions of principle and strategic goals. In fact, this is how it was in Lenin's lifetime, when broad, firm intraparty democracy was ensured in the most difficult conditions.

Another thing—close collaboration is needed between the party and various social organizations. The party should sensitively grasp the full gamut of opinion in society and react promptly to changes in society's mood. But it cannot "grasp infinity"—it cannot itself fill the entire sociopolitical spectrum. Here we cannot do without living links, constant dialogue with social organizations and movements. The party will only strengthen its positions if it collaborates with such movements and with society as a whole, enlisting all its viable, intellectual forces in the formulation of a common policy and program of actions.

And finally, one more thing. For we Communists it is quite clear that the CPSU is at the service of the people and should be under their constant democratic control. The CPSU voluntarily places itself under the masses' control, through, among other things, the election of its representatives to the highest and local organs of power, and also to trade unions, social organizations, and so forth. Through these and other democratic procedures the party conducts a constant dialogue with the whole society on every issue.

All these, comrades, are, so to speak, general points on the question under consideration. Obviously, now that the party faces on a practical plane the tasks of substantially changing its methods of work and of organic involvement in social processes within the framework of restructuring and political reform, certain fundamental problems demand more concrete examination and discussion.

The central question here is, of course, that of the relationship between the party and the soviets.

I do not think there is any need for me to rehearse the argument that party organizations and the entire party should operate within the framework of the law. That is a political axiom for us. And at the same time the party's tasks and the forms and methods of its work are defined by the party itself, by its program and statutes. We should state quite clearly that the political system of socialism and radical reform are inconceivable without the party's active participation.

In this connection I would like to reiterate that attempts to counterpose the party to the soviets are entirely unacceptable and do not meet the tasks of restructuring or the interests of the working people. Proposals to staticize the party and subjugate it to the state are also theoretically groundless and politically erroneous. This is a kind of backward step. It is in effect a reworked version of the administrative edict system. Basically there is nothing new in it. It is necessary to move firmly forward, guided by Lenin's principle of the demarcation of the functions of the party, soviets, and management organs. We have embarked on this path and will not turn aside from it.

Taking note of these principled approaches, we should tell ourselves frankly that the old practice of party diktat over the soviets at every level is completely obsolete. It is unacceptable. New, democratic forms and methods of collaboration should be based, as I have said, on the clear separation of the functions of the political vanguard of society, on the one hand, and the exercise of power and administration, which are being handed over to the soviets, on the other. We must recognize this, understand the objective necessity for this approach, and restructure ourselves politically and psychologically. Psychologically, because certain comrades seem to regard the transfer of power to the soviets as virtually the end of the universe. But if this is the end, comrades, it is only the end of a deformed universe.

But it is basically a question of creating a new mechanism of collaboration between the party and the soviets and of the party's political methods of influence on their activity. It is first and foremost a question of formulating policy and implementing it through the soviets. This is not only a task on a statewide scale. At the republican level there is a policy, at the local level there is a policy. As Lenin said, wherever the masses are, there is politics. And party organs can only carry political decisions in the organs of people's power through persuasion, recommendations, and democratic agreements, through Communists working on the soviets and their executive organs.

It must be admitted that we are only taking the first steps along this path. This applies to the Central Committee, its Politburo, union republic Communist Party Central Committees, and party kray committees [kraykoms], oblast committees [obkoms], city committees [gorkoms], and rayon committees [raykoms]. In fact, the practice of taking the place of the soviets still occurs. This is now justified to some extent in terms of the transitional period we are living through, when the soviets are not yet fully prepared to assume power, and also, in order to successfully exercise power, they are still short of the relevant legislative acts and skilled cadres.

In this connection I would like to answer a question that is often asked by party committee secretaries: How do we work now, today, when the soviets have not yet assumed full responsibility and concern within the limits of their competence? But it does not follow from this, comrades, that party committees can operate by the old methods regardless of the radically changing situation in society.

Life shows that many party committees are, in the present situation, fulfilling their functions comparatively and successfully, resolutely changing their work style and methods, increasing the role of primary organizations, shifting the center of organizational and ideological work to the masses, and making wide use of the mass media to that end. These approaches, as experience shows, quite rapidly change the atmosphere in the rayon or city, bring the party organs closer to the working people, and produce results in terms of the mood and in terms of political and economic activity. Examples of this are the activity of the Krasnodar and Stavropol Kray and Lipetsk, Rostov, and Saratov Oblast party organizations, and others.

Conversely, where party organs do not take much trouble to look for new methods in light of current needs, but stay in their old rut, here, to be frank, restructuring processes are also proceeding slowly and with difficulty, which causes dissatisfaction in people. And some comrades are so accustomed to the old ways that after the abolition of sector departments they find all kinds of loopholes to reproduce these functions in organizational or socioeconomic departments. I have, so to speak, nothing to add here. You will not get far with that interpretation of the restructuring of party activity and organs and of their style and methods.

I would also like to share my thoughts on the question of the work of Communists in the organs of soviet power. Here there are, no doubt, some things that are obvious and do not require any additional proof. Party organizations and the party as a whole should demand quite clearly and firmly that Communists who are entrusted with work on the soviets set an example of a high degree of responsibility for the task in hand and work selflessly to resolve the large-scale and to a significant degree unfamiliar tasks of restructuring.

But new questions also arise here that we must perceive and interpret properly. The fact is that the people's deputy who is a Communist now finds himself in a system of dual responsibility—to the party and to the voters. We naturally cannot regard Communist deputies

as free from party discipline or the fulfillment of party decisions. But it would also be wrong to reduce their activity as deputies to a matter of giving a state formulation to party instructions. I think it is the duty of every Communist deputy to act from a united position on the fundamental questions arising from the party's political strategy and from the decisions of the party organ at the relevant level on matters of principle. In everything else, he has total freedom of initiative, opinion, and voting.

During the election campaign we did not see sufficient clarity in the norms of party ethics pertaining to candidate deputies who were Communists. Some of them conducted themselves basically like independent candidates. I think a Communist should first and foremost defend the party's election platform and coordinate with it the main, fundamental provisions of his program, enriching it with concrete proposals and pledges.

This was associated to a significant degree with the lack of clarity in the positions of party committees during the election campaign. Many of them proved unprepared to work in the new democratic situation, in the mood and atmosphere in which the elections were held. Although we discussed this question at a party Central Committee plenum and recognized that a unique election campaign lay ahead for us and that we should be prepared to encounter completely unfamiliar situations. And the party's election platform was prepared with a view to the specific nature of this election campaign and, as you remember, met with a fairly wide response in society. Many deputies, even those who adopted keenly critical positions with regard to the party, filled their programs with provisions drawn from the CPSU election platform.

In a number of instances the adherence of party committees to the old approaches and attempts to impose their own opinion instead of working out common approaches together with the working people and putting forward agreed candidacies prompted a sharply negative reaction, and even conscious opposition, among the voters.

This placed some Communists who enjoyed real prestige and received the voters' support in a complex position, and sometimes even created a conflict situation. A considerable number of party workers failed to follow the best path and stood aside from this important campaign, with which we associated the resolution of the most important tasks of the first stage of the political reform.

All this, comrades, must be considered carefully. I know that discussions have taken place and are still in progress on these matters in rayon, city, oblast, and republican party organizations. It is important to learn all the necessary lessons for the future, especially in light of the new tasks at the next stage of the political reform.

I do not think anyone doubts that the forthcoming elections of people's deputies to republican and local soviets will give a new boost to the politicization of the masses. The party should be ready to act energetically in this situation. Party organizations cannot maintain neutrality in the election struggle. They have no right to remain silent where it is necessary to speak, to convince the voters. Party organizations should be prepared to act skillfully in the most diverse and even, I would say, unique conditions in working with the population.

The forms and methods of work may vary according to the distribution of political forces in different regions of the country, but a whole group of general avenues in this activity can be identified: formulation of an election campaign strategy; study of public opinion; selection, preparation, and nomination of candidates (after all, we have to elect more than 2 million deputies); program support for the election campaigns; corresponding ideological work, including propaganda and political publicity for candidates; and, lastly, the technical and financial aspects of the elections.

It can be assumed that a major trial of strength will begin at the stage of the formation of election commissions, and particularly in the course of the nomination of candidate deputies. Here it must be taken into account that on the basis of the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies the party is coming under justified criticism from the working class and peasantry because of insufficient attentiveness to their representatives. I would say that as a result of this party committees have suffered a severe loss in the eyes of labor collectives and primary party organizations. This obviously also explains the fact that in many regions of the country debates have begun on guarantees for the representation of labor collectives.

In general, comrades, over many years we have lost the habit of regarding elections as a keen political struggle. Now this has become a reality. We must recognize this fully and prepare the party accordingly for actions in the forthcoming election campaign. We cannot now tolerate the complacency that was observed at the last elections. Otherwise the party could suffer serious political losses.

I would like to touch on one more question in connection with the forthcoming elections to republican and local soviets. The question of combining the posts of party committee secretaries and soviet chairmen is now being discussed with considerable animation in society. You remember that this question was discussed heatedly at the 19th party conference. The political directive of the conference on this score is not of a categorical nature. I think the resolution of the question of combining posts must be approached in concrete terms in each case, on the basis of the developing political situation. In principle any deputy who has prestige can become a soviet chairman, regardless of the post he holds and whether he is a Communist or a nonparty person. It seems that this approach accords both with the Constitution and with the present state of development of democracy.

We must also take a new look at the party's relations not only with the soviets, but with other components of the political system, first and foremost social organizations. It must be said frankly that the old approach, whereby the party, in essence, directly ran the work of social organizations, thus restricting their autonomy even in the resolution of internal questions, is not acceptable to us. And we should put an end to that anachronism.

This applies first and foremost to the trade unions—the biggest mass organization of working people. Here the consequences of the past distorted relationship between them and the party are still powerful, and this is one reason why the trade unions are now restructuring themselves only slowly. They are still far from fully carrying out their function of expressing and defending the working people's interests. And this means that problems accumulate and are not resolved. This is confirmed by recent events in the country. It is becoming clear that many acute problems concerning labor and everyday life and the social and ecological conditions of working people's lives were for a long period left without due attention or consideration, which led ultimately to their exacerbation and to conflict situations.

There are fairly strong critical feelings among working people over the passive position of the trade unions on these matters, a position that does not accord with the present-day dynamics of social life and the real state of affairs. Our entire society has a vital interest in updating the trade unions' activity and ensuring that all problems relating to the life and activity of labor collectives are considered promptly and resolved. Otherwise we will continue to be unable to avoid major conflict situations.

All this is, of course, comrades, first and foremost the concern of the trade unions themselves, the trade union aktiv and workers, and ultimately the trade union members. But as I have said, the fate of the mass organization of working people is not a matter of indifference to the party. And today we have a right to make serious demands on Communists working in the trade unions because of omissions and shortcomings in their work, and to remind them of their responsibility for the task at hand before the masses, who have placed great trust in them. And to continue to recommend to the trade unions the most authoritative and capable Communists, not simply those who have gained experience in other sectors.

Relations with the Communist Youth League [Komsomol] must also be structured in a new way. There are direct instructions to this effect from the 27th party congress and the 19th party conference, and also CPSU Central Committee decisions. And if we are nonetheless returning to this question yet again, this is dictated by the fact that in this organization too, which unites the most dynamic section of society, restructuring processes have not achieved the necessary development and are going too slowly. There is a sense that our Komsomol is bogged down at the stage of debates which, having an acute critical thrust, have as yet provided little that is constructive for restructuring in this important political organization. And we Communists speak of this with concern and sympathy, because we cannot be impartial observers. The future of the Komsomol is indissolubly linked with the future of the party and restructuring.

Now, in essence, the question of reviving the Komsomol's prestige among young people, and indeed in society in general, is urgent. And that cannot be achieved without restructuring the internal structure and the very life of Komsomol organizations. It is a fact that the present organizational structure and forms and methods of work led to the bureaucratization of the Komsomol, a lessening of young people's interest in it, and the spread of, frankly, nihilism among young people with regard to their organization.

But for all the criticism in assessments of the Kosmomol's present activity, there is no doubt that the country must have a young people's political organization that is close to the party and works under its leadership, under its ideological influence. And that is the position not only of adults, but of young people themselves. Young people are powerfully attracted to socialist values. Political activity is also a powerful attraction.

There is already clear disagreement among young people with the calls to disband the Komsomol. The Komsomol can and must be in reality a strong and dynamic political organization of young people expressing young people's interests. But the Komsomol can be such a serious political force only if it is organically involved in all the processes of public life and takes part in shaping and the functions of political power and management organs at all levels.

The main sphere of Komsomol restructuring, as we see it, is that of ensuring its complete organizational independence and spontaneous character. The actual formation of Komsomol ranks should take place in such a way that the Komsomol includes on a voluntary basis the most active, creative, and politically enterprising forces of young people. Obviously there should be no endeavor to make Komsomol membership universal, as was done until recently.

We must take to heart everything that is happening in the Komsomol, show the greatest attentiveness toward our young comrades in ideology and restructuring, and feel a greater sense of responsibility for the future of the Komsomol. But we must not have a situation whereby one extreme, the unwarranted interference, issuing of edicts, and petty tutelage of the Komsomol that occurred in the past, is replaced by the other: indifference and an inattentive attitude toward it. But this already exists in some places. What is needed now more than ever before is closeness and comradely collaboration between party and Komsomol committees, between party and Komsomol organizations, between Communists and Komsomol members. Restructuring is a revolution, and young people must be an active and enterprising force in it.

What we need to do today is exchange opinions on approaches to so-called informal public organizations and movements. They are continuing to grow, becoming increasingly active, and are frequently taking over the initiative in influencing the masses' sentiments. How are we all supposed to view this?

Alternative programs for the solution of the important problems that have accumulated in the country contribute to a deeper understanding of particular phenomena and factors and aid the implementation of effective practical steps. By the very fact that they exist these movements prompt party, soviet, state, and economic organs to act more vigorously and to be more flexible and efficient.

When assessing the various informal groups, organizations, and movements, party organizations must adopt a differentiated approach that takes into account their places and roles in the sociopolitical spectrum. On the basis of actual experience we can now say that the vast majority of these organizations advocate deeper restructuring, further democratization, the preservation of the natural environment and ecological standards, and the development of the historical and cultural heritage and are sincerely concerned for the fate of cities, rayons, oblasts, republics, and the state as a whole. Of course, each organization has its own particular viewpoint and its own methods of attaining its goal, which often arouses wariness. But this should not obscure the objective coincidence of their positive goals with the goals of restructuring. And this is a basis for dialogue and collaboration with them. This is a principle we must follow.

We must adopt the same clear stance vis-a-vis destructive elements in some unsponsored organizations and public movements. We cannot accept their antisocialist views and antisocial actions and must make a timely and proper assessment of them and rebuff them. But that is just one side of the coin.

We must be aware that the destructive elements are speculating on the difficulties in our life today and on the many unresolved issues wherever soviet and economic organs do not pay due attention to pressing questions of working people's lives and party organizations neglect them. The necessary conclusions must be drawn from this as far as our work is concerned.

In short, Comrades, we must not lag behind the rapid changes in life, we must pick up speed, take charge of the processes of restructuring of the political system and actively collaborate with all public organizations, making their activities constructive and involving them in the common creative work.

Now we come to the **change in the party's role in the socioeconomic sphere in restructuring conditions.**

First of all I want to express the firm belief that neither in the future, nor now, especially now, can the party get away from economics and relinquish its political influence on the socioeconomic sphere and its responsibility for the condition of that sphere, because this governs Soviet people's lives.

We have all been aware of late of the sharp increase in the pressure of economic problems on the political situation. It is precisely the economy that contains the roots of the growing tension in society and it is there above all that the party must seek a way out of the situation. I do not intend now to give you a detailed picture of the current state of the economy. It was described quite comprehensively and thoroughly at the first Congress of People's Deputies. And, as you know, the congress gave instructions to the Supreme Soviet and USSR Government on this score.

It is primarily a matter of adopting the most resolute and, I would even say, extraordinary measures to normalize the situation in the consumer market. The task of eliminating shortages of daily goods, which are subject to long periods of unavailability and quotas and shortages of which prompt the greatest complaints from people, can be specially singled out. The government is now engaged on this in the practical sphere. All the reserves within the country are being utilized and, moreover, additional potential for replenishing the market by importing goods worth around R10 billion has been found.

In tackling these most urgent and acute problems, the government is preparing the plan and budget for 1990 and draft plan for the 13th 5-Year Plan in light of the real situation in the economy. In both cases the task is to orient the economy more resolutely toward people's social needs and above all improve food supplies, expand the scale of housing construction, improve health care, and solve ecological problems—everything that determines the conditions of people's daily lives. Specific proposals on this will be discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet and will then be submitted for consideration by the second Congress of People's Deputies.

The task of fundamentally improving the situation in the economy should be central to the activity of all party organizations. Let us gear party organizations and the general public to the quest for reserves in republics, krays, oblasts, cities, rayons, and villages, wherever they exist. But I would not like to confine myself merely to that appeal. The information we are receiving from major industrial centers indicates that people are unhappy with the way matters connected with improving their daily living conditions are being resolved. I saw this for myself once again the other day during my visit to Leningrad. I must bluntly say that people are very critical. They will not accept all the red tape, inefficiency, irresponsibility, and indifference of soviet and economic organs and party committees.

People know that we have problems that will require considerable resources and time to solve them. But they do not want and will not accept a lack of progress in matters which can be resolved even given our current potential. Both in the center and at local level people must clearly realize that we do not have much time to change the situation. This is the reality. And this must be the principle behind our work.

Now I want to submit for discussion by our conference the question of the content of the activity of the party and all its components in the economic sphere in conditions of the separation of functions among party, soviet, and economic organs and the implementation of radical political and economic decentralization covering the whole of society.

We are living through a kind of transitional period which is characterized by the fact that—whether we like it or not—both the old forms of organizing economic activity and the new approaches, which are gradually gaining momentum, are coexisting at the same time in our country. Correspondingly, both old and new are intertwined in the work of party, soviet, and economic organs. Herein lies the difficulty and contradictory nature of the time. There is nothing unexpected and surprising in this. Nevertheless, today, leaving aside the future, we have to throughly analyze what the party's role should be in the economic sphere under conditions of restructuring to ensure that we abandon the old methods step by step and make way for the new ones. This will not happen on its own. Moreover, habits which have become deeply embedded in us will constantly make themselves felt. We are all conscious of this.

Fundamental considerations have been voiced on this score. The party's role is irreplaceable vis-a-vis the economy because it has to equip society with a scientifically grounded, socially oriented economic policy. I think everyone agrees with this position and that this is not a matter for debate. But it is necessary to reveal the meaning of this fundamental position as it applies to the specific activity of the party's various links.

There is no denying that many people hitherto believed that it is up to the center to formulate economic policy. No, comrades, the party must tackle this at all levels. For within the framework of the overall socioeconomic concept we are tasked with concretizing this concept with reference to conditions in the republics and the various regions. This is all the more vitally necessary under conditions whereby our entire economy—not only production collectives but also all republics and regions—is transferring to self-management, cost-recovery, and economic accountability. I would say that every republic, every region, and every oblast must have a well-conceived program for its socioeconomic development.

To substantiate this approach we are primarily relying on the real processes which are already under way. Those party organizations which realized this in a timely fashion and have taken the appropriate action must be given credit. Very interesting proposals were elaborated at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee on the basis of precisely these approaches. They are now being examined by the country's planning organs. We know that the Baltic republics and Belorussia submitted an initiative to switch to republic economic accountability as of next year. They have done a great deal of work for this, the results of which have been discussed at the USSR Gosplan and are now being examined by USSR Supreme Soviet commissions and committees.

But of particular value for us is the work experience of party organizations which is already bearing real fruit. Anyone who has visited Vitebsk Oblast will ask the following question: Why are there more commodities in the stores there than in other regions and why are the food shelves not empty? Moreover, people are particularly interested in what has happened because they know that recently this was one of the most neglected oblasts. So what has indeed happened? There is an answer to this question, comrades. The key to understanding what has happened lies in the obkom's stance. A few years ago the party organization was able to elaborate a program for the oblast's socioeconomic revival which won warm support not only from the republic's leadership but—and this is the most important thing—from all the oblast's working people. The struggle to fulfill this program became their common cause. They sought opportunities for the social development of cities and villages. All enterprises, irrespective of departmental subordination, were involved in resolving these questions. An especially large amount of work was done in the countryside. The most important thing is that this has all happened in the last few years of restructuring. So there you have one approach and its results.

I could illustrate this using other examples where quite profound changes are taking place in all the activity of party organizations. But I believe that you know where this experience has been accumulated and many of you have had an opportunity to personally acquaint yourselves with it. But, as the saying goes, one or two swallows do not make a summer. So there you are.

Many party committees have been slow to involve themselves in restructuring. They have engaged in lengthy, agonizing thought, hoping something would happen. In saying this I do, of course, realize that the economy has found itself in a difficult position in many regions and that it is not so easy to extricate it from this state. Nonetheless, comrades, the changes taking place in such oblasts as Kaluga, Orel, Ryazan, and Vitebsk show that there are real opportunities even in the most difficult situation to achieve substantial changes.

When I speak in this way I am primarily recalling such party organizations as those in Krasnoyarsk, Chelyabinsk, Gorkiy, Novosibirsk, Kuybyshev, and Zaporozhye. All these regions possess vast potential opportunities. It

is the task of the party organizations —relying on Comunists and all the working people—to utilize these opportunities to improve the socioeconomic situation in the region.

The party organizations' new role in the economic sphere also applies to such a very important area of our transformations as the economic reform. A trenchant debate over the reform is now under way. Differing, sometimes most extreme, viewpoints have been voiced. There is the opinion that the reform has produced no results and that we should return to a pre-restructuring economy. People with these views are refusing to face up to the facts and derive lessons form the past and from real experience.

Another extreme solution is to wholly pin our hopes on uncontrolled market development and give supply and demand and the rates and proportions of production the chance to balance automatically by giving free rein to market prices. That is an oversimplified viewpoint. In conditions of an unbalanced economy uncontrolled market development can have grave consequences for the people, provoke unrestrained inflation, promote speculation, and give rise to other adverse phenomena.

I must say in general that an unregulated market is an anachronism, an elapsed phase for states with a modern economy. In order to form a socialist market we need to restructure the financial-credit and tax systems, do away with monopolism, and switch to new principles of price formation. All this must be done within the framework of the economic reform.

We believe that we have no grounds for rejecting and deviating from the reform concept we have adopted. The fact that it must not be regarded as something inviolate and carved in stone is another matter. It must develop, enriched by experience and new conclusions. The main thing is to advance more boldly and consistently, overcoming the resistance, sluggishness, and incompetence which I have frequently mentioned.

People rightly criticize the reform for its indeterminate nature. The law says one thing while legally binding acts at the level of central departments, sectors, and middle management links block the reform. People nearly always raise the issue that they are still bound hand and foot in their activity. I believe the Central Committee has something to ponder and must produce an assessment of the activity of Communists responsibile for implementing the reform.

But there are difficulties in implementing reforms at the level of the basic link. Here too the process of transferring to new forms of economic activity, economic accountability, and self-management is curbed on all manner of pretexts. This occurs at industrial enterprises, construction sites, collective farms [kolkhozes], and state farms [sovkhozes]. I must say that people are developing the conviction that there are forces at various levels of management in the country which are holding back the economic reform. The following question arises directly at meetings with workers and labor collectives: Do we not need to create committees to defend restructuring and advance economic reform?

Dissatisfaction with the way in which questions linked with the development of independence and self-management are being resolved at the level of labor collectives has emerged in its most acute form in the Kuzbass. The miners are saying bluntly that their frequent appeals to oblast, sectoral, and central management organs in connection with the unsatisfactory progress of the economic reform have met with neither understanding nor support. People realize here that the situation within the country is a strained one and that the state does not possess spare resources. Proceeding from this premise, they are raising the question of being given an opportunity for independent economic activity so as to earn the money themselves to resolve the social problems that have assumed a dramatic character in the Kuzbass. You are aware that, in view of the acuteness of the situation, a commission comprising Comrades Slyunkov, Voronin, and Shalayev has been sent to the Kuzbass, tasked with finding a solution to the questions that have arisen on the spot and with the involvement of miners' representatives.

Now, comrades, the center of gravity has shifted to the practical implementation of reform. At this stage it is particularly important for party organizations to direct public opinion and the work of all state and economic organs toward the restructuring of economic relations on the basis of diverse forms of social ownership, the strengthening of the socialist principle of distribution, and the shaping of a regulated market. This is a most complex and important task.

Of course, a great deal will have to be done to improve economic legislation and restructure the work of central organs of management. The USSR Supreme Soviet, the government, and the country's economic departments are currently engaged in this. But, at the same time, it must be directly stated that if we do not reinforce economic reform with multifaceted, cogent, and constant organizational and ideological work among the masses it will not work, or at least will creak along painfully, making the people dissatisfied.

At the same time, comrades, we should bear in mind the fact that reform, by dint of its radical nature, is not aimed at ensuring for everybody a quiet life with a guaranteed wages fund. That is what we all need to properly comprehend. The slightest advance along the road of reform will, of course, require changes in attitudes to work and new approaches—that is, the cozy situation that exists is being broken. And often this makes people start to worry about new things and immediately look to the center instead of rectifying their own work. But the point is that the transition to the new economic mechanism is not being prepared politically or ideologically.

After all, the essence of the reform is to encourage initiative, economic enterprise, innovative questing, and conscientious work. And, in turn, people who work badly, who are unconscientious about their job, or who operate in the old way should feel the effect of it in their income.

The principle of earning funds is not yet fully up and running and has not been grasped by many working people. During the long years of dominance of the former methods of economic management both parasitism and wage-leveling took deep root in people's minds. All this must be gradually eradicated without allowing the wrongly understood principle of social justice to hold back the collectives and all of society. We must defend reform against all kinds of distortions, deformations, manifestations of group egoism, and attempts to use the rights granted to enterprises to boost incomes not through work efficiency but by hiking output prices.

We have recently also encountered the phenomenon of ultimatums being made that wages be increased and social problems be resolved irrespective of the end results of enterprises' activities. Or take cooperatives—we are in favor of cooperatives, which are helping to improve people's lives. It must be said that one of the points of the Kuzbass miners' demands is to close down cooperatives in public catering, medicine, and the processing industry. It is, of course, not difficult to close them down. This is the easiest route. But is there a better way? After all, we decided to give republics, krays, and oblasts the right to work out a taxation machinery and system to regulate this locally.

Of course, we are categorically opposed to self-seeking and to those who are striving to live off the population by speculating on shortages of goods and services—particularly with regard to food. In this respect we must instill order forthwith. Whatever the interest of a region, it should be encouraged—preferential taxes should be levied, there should be help with construction materials, equipment, and so forth. In other instances it is necessary to restrict incomes and—where the principles of our social policy are clearly being violated—to put a stop to a cooperative's operations. This is all in the hands of the local soviets.

All this is acquiring political overtones, and therefore directly affects party organizations. Of course, the reasons for such negative phenomena are largely a result of the imperfection of the new economic mechanism. But it must be borne in mind that any economic mechanism, however sophisticated it may be, is incapable of automatically resolving all the situations that arise in socioeconomic life. There is still huge scope for working with people. This would mean harmonizing relations within collectives, between collectives and society, and between various social groups, and combining interests among them. All these and other questions should be at the center of party organizations' attention.

Now that the economic autonomy of economic units and republic and local organs of power is growing sharply, party committees must resolutely abandon the practice in which they have been predominantly involved for many years—undermining the leaders of enterprises and local soviets. It is planned to consistently switch from outright directives and instructions to a system of political influence on the economy—through organizational and ideological work in collectives, through people's economic interests, moral values, and mentality, and, of course, through all Communists—leading cadres above all—working in the economic sphere.

The **new concept of the party's ideological activity** should correspond to the new social conditions, the new experience of the masses, and the modern nature and level of present-day social awareness. The elaboration of this concept and its practical implementation are a no less complex and difficult issue than staging a turnaround in the economy and the social sphere, and are perhaps even more difficult, since we are talking about consciousness. The party's ideological and theoretical work should be ahead of its time, anticipating any possible turn of events.

The liberation of party structures from functions that are alien to them will, finally, make it possible to make ideological work the most important avenue of party activity. We cannot fail to see that during the personality cult and stagnation years the content of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the principles of organization, and the means and methods of the party's ideological activity were substantially deformed. Ideology was adapted to transient interests and made the servant of everyday concerns. Its revolutionary and critical essence was removed, its function of renewal and conviction was belittled, and it was to a considerable extent distanced from the masses and driven into offices and tight little circles. All this runs fundamentally counter to the traditions of Bolshevism that were enshrined by the party under Lenin.

It should be bluntly stated that the weakening of theoretical and ideological work among the masses led to an overall weakening of party activity.

And this was seen most graphically and particularly dramatically at the abrupt turning point when society embarked on the path of profound change. Dogmatic ideological work failed the test of restructuring.

I think you will agree, comrades, that, although real life gave impetus to restructuring, it essentially began in the ideological sphere, overcoming the crisis in ideology. Today we can argue about what has and has not been achieved during this period. But one thing is clear, had it not been for what the party has done in the sphere of the theory and ideology of renewal, restructuring itself would have been simply unrealistic and inconceivable.

It seems to me—and this is no exaggeration—that we have managed to produce very important and wide-ranging theoretical generalizations and conclusions about both the

modern world in which we actually live and about the analysis of previous stages in Soviet society's development. I would say that a kind of breakthrough has begun in the sphere of theory and ideology. But we have not yet made real use of it to launch a widespread offensive. The lag in this avenue of activity is being keenly felt not just by Communists but by all society.

We really need to answer the most fundamental questions. How do we envision the society which we are striving to achieve? What are we abandoning? What have we inherited? And what are we using to reach a qualitatively new state of socialism through restructuring? In this respect only the general outlines of this society have been sketched in today. To achieve revolutionary transformations we need a wide-ranging concept that encompasses all aspects of our future society's life.

It is not only among theoreticians and social scientists but also the broad circles of the intelligentsia, the party, and in society that the interest in these problems is growing and the need to examine them is being felt increasingly urgently. The backlog in this area and the vacuum which is forming are immediately filled by various stories, ideas, and concepts which are often very far from science and the fundamental interests of the working people.

One can also discern an attempt to confine ideological thinking merely to a critical analysis of the past. But after all, an analysis of the past is meaningful only if we are motivated not simply by curiosity and the desire to scourge ourselves but first and foremost by a desire to learn the lessons which we need to understand the present and, most important, to elaborate paths for the future.

No matter how acute our present-day concerns, we must not abandon our guiding principles for a moment and we have no right to allow the theory and development of social thought to be ignored. Some fundamental initial positions are gradually being formed in the description of the qualitatively new state of society in our country and are receiving definite recognition in scientific and social circles.

The point is that this is a society of free people, a society of the working man and for the working man, which is being built on the principles of humanism, socialist democracy, and social justice.

It is a society based on a diversity of forms of social ownership which ensure man the position of master and unlimited potential for displaying initiative and abilities. But economic development is based on self-regulation with the economic center playing a coordinating role.

It is a society which ensures the full power of the people and the full range of human rights and which absorbs the best traditions of Soviet democracy and the experience of the democratic development of mankind.

It is the development of the real equality of all nations and ethnic groups which creates all the conditions for their comprehensive development and the harmonization of interethnic relations within the framework of the Soviet federation.

It is a society which lives a rich spiritual life and is distinguished by a lofty culture and morality. It is a society where broad opportunities for the display of talent and the free self-expression of the individual are created and realized.

It is a society open to the outside world and to cooperation in the interests of building new international relations based on free choice, equality of rights, security, and general human values.

These, I repeat, are only the broad outlines which need serious and specific investigation. This is vitally important to us today. Without examining the general questions of theory we will not be able to successfully resolve the concrete questions of social practice or avoid errors and mistakes.

There is a broad area of activity here for our social scientists. But we cannot fail to be concerned about how matters are in the social sciences sphere today. It must be said plainly that our social scientists are finding it hard to emerge from the state of crisis to a new level of theoretical activity. I would like to wholeheartedly welcome the first steps on this path. I have in mind here the work now begun to create new textbooks in social science disciplines and the debate within the USSR Academy of Sciences which has acquired a systematic character. I think that a number of major contributions by our social scientists in theoretical journals have not gone unnoticed either. But all this at the moment still clearly does not match our needs.

There is a second and no less important aspect of the party's work in the ideological sphere, comrades. I have in mind the practical work of ideological cadres and all party organizations in the shaping of a social consciousness appropriate to the realities of life, the tasks facing us, and the goals of restructuring. Here, too, the progress of restructuring is very difficult and slow. This is connected to a considerable extent with the fact that a section of our ideological workers and leading cadres are still living in the past and are using an old set of ideas and outmoded forms and methods of work which are no longer yielding results. That fact was graphically shown during the election campaign when the ideological apparatus was considerably shackled and in a number of cases paralyzed. In the new political situation, which is characterized by broad democracy, people's social activeness, and a diversity of opinions, the ideological apparatus is trying to act using the old methods and directives. When it becomes clear that the old methods are no longer "working," ideological workers lose heart, panic,

and begin citing general political processes, sometimes lapsing into criticism and nihilism in the evaluation of the changes that are taking place in the country.

In brief, we must thoroughly understand the need for serious changes in the party's ideological work based on the intensification of links with the masses and the launching of a keen dialogue on all the topical problems of restructuring. People expect this, and they are saying bluntly that in some places now many of their questions do not receive an answer from party organizations.

I would like to talk about the tremendous role of the mass media. At one time V.I. Lenin called ISKRA the framework on which the party itself will be built. Times are different now. But Lenin's idea on the creative role of the press is relevant today, too. And we can all verify the correctness, profundity, and validity of Lenin's comment from our own experience.

In recent years our press has done much to support the policy of the party's restructuring and to make it the property of the broad people's masses. Our press has played and continues to play an indispensable role in developing the democratization of Soviet society, glasnost, people's social initiative, and in the struggle against everything which hinders our movement along the path of renewal. Nevertheless, this does not mean that everything is well in our press or that its life is free of problems. Today we are acutely aware of the weakness of our press and the lack of competence in the coverage of the complicated and difficult work involved in mastering the new ways of life. I would say that our mass media also lack constructiveness, although we have already discussed that on a number of occasions.

Our general shortcomings have an effect here, too, no doubt. There is a shortage of ideas and concrete experience in implementing economic and political reforms and in renewing the forms and methods of the activity of the party itself. We must put all these questions to the press and the Communists working in the mass media all the more trenchantly. People expect real actions from party, soviet, and economic organs and our cadres. This must determine the content and thrust of our press articles today. I would say that it is necessary to act more forcefully and thoroughly and increase the constructive principles in the work of the mass media.

This conference must clarify one very important question which is troubling party workers, the press, and our society. That is the question of mutual relations in the triad of society, the party, and the press.

The entire experience of world development, and present experience in particular, shows that the press—that powerful social institution—can never be independent of society anywhere. And Lenin was right. The press is always the party press. It always expressed the interests of particular social forces. And that also applies fully to our society and to the times in which we live.

As the ruling party and the political vanguard of society, the CPSU has done and will continue to do everything to ensure that the press always serves the interests of the people, the cause of socialism, and the principles of humanism in the best possible way. And, of course, in the context of the real tasks we are now solving at the present, crucial stage in our history. This is our response to those who would like to tear the press away from the party. There can be no concessions on questions of principle. There is a political line and main guidelines which must determine the direction taken by the press. In all other matters, Communists and nonparty people working on any press organ, publication, or editorial board must have complete freedom of creativity and the full right to raise whatever problems they wish, uphold and defend their standpoint, and generally work creatively and responsibly. As a rule, party members head our publications, and a substantial proportion of journalists are Communists.

Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the question of whether everything is being done by party committees to give ideological guidelines and assistance and support to journalists, which naturally also includes exactingness. We have no areas out of bounds to public control and criticism. And this fully applies to the mass media.

I would also like to say that our party workers at various levels make poor use of the mass media for conveying their point of view to the working people on various topical questions being discussed in our society. The resulting vacuum is often filled by material that is not always of the best quality. In this respect party cadres should take the initiative. It is true that the Central Committee has received information that some organs of the press are refusing to publish those authors whose opinions differ from the stand taken by the editorial board.

I would like to remind members of the press that pluralism presupposes an exchange of opinions, comparison of views, and discussion and that in this respect they must be guided not by personal sympathies and attachments but by considerations of principle.

Everything I have said about the relationship between the party, state, and social organizations and the mass media once again brings us to the need to adopt a Law on the Press, a draft of which will, as far as I am aware, soon be considered in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Now about questions of internal party life.

Four years ago the party made a choice and embarked on the difficult path of ascending the steps of democracy. We were not mistaken, and, as time has passed, we have become ever more sure that the democratization of the entire structure of party life is the strongest antidote to the ills that have accumulated within it.

But the democratization of party life is not just an internal matter. Without this process the restructuring of society as a whole is impossible, as is the creation of a rule-of-law socialist state and a truly civil society. Only on the basis of democratic principles can the party integrate in its policies the diverse aspirations of the different strata and groups which make up the population, rally them around the aims and interests common to all the people, and ensure national accord in the country. This is particularly important in view of the features of our one-party system.

Overcoming as soon as possible views of the party as a hierarchical, extremely rigidly constructed organization issuing directives and "sending them down" to the lower echelons and exerting monopoly control over all social matters is an essential precondition of its thorough, consistent democratization. It is a question of fully restoring the democratic nature of the party as a self-governing sociopolitical organization.

It is from this standpoint that the party is now bound to take a serious look at itself, strictly appraise the work of all its links, conduct a critical self-assessment of the activity of party committees, its cadres, and all Communists, unite its ranks, and galvanize internal party life and all party activity.

The key to resolving this task lies in primary party organizations having a full-blown life which accords with the present atmosphere in society, the seriousness of the problems, and people's needs and expectations. Comrades, we cannot take a calm view of the fact that all is peace and quiet in many party organizations while feelings are running high around us in society, there are clashes of opinions, and turbulent rallies are being held. Communists in Leningrad have spoken of this with bitterness and concern. In order to satisfy their interest and express their opinions on topical issues they are taking part in various discussion clubs and rallies. There is nothing reprehensible in this, of course. What is bad is something else—the fact that they cannot discuss all these issues of concern to society among themselves in the party organizations.

Members of elected party bodies are also essentially standing aloof from burning problems. This was discussed at the plenum of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, by representatives of labor collectives too. These are very serious matters. After all, elected bodies have 5 million members, most of whom enjoy authority among Communists, have serious political experience, and sincerely wish to do something and make their contribution to the general cause. And they were formed less than a year ago.

So, why is this happening? What is this—inertia of thinking, fear of new ideas and difficult questions? Or are the old habits of deciding everything in offices, in a narrow circle of people, or on the basis of instructions from above taking their toll here? Comrades, let us frankly discuss all this. We simply cannot leave the party in this state at the stage of far-reaching changes, when society is experiencing the process of further politicization.

Reports and elections lie ahead in many primary party organizations, while in others—where party committees and bureaus operate—and also in rayon, city, oblast, and republic party organizations, report sessions are going to be held. They must be conducted in an atmosphere of comradely party discussion, and work to ensure the tasks of restructuring must be analyzed in depth, from the standpoint of party principle. Urgent cadre problems must also be resolved in this connection by promoting to positions of leadership really convinced, active supporters of restructuring who have the ability to think and act in line with the times. In some areas Communists are proposing to hold party conferences on the basis of the importance of the moment and the complexity of the problems in party and society life. This is not at variance with statutory principles and there are no obstacles to such conferences being held.

I would also like to raise a number of other questions for discussion by our conference which have now become very serious and need to be explained.

There is a lot of dispute in both the party and society over the problem of combining freedom of opinions and unity of actions. Communists are looking for a democratic solution to this problem.

For many years even the most important questions have been decided in many party organizations automatically, by a simple vote, and without properly studying different views. This has impoverished party life and created a situation where serious miscalculations have been made, arbitrary rule has prevailed, and, in a number of cases, even lawlessness. This practice cannot be justified and can only be explained by the fact that it conveniently fits into the administrative-edict system. Now, however, we must revive the truly Leninist view of the correlation between freedom of opinions and unity of actions, between democracy and centralism.

The atmosphere of constructive discussion and consideration of alternatives introduced into society by the efforts of the party dictates a certain logic in party life also. A show of unity is not what is needed today. It is now both impossible and unnecessary. Genuine unity can only be achieved if the following are ensured within the party: freedom of debate, freedom to discuss problems of party policy on an alternative basis, and the right of the minority to express its views, including on decisions adopted by the majority, but with the minority definitely being subordinate to the majority.

In short, we must ensure that an atmosphere of party comradeship is created within the party which will make it possible to freely defend one's position, discuss problems, and compare points of view. But it is no less

important to ensure active, harmonious, joint work to put decisions, once made, into practice. Both are equally important for party life. Such are the dialectics.

There is an organic connection between this and the problem of party discipline. I do not think anyone has any doubts that we have a vital need for discipline in society, and in the party in particular. I will say, moreover, that the present state of discipline both in the party and in society is of concern to us all. And we must act decisively at the center and in the provinces to rectify the matter. But the question arises: How is discipline to be ensured? In the present complex situation, expressing views on the need to strengthen discipline, certain comrades put their trust at the same time in a "firm hand" and call, in point of fact, for the "tightening of screws."

We are in favor of enhancing exactingness, but I do not think it is possible to agree with such an approach. This would contradict the whole spirit of the changes taking place in our society. And what an example our party would set the whole of society then! That would mothball the hopelessly rusted assemblies of the command-administrative system and lead inevitably to the deepening of the state of crisis from which we must extricate ourselves as quickly as possible. I am sure we must raise decisively and committedly the question of strengthening conscious, comradely discipline founded on a high sense of party duty. This does not eliminate but, on the contrary, presupposes increased responsibility for the assigned task. This is how the question must be put, and this is how it is necessary to act in party organizations.

In the process of the party's democratization the question of the nature of relations between the CPSU's central organs and the union republic communist parties and local party organizations inevitably arises. In the age of the flowering of command-administrative leadership methods V.I. Lenin's instruction that the struggle for the unity of the proletariat of all nations must be combined with "autonomy of local and oblast organizations" was frequently hushed up. That hushing up was not accidental but reflected the actual practice whereby proper account was not taken of the ethnic and other specific aspects of various regions and the necessary flexibility was not manifested in the party's work with working people of various nationalities.

Under the conditions of restructuring today we must tackle problems connected with granting greater independence to union republic communist parties and local party organizations. We consider it natural for a number of union republic communist parties to formulate the question like this. At the same time, Comrades, we can resolve these questions right now, without waiting for the congress, because our Statutes provide broad opportunities for this. After excluding from practice everything that fetters the initiative of party committees, we must delegate to them the right to resolve many organizational, structural, staff, financial, and other questions. Under modern conditions we cannot tolerate the fact that local leaders endeavor to agree with the center on every decision that is at all important. This gives rise to nothing but freeloading and red tape. While emphasizing the need to resolve urgent problems and to define more precisely relations between the center and union republic communist parties and local party organizations, I would like to warn comrades against erroneous judgments which run counter to Lenin's basic guidelines on the party's structure and vital activity.

We cannot—and all Communists must understand this well—mechanically transfer to the party the principles on which our federative state is built. According to V.I. Lenin: "...In the system of our party we are against a federation and for **unity** of local (and not only central) social democratic organizations of all nations." Here I wish once again to emphasize the leading idea of the party's purpose as the political vanguard, the bearer of programmatic aims, the chief expresser of the working people's inter-nation interests, and as an irreplaceable and exceptionally important factor in society's social consolidation around the aims and tasks of restructuring.

Comrades, the whole package of complex questions connected with reinterpreting the party's activity and understanding its new role under present conditions, including the democratization of life and the mastering of political work methods, is connected to a decisive degree with how cadres work and how cadre policy is implemented.

The past few years, full of major events and marked by profound changes in the party and in society, have affected the state of cadre work and led to serious changes both in the makeup of our cadres and in their work methods. These years have not been lived for nothing, as it were, and, as regards work with cadres, have not been lost either. Although it has to be said in a party-minded way that restructuring is not proceeding easily in work methods or in the very makeup of cadres. And it is not a matter here of particular workers being opposed to restructuring and changes, although there are such people. But this is not the chief point.

The chief thing, nonetheless, is the force of inertia, the great tenacity of old habits, adherence to established concepts, and the difficulties of mastering the novelty of life, which demands new assessments, new vision, resolute restructuring of work forms and methods, and new energy. For many, in principle, good communists and honest workers this is, quite frankly, a human drama. And reckless assessments and sweeping actions on the part of party committees are inadmissible here. You must not break people's destinies across your knee.

But, while resolutely defending party-mindedly considered approaches to cadres, we nevertheless cannot place the interests of individual workers above the interests of society and the people. In the final analysis, we must proceed in cadre work too from the premise that we are

faced with a huge amount of work and the need for profound changes and the country's extrication from a grave state. We are obliged to remember this when resolving cadre problems. Therefore we cannot defer the resolution of urgent cadre questions. Particularly as the past few years have given us an opportunity to see many new people who have revealed their good side and shown their adherence to restructuring and their ability to run things and to work among the masses.

Restructuring will succeed now where cadre questions are resolved correctly and where an influx of fresh forces is ensured. And this, Comrades, is determined by the cadre policy for which the CPSU is responsible to the country and our people. In this connection I must say that things here largely depend on first secretaries of party committees. Without their interested participation and their democratic mood it is impossible to assert new approaches in cadre policy and put an end to authoritarianism and arbitrary decisions.

The democratization processes under way in society require the party resolutely to put an end to the formal, party schedule approach in cadre work, to its self-isolation, and to the exclusivity of the cadre corps. New cadre decisions must not be made by means of reshuffles and transfers, when we rotate the selfsame people and do not open up new opportunities for an influx of fresh forces.

It has to be said that party committees also lose out in many ways and lose the ability to act successfully in a changing situation if they get their reinforcements from that same closed milieu. We must reinforce the cadre corps with creative forces and make way for those communists who can infuse new spirit into the activities of party organs and ensure the success of restructuring.

The principle of multiple choice in elections has proved to be an effective method of cadre work, for selecting the most able people. As is known, the Central Committee January (1987) Plenum gave an unequivocal guideline in this regard. But it has to be said that this principle is catching on very slowly in the party, and yet it is the party that must set an example to the whole of society in this. Even during the last reports and elections only one-half of primary party organization secretaries were elected from multiple candidates, even fewer in the rayon link, and mere individuals in the oblast link. In this sense the party was greatly overtaken by the soviets and many public organizations and labor collectives. We must resolutely overcome the quite unjustified and even hardly explicable conservatism of party committees in this matter. This is the opinion that communists express in meetings.

And another remark of considerable importance, Comrades. We must influence people not by means of orders and commands but through authority and conviction. Party committees must rally around themselves all intellectual forces and the best minds among communists and nonparty people. We must ensure that capable young people who think in a modern way "revolve" around party committees. And thereby create conditions for a natural rotation of cadres. This is no simple task, but at the same time there is nothing supernatural here. What is more, this is simply essential in the present democratic situation.

It is very important, comrades, to assure the representation of national cadres in elective organs at all levels and in the party apparatus. The same applies to state and economic organs and social organizations. For many years proper attention was not paid to this, great distortions were allowed to occur in this sphere, and this has damaged our cause and is evoking justified criticism from working people of various nationalities. The Central Committee must, of course, set an example in this respect. Although specific steps to this end have been taken of late, they are clearly insufficient. And we must, self-critically, admit this.

In my view we cannot sidestep the question concerning the party apparatus at this meeting where topical issues of the party's life and work in current conditions are being discussed. Whether we like it or not, we are in a situation which has evoked wholesale criticism of the party apparatus and party officials. For the sake of the party and the sake of society we must state our viewpoint on this question.

First of all I want to categorically state that we reject the attempts to run down the party apparatus. The apparatus is needed. However, what we need is a new apparatus capable of skillfully discharging its functions and rendering all-around assistance to elective organs, and lately we have been trying to form such an apparatus. Many new officials have now joined the apparatus, people who are wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of restructuring, who think along unorthodox lines, and act with initiative.

In order to ensure a constant influx of fresh forces into the apparatus, in order to ensure that life within the apparatus is in tune with the processes which are taking place in the party and in society, it is above all necessary, of course, to ensure democratic approaches to its formulation. It is here that the opinions of Communists about specific officials and their political, professional, and human qualities are particularly needed. We must not be afraid of rivalry here, of alternative choices, of choosing people on a competitive basis. I believe that we also should carry out certification on a regular basis, timing it to coincide with party committee elections.

As is known, major measures to cut back and change the structure of the party apparatus are currently being implemented in the party. This is being done in accordance with fundamental considerations with a view to bringing the party apparatus in line with the new conditions engendered by the separation of functions among party, state, and economic organs.

In doing this we were guided by a desire to consolidate the apparatus, to attract the most skillful forces into it. In this context we regard it as expedient to channel the resources that are released in this way into raising the labor remuneration of party officials, especially since in recent years it has seriously fallen behind the level of remuneration of the categories of workers from which the party apparatus is formed. The Central Committee issued instructions to the appropriate departments on this question some time ago, and the necessary decisions will be adopted before the end of the current year.

Questions on the training and retraining of party cadres also arise in a new light now. They must hinge on the acquisition of the new, modern methods of work. In this connection we must restructure the cadre training system at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School. The CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department and Department of Party Building and Cadre Work are dragging their feet on this idea. It is necessary, without procrastination, to organize a network of courses and seminars for young officials who have joined the party apparatus in recent years.

III.

These, comrades, are the questions which we thought were essential to submit for discussion to the present meeting. They do not, of course, cover the whole range of problems pertaining to restructuring and the renewal of the party in view of its changing functions and the profound revolutionary transformations taking place in society. However, as a result of the debate which will unfold at our conference I believe that answers will be provided to the key questions which concern the party and our society today.

As you have noticed, the report does not contain a detailed expose of the issues pertaining to the nationalities policy in current conditions and the tasks ensuing from this for the party. This was also done deliberately inasmuch as a thorough discussion of these questions is to be held at the next party Central Committee plenum.

A few days ago the Politburo, as you already know, examined the draft CPSU platform on nationalities policy in the present conditions. The lengthy and serious work on the plenum's preparations was summarized, as it were. It can be said that for the most part the document has been prepared and, taking into account the discussion which took place, very soon, before the end of this month, it will be sent to the union republic Communist Party Central Committees and party kraykoms and obkoms. We believe that because of this document's great significance we need to assess it once more with you. And then—clearly, by this time it will be September—submit it for discussion before the Central Committee Plenum.

In conclusion I would like to say the following. You know that proposals are being made to convene an extraordinary CPSU congress. I think that we must assess these proposals in the context of the present situation.

The 19th party conference, at which the most important questions of the party's activity and policy for the coming period were discussed, was held only a year ago. I think that the political directives formulated at the conference have not lost their significance, but instaed retain their force. After the conference there were party reports and elections embracing both primary party organizations and rayon, city, oblast, and kray party organizations.

Major political events lie ahead of us—the Central Committee plenum on the nationalities question, the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and, in the spring, the elections to republican and local soviets. These are important landmarks in implementing the political reform. It must bluntly be said that an enormous amount of work lies ahead in connection with them, work that will involve the party, the soviets, and public organizations—essentially our entire society.

August in the party will see the start of the report and election campaign, which we must fully utilize in order to resolve the tasks of galvanizing all internal party life and the party's entire activity.

And the most important point—at the next party congress we must renew the CPSU Program and adopt new statutes. Without this there would simply be no justification for holding a congress. But you realize that it will require thorough work and it will take time to prepare proposals for the program and the statutes. And if there is anything that we must do, it is to launch preparatory work without delay.

All these are arguments against convening an extraordinary congress. But clearly, the question of bringing forward the date of the next, 28th congress should be discussed. It could be held in the fall of 1990. Let us consult on this question.

I would like to finish on this point. I ask you, Comrades, to express your opinion on the essence of the questions touched on in this report.

Miners Continue Strike in Kuzbass, Donbass

Kuzbass Strikers Interviewed

LD1807175189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast N. Chirkov report from Kemerovo Oblast in the Kuzbass region]

[Text] [Chirkov] We came to one of the mining sectors of the open-cast mine to (?meet) with representatives of the settlement strike committee. Even yesterday things were

quiet here: excavators were not working, and the technical roads and workfaces were unaccustomedly empty. True, as the miners told us, they were not sitting idly waiting for decisions on their demands. The repair and breakdown brigades were working; incidentally they were needed when the work faces and mining equipment were flooded after heavy rains. The miners were working on some particularly important facilities in the settlement; they worked on the reconstruction of the school, occupied themselves with building a nursery school, auxiliary plots and housing.

The Kedrovskiy miners built a lot by the direct labor method: This year alone 56 families will get apartments. This is why, when they speak of the strike, they usually reckoned that 24 hours idling cost the open-cast mine about R280,000—a nursery school with 160 places was built for nearly the same sum. That's the kind of loss. But the people embarked on them, since they had grown tired of waiting for decisions, which are most often (?grudging) and shortlived.

[Chirkov addresses members of the strike committee] The time has come to reflect, as they say, to ponder what the causes of the strike were. In your opinion, what pushed the workers to leave the workfaces?

[S. Chakipev, member of strike committee—identified by screen caption] In my opinion, to speak honestly, it stems from the very scant attention paid by our leadership, the higher leadership, our government. Very little attention. After all, our leadership needs to pay a visit to our Kuzbass, and as often as possible. And to help us. What help do we need? We need help with construction materials—bricks and cement.

[A. Vasilyev, chairman of strike committee—identified by screen caption] I want to say that it's not only because of that that we have a strike in Kemerovo Oblast. Not only because there is no food in the food shops. If any of us—or rather I mean you—were to travel around Kemerovo Oblast, along the central road of Kemerovo Oblast, starting from Kemerovo to Mezhdurechenk, and travelled round the Kiselevsk-Prokopyevsk region, our oldest mining centers, I mean, why are we now in an oblast strike committee? If you saw the barracks we have to left and right, I mean, I think they have been there since the war years and people are still living in them to this day. Can people really live in such conditions? Especially when a miner gets home from work, and comes to such a hovel. What kind of leisure does he have? How can he rest?

[Chirkov] It seems that the tipper trucks are honking wearily along the roads today. Now they must work even more strenuously and hard to make up for all the shortfall, for it is the 8th day of the strike, and although work is being arranged a little, [words indistinct] are throbbing in the truce. Too many problems have built up in the Kuzbass, but they must all be solved.

Deputies Cited on Strike

PM1907113889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Kuzbass people's deputies V.M. Gvozdev, V.Ya. Medikov, and S.I. Nevolin by A. Fedotov: "By No Means a Whim of the Miners"; first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] As is well known, having started in Mezhdurechensk, the miners' strike "overflowed its banks" and spread throughout the Kuzbass. There is of course no cause for sympathy here. Those who brought people to this point should want the earth to swallow them up for shame and should resign immediately. After all, the problems brought to light by the eruption of a protest that is destructive to the country are not a whim of the miners from who knows where. They are the pain accumulated over the years, which for years people seemed not even to hear, thoughtlessly supposing that the pain would go away. It did not...

It was along these lines that the talk began with people's deputies from the Kuzbass: Hero of Socialist Labor Vladimir Matveyevich Gvozdev, team leader at the "Raspadskaya" mine; Viktor Yakovlevich Medikov, pro-vice-chancellor of the Siberian metallurgical institute and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and Sergey Innokentyevich Nevolin, chief physician at the Novokuznetsk hospital and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Correspondent: I know that two of us—V. Gvozdev and S. Nevolin—have only just returned from the Kuzbass.

V. Gvozdev: The situation is still serious. The strike has gripped all coal associations—the Prokopyevsk, Leninsk-Kuznetskoye, Belovskiy, and Berezovskiy associations... Even where work has begun—in Mezhdurechensk—things are advancing slowly—the days of idling are having an effect. There are many spokes in the wheels, unnecessary confusion, and political detritus from the bellicose "informal organizations" that latched onto the miners' movement. It is true that you cannot shake the miners here—they are not letting themselves be drawn into an adventure.

S. Nevolin: The situation is unstable. There is no trust in the apparatus, which on many occasions has fed the Kuzbass people empty hopes and has broken its word or completely ignored their claims. If we are speaking of the spark that caused the strike, it is worth noting that 10 days before the events that ensued, the miners' demands were conveyed to the leadership of the association and the Mezhdurechensk City party committee. They paid no attention to these demands. They will make a noise and then calm down, they said, it has happened before... And then people went out on strike.

V. Medikov: I should like to stress that the Kuzbass demonstration is the offspring of perestroyka. It is not some kind of rowdyism or capricious self will but a conscious display of the will of the people's masses, a just expression of their resolute dissatisfaction with the extremely neglected situation in the region. To simplify the situation, as some people are trying to do, by reducing it to the dimensions of a local "food store" would be simply to fail to notice the springs that "uncoiled" the strike and to insult the miners undeservedly.

Correspondent: Why is the strike not ceasing?

V. Medikov: The Kuzbass needs guarantees that the decisions that have been taken will be fulfilled. It has been deceived so many times that it no longer believes anything. It was constantly told: Give us metal and coal and we will feed you. In exchange the Kuzbass got smoke, dirt, polluted water, lifeless landscapes, diseases, and much more of the same. Now times are different and the songs are different. We are told: We have perestroyka, feed yourselves. But, we ask, what we are to feed ourselves with when we have no land—it has all been eaten up by slag heaps and quarries and the peasants have fled in all directions?

Now let's ask ourselves: But do we Kuzbass people have any prospects? To this the departments, including the Union State Planning Committee, give us no reply since the Kuzbass does not have any; all efforts have been put into cheap coal and large quantities of metal—there are no funds, no working hands, and no capacities in construction organizations for sociocultural and consumer needs or the ecology. We cannot live or work like this any longer.

Correspondent: What is the way out of this situation?

V. Medikov: The Kuzbass today requires the merest trifle—a minimum for survival so it is not torn apart, so that some of the funds that it earns in the mines by the sweat of its brow are left for it so it can have a tolerable life. And if the country is unable to feed the Kuzbass in exchange for the metal and coal, then give it at least 15-20 percent of its output, in other words, reduce the state order to 80-85 percent, and we will exchange this metal and coal in the country and abroad for the miners' most urgent needs.

Correspondent: Let's return to the strike. In speaking of its causes and development we cannot fail to mention the role of the local party and soviet organs and the position of the leadership of the Ministry of the Coal Industry.

V. Gvozdev: The state of affairs in the Kuzbass, the explosive situation that merged into the strike, was no secret and came as no surprise to the ministry. During the work of the Congress, I myself approached M. Shcharov, the minister of the coal industry, and insisted that he investigate the matter before it was too late. He promised to do so... The result, as you can see for yourself, was a strike. No, our leaders have not become accustomed to a rapid reaction, they have become used to asking more than being answerable. For instance, at the party aktiv that met in Mezhdurechensk in a critical, white-hot situation, Vilchitskiy, the deputy minister, who, it must be supposed, had come to understand and weigh the miners' demands, behaved like a governor confronted by troublemakers—he did not listen to or even hear what they said but merely issued rebukes and reproaches.

V. Medikov: The miners' protests have proved that neither the local organs of power nor, especially, the trade unions, were able to cope with the situation. It looks as though they have become hopelessly bogged down, so to speak, in the old stereotypes. On the other hand, the strike brought forward workers and engineers capable of rallying the masses and being answerable for the decisions taken. They joined strike committees. And just look—under the leadership of elected committees the mine workers are maintaining order beautifully: They have closed the wine stores, cut off access to liquor, and set up sobriety checkpoints on the roads... They have not succumbed to the extremists' provocations and they have formed voluntary workers militia teams...

S. Nevolin: I remind you that People's Deputy T. Avaliani, deputy director of the "Kiselevskugol" enterprise, the man who ventured to write a letter to Brezhnev sharply criticizing the disorder in the party organs in the country and who paid for it with persecution and his health, was elected chairman of the Kemerovo strike committee by the miners...

Correspondent: In noting the complexity and variety of what is taking place in the Kuzbass, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov stressed the danger of the strike's "chain reaction" for the country and for is entire economy. Halting the coal production process means a dangerous interruption. It is no secret that the metallurgical plants and electric power stations are already on the verge of breakdown. In brief, the consequences are unpredictable. How do you assess the situation in the Kuznetsk coal basin from this position?

V. Medikov: I understand all the acuteness and complexity of the present situation. That is why from the rostrum of the USSR Supreme Soviet I appealed on behalf of the Kuzbass deputies to all inhabitants of the Kuzbass, my fellow countrymen, to end the strike, and to go to work in an organized fashion. To continue to strike means taking aim not only against the bureaucrats, not only against the administrative-edict hierarchy, but also against the people, against the country, to which we are all in debt. Continuing to strike means today playing into the hand of the malicious opponents of perestroyka.

Kuzbas Situation 'Tense'

LD1807212289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1950 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] The situation in the Kuzbass: The oblast strike committee recommended on Tuesday that the town strike committees halt the strike after the third shift and

resume work at all enterprises. At present the situation is tense. According to data for 18 July, more than 160 enterprises of the coal, machine-building, electro-technical and light industries have been on strike—but primarily it is the miners. Workers' militia units and the militia are maintaining order.

The government commission led by Slyunkov, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, is working. As a result of talks, it was possible to agree to the positions made in a number of points of the miners' demands. On Wednesday, Comrade Slyunkov and the commission members are planning to travel to Novokuznetsk to acquaint themselves with the situation in this major industrial center.

Slyunkov Meets With Strikers

LD1807172589 Moscow TASS in English 1654 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Prokopyevsk, Kemerovo region July 18 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and the government are concerned over the situation in the Kuznetsk coal fields, Politburo Member Nikolay Slyunkov told striking mine-workers in this Siberian city early this morning.

The government commission, headed by Slyunkov, arrived here last night and ended its first day of work at 4 am today.

After talks with members of the regional strike committee headed by People's Deputy Teimuraz Avaliani, Slyunkov told a rally that had lasted through the night that the "first hours in Kuzbass has convinced us that the region has many problems."

"These are complicated problems," he emphasised. "People have lost patience and composure. We understand you. And we say: we shall not limit ourselves to half-measures."

Slyunkov told the mine-workers about the first results reached in the course of negotiations. They concern the range of issues that demand an immediate solution: problems of improving the supply of food and manufactured products, fair pay for hard work, greater economic independence of enterprises.

The government commission supported, specifically, the strike committee's proposal to grant most enterprises the right to sell products turned out in addition to contracts on the domestic and foreign market on their own.

"This is just a beginning," Slyunkov observed. "The second range of demands advanced by the Kuzbass workers cover deeper problems and prospects of the region's development on the whole.

This means that we ought to determine today what is to be done to change unsatisfactory living conditions in the coal-producing region and do everything so that the worker go to his work with eagerness and home with joy."

The commission will consider all these questions, the party official assured the workers.

In the afternoon the chairman of the government commission and the head of the strike committee spoke over regional radio and then addressed a rally in downtown Prokopeyvsk to report on the work done.

It was announced that the regional strike committee recommends city strike committees to suspend the labour action starting from the third shift on July 18 and resume work at all enterprises in the region.

"This is an exceptionally sensible decision," Slyunkov said. "It has been promoted by the high civic consciousness of the workers, engineers and office employees and their interest in creating favourable conditions for the joint work of the government commission and the strike committee."

At this complicated moment, he said, it is necessary to display maximum prudence, responsibility and workman's wisdom and do everything to resume normal operation.

The situation in the region remains tense, TASS learned, despite efforts by workers' detachments and militia units to maintain order.

Trade union committees provide free meals for the strikers.

The second stage of negotiations with the regional strike committee began at the Prokopyevsk City Party Committee at 2 pm local time.

"Our interlocutors are respected representatives of the region's workers," Slyunkov told newsmen before the meeting. "They know the ropes, are correct and well up in matters of law. They care for the region's future and, what is especially important, control the tense situation during numerous rallies."

The day's top news is that Mezhdurechensk is no longer the only city where work has been resumed.

According to information provided by the regional press centre, the workers in Myski ended the strike, while the Mezhdurechensk mine-workers surpassed their daily assignment by 20,000 tonnes.

It will not be easy to make up for the losses, now that the region's debt has run into 1,875,000 tonnes of coal, but Kuzbass has begun picking up speed in the face of the disaster that the strike could have dragged the country's metallurgical and power-generating facilities.

Some Strikers' Demands Met

LD1807171789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] The situation in the Kuzbass remains complicated although the strike has been halted at several mines in accordance with the recommendations of the Oblast Strike Committee. The coal enterprises of Mezhdurechensk, Myski, and several mines of Novokuznetsk are working. This afternoon the speeches by Slyunkov, chairman of the commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Avaliani, chairman of the Oblast Strike Committee, which reported on the first results of the talks were transmitted on the oblast radio. They were successful in coming to agreement on a number of points in the miners' demands.

Here are some of them: From 1 August a coefficient of 1.3 is to be added to wages over the whole territory of the Kuzbass; the delivery of foodstuffs, footwear, garments, knitwear, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, cars, and detergents to the oblast is to be increased; sources of financing additional payments for evening and night shifts have been determined; enterprises are to be granted the right to sell above-contract production at their discretion within the country and abroad; the possibility of establishing for the coal workers of the Kuzbass favorable links between labor productivity and wage growth was considered.

The commission is continuing its work.

Prokopyevsk Miners on Slyunkov Talks

LD1807193989 Moscow Television Sevice in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by A. Andreyev from Prokopyevsk]

[Excerpt] Tuesday, 18 July, 1730, Prokopyevsk—As you see, the miners are not leaving their positions, and here on and around the square the tent camp is still in use. Five hours ago, Comrade Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, addressed the miners of Prokopyevsk. There was a meeting. Representatives of the towns' strike committees have now gone off to coordinate their actions with their strike committees, but here on the square in Prokopyevsk everything is still as it was. The miners of Prokopyevsk did not support the call by the strike committee to end the strike. [video shows tents, crowds of people in rest day clothes, then crowd of miners with bare chests and hard hats, to whom Andreyev speaks]

[Andreyev] How long will the strike go on?

[Miner] Until all our demands have been fulfilled.

[Andreyev] Do you think the talks between Slyunkov and the representatives of the oblast strike committee came up with anything so far?

[Miners murmur negatively]

[Andreyev] You have not heard that anything has been decided?

[Miner] It is all half-baked measures. It did come up with something, but not what we were expecting, of course. It is all half-measures.

[Second miner] What they have given they will take from the funds we have at the enterprise. Not from anywhere else, but from us again.

[Andreyev] What funds would you like it to be from? [Miners all speak together]

[miner] From the coal that is sold.

[Third miner] The most important thing is the question of independence; something has been cleared up about the other, but independence [word indistinct as all speak at once].

[Fourth miner] The association will not give the mines independence, because the association needs to (?grow) itself. That means it must not give the mines independence, because if you give the mines independence, you would have to do away with the association. That is not in their interest. [passage omitted]

Strike Affects Steel Production

PM1907100989 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Jul 89 p 1

[Yu. Kotlyarov dispatch under the general rubric "TRUD Correspondents Report": "Appeals for Reason"]

[Excerpt] Kemerovo Oblast, Prokopyevsk—[Passage omitted] What is the situation like in the oblast now? A.G. Melnikov, first secretary of the oblast party committee, reports that on the morning of 18 July, strikes were still continuing at 160 enterprises in various sectors. Around 180,000 people were involved.

According to an operational bulletin from the Ministry of the Coal Industry, only 69,900 tonnes of coal were extracted in the Kuzbass on 17 July—a shortfall of 378,400 tonnes against the plan; 179,600 tonnes were dispatched versus the 476,300 tonnes planned. The "Severokuzbassugol," "Leninskugol," Kiselevskugol," and "Prokopyevskgidrougol" associations were not loading coking coal.

The miners have received numerous cables from metal workers in the Kuzbass, the Ukraine, and other parts of the country. They express support for the strikers' just demands and appeals to show reason: After all, without the Kuzbass coal, metallurgical production is threatening to grind to a halt...

While this report was being transmitted, a discussion of all the aspects of the latest package of miners' demands continued in the sessions hall of the city party committee. Taking part in it were L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Minsters, S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and others.

Donbass Miners Air Grievances

LD1807202689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] The strike in the Donbass is continuing. Our correspondent, Gennadiy Kondaurov, reports:

[Kondaurov] By this hour almost one-third of the mines in Donetsk Oblast are not operating. Miners at the largest mines of the Donbass—Krasnolimanskaya, Stakhanova, and others—have joined the strike.

The striking workers are gathering in the central squares of cities, near the buildings of city and rayon party committees. Here meetings take place with the leadership of associations, with party and local soviet staff, and with representatives of the Ministry [of the Coal Industry]. Nevertheless, in the Donbass people are badly informed as to how the questions raised by the strikers in the Kuzbass have been resolved, and as to what decision was made there by the strike committee. That is why the miners are continuing to heatedly discuss the problems that have accumulated in the industry and the infringements of the principles of social justice. The discussion is very trenchant. Everything is being discussed openly and without embarrassment.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified speaker] Why is it that when we are idle through no fault of our own we are paid a minimum? We are paid by bonuses. For instance, suppose a delivery was a sack of coal short, then our wages as a whole go to the devil. But there must be such a wage so that rates are set, so that we know how much we will earn and for what we are working.

[Second speaker] We used to have a rate of R5. We used to receive more. Now our rates have been raised but the norms have been raised even higher. It is not realistic. [passage indistinct] These quotas cannot be met according to the accepted standards without safety regulations being violated.

[Third speaker] As for days off, they round us up on Sundays and holidays to work, yet during the middle of week we stand idle for 3, 4, or 5 days. How can you comprehend that? Get rid of the idling and you can rest on Sundays.

[Fourth speaker] A very sore point: injuries happen very often at our mine. Well, for instance, suppose you tell the boss that you have had an injury [others speak in agreement], but the injury is concealed. The injuries are concealed.

[Fifth speaker] We demand that miners have 45 days annual leave. A tutor in a kindergarten gets 45, whereas a miner gets 27 working days off. [end recording]

[Kondaurov] The strike began not all that long ago in the Donbas mines, and more than R1 million has already been lost. Well, in a number of mines in the city of Donetsk it has been decided that they support many of the demands of the strikers of neighboring cities, and they add their own to them. They sent this package to Moscow, to the government, and to the Supreme Soviet, but they are not leaving their work at the mines. The mines are continuing to work.

The demands of the miners are, just, and I have heard no one repudiate them. However, at this time one must act sensibly, attain a just solution and not deprive the country any further.

[Announcer] I would like to add this: This morning the presenter of the "120 Minutes" television program made a mistake and called the striking Kuzbass miners Karaganda [karagandintsy] miners. As our correspondent reported, everyday work is continuing at the Karaganda mines, its rhythm is not changing. In the last 5 days, 13-17 July, more than 70,000 tonnes of coal have been mined above plan. However, it must be admitted that the problems of which the Kuzbass miners speak are also of concern to the Karaganda miners. That is why the trade union territorial committee supported the demand of the central committee of the coal miners' trade union to the Ministry of the Coal Industry on the improvement of the miners' work schedule, conditions, and their everyday life. These demands of the trade union territorial committee were expressed to the leadership of the Karagandaugo production association, which has outlined and already carrying out measures to resolve these issues.

Makeyevka Strikers' Demands Detailed

LD1807201789 Kiev in Ukrainian to Europe 1700 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Miners at six pits in the town of Makeyevka in the Donetsk Coal Basin are holding a strike. They are demanding longer holidays, additional pay for night shift, and improvements to pensions. The demands of more than 2,000 workers also include a reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus; an increase in housing construction for miners, and an improvement in the services sphere. Action on the part of both local authorities and the country's government is essential to meet their demands.

Earlier, the miners of another coal region, the Kuzbass in Siberia, went on strike. [passage omitted]

Makeyevka Miners Continue Strike

LD1807224489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Report by Gennadiy Kondaurov from Makeyevka]

[Excerpts] I am now in Makeyevka, in a miners' village called (Khonzhenka). Makeyevka is in Sovetskiy Rayon. At the moment there are several thousand miners in the

square in front of the party rayon committee building. The strike goes on. At the moment, as it happens, columns of miners from other mines are approaching. Yesterday evening there were eight mines taking part in the strike, but today (?it was reported by) the strike committee that other mines from other towns in the Donbass had joined in, from Yenakiyevo, Donetsk, and several miners' villages. Some 17 mines are already on strike. I would like to say that a meeting took place in this square late yesterday evening and went on very long into the night. It was addressed by Anatoliy Nikolayevich Saunin, USSR people's deputy for Makeyevk[illegible] He came to the miners specially. They asked him to come and tell them how these issues are being considered at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Representatives of the Ministry of the Coal Industry and oblast party leaders also spoke. The miners once again presented their demands to them. There were talks.

With me now is (Valeriy Matveyevich Blishchik), a member of the committee. I want to ask: How did these talks end?

[(Blishchik)] Essentially, they have not ended with anything yet. Yesterday we listened to Comrade Ryzhkov's speech.

[Kondaurov] Here in the square?

[(Blishchik)] Yes. Right here in the square. A linkup was arranged, a radio relay. We listened to it, and we listened to our deputy. Everything was vague, with only promises. The specific issues are not being resolved. Together with the deputies and the party and local soviet leaders we looked at all our demands: 38 points.

[Kondaurov] How many points have they accepted?

[(Blishchik)] Twenty. But these are less important points. Our main points are: increased pay, increased pensions, increased leave. [passage omitted]

Kemerovo Strike Committee Formed

PM1807154589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Jul 89 Second Edition p 2

[Own correspondent V. Kostyukovskiy report: "Situation in the Kuzbass. Time for Strict Assessments"]

[Text] Kemerovo Oblast—No one has left the squares in the mining towns for several days. More than 150,000 miners are on strike. The situation is alarming. The miners fully realize the enormity of the scale of the strike. If blast furnaces are left without coal, they can be started up again. But coke-oven batteries will be extinguished forever.... That is why the Novokuznetsk strike committee has resolved to dispatch coal to western Siberia and to the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine. Coal deliveries to power stations and the population continue in other cities.

Minister M. Shchadov was due to meet with representatives of the strike committee who had gathered in Prokopyevsk Sunday afternoon [16 July]. However, the talks did not take place—the miners were dissatisfied with the results of their previous talks with the sector leaders. Instead of meeting with the minister they held their own conference, deciding to elect an oblast joint strike committee.

The discussion at the conference was both heated and responsible. But, at the same time, you got the impression that the strikers' representatives were not always sufficiently competent and sometimes lacked even elementary economic knowledge.

The first package of demands was discussed. It covered issues of economic independence, economic accountability, the price of coal, foreign economic activities, and the distribution of profits. In addition to the above points it is planned to give labor collectives the right to independently determine forms of ownership (state, cooperative, or lease ownership) within the framework of socialist ownership. They discussed the need for 10 percent of profits to be allocated to the state budget, 20 percent to the local soviets, and the rest to be left with the mines.

Economic points were discussed for an excruciatingly long time—hour after hour. They finally got confused about the norms for deductions of foreign-exchange profits. Somebody proposed giving the state 40 percent. Somebody else was confused about why the enterprises should not retain all 100 percent. Somebody else remarked: How will the state buy wheat for us? Yet another objected: We are discussing some kind of incomprehensible rubbish, people will not understand us, they will demand that questions of salary, pension, and food supply be resolved. The response to him was that the first group of demands is the most important, since it will ensure the resolution of a considerable number of the other demands. There were arguments and emotions....

They decided to determine the immediate demands which the minister was in a position to satisfy. They formulated the first demand as being to set the pay of evening and night shifts. But the minister had already decided this, had signed the order, and had allocated the necessary funds for the entire Kuzbass.... Then it was a question of setting a higher rayon coefficient.... Probably they had already simply forgotten what they were discussing: The minister of the coal industry is not entitled to resolve such questions, however much he might want to.

Every city delegated two representatives each to the oblast strike committee. These were mainly workers, but there were also, for instance, sector chiefs, mine foremen, a party committee secretary, and a chief engineer. T. Avaliani, USSR people's deputy and deputy general director of the "Kiselevskugol" Association, was elected chairman.

The telegram from M.S. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov was conveyed to the auditorium. Reporting the setting up of a special commission and its departure for the Kuzbass, they appealed to the strikers to be sensible.

After a short silence (and what a pity that this highly important pause was so short!) there was another storm of arguments in the auditorium.

It is even more painful to write about something else. But the fact is that you either tell the whole truth or nothing. When we walked with everyone else to Victory Square and the citizens and striking miners, I thought hopefully that reason would prevail and people would be convinced of the need to start work! But, talking with the many people assembled in the square, we could see that most of them still take a different position.

And yet, it was clear from everything that a breakthrough is emerging. Certain city strike committees did not adopt the proposal for a blanket stoppage of shipments; they retained the right to decide this issue themselves. Coal is being shipped from depots where, incidentally, around 12 million tonnes of fuel are stockpiled because of rail transport inefficiencies. The miners' work is going to waste....

I think that very soon the Kuzbass miners will fully display the qualities which the country is asking them to display.

95 Enterprises Stop Operations

LD1807175789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] The latest reports from Kemerovo oblast: [reader in studio: one of two sitting at table by monitor screen] Now a report from the the oblast press center on the situation in the oblast. This was the situation this morning:

In both Novokuznetsk and Kiselevsk 32 enterprises were not working; in Belovo 29, in Berezovskiy 18, in Leninsk-Kuznetskiy 16. Several of them stopped as a result of picketing by mine workers. The work of transport is becoming difficult, the oblast press center reports—880 wagons have not been unloaded; 91 wagons are waiting to be unloaded in Prokopyevsk. These include: three wagons with tomatoes; five with meat; one with tea; two with tobacco; and wagons with motor vehicles, motor vehicle spare parts, and with fuel.

Since the beginning of the strike the shortfall in the amount of coal mined—I presume in the oblast—is 1,851,000 tonnes.

Some Ukrainian Miners' Demands Met

LD1807181189 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Donetsk July 18 TASS—The scale of the strike started by miners at Makeyevka has considerably expanded. Thirty nine mines are on strike today in the Donetsk region, which is the major part of the Donbass, Ukraine. The strikers advanced a number of economic and social demands. Aleksandr Fisun, first deputy minister of the Coal Industry, arrived here to help settle the conflict. He told TASS that negotiations with the strike committee were held throughout the night. During the discussion which involved government, union and party bodies (Makeyevka Mayor Vasiliy Klets was unanimously elected to the strike committee), some of the demands within the competence of local administration were satisfied. In particular, heads of mines were instructed to increase pay for miners and tunnellers working with pick hammers. Now the councils of labour collectives can give longer holidays to people working in dangerous faces and, on agreement with the administration, fix an uninterrupted working week for miners with one day-off on Sunday and the other according to a sliding schedule. It was also decided to increase pay for evening and night shifts. Out of material incentive funds the councils of labour collectives can now grant an additional paid leave for women upbringing children under 3 years of age.

The strikers' other demands were handed to the USSR People's Deputy from Makeyevka who will convey them to the USSR Supreme Soviet. They include demands common for the workers of the entire branch. These problems are currently being tackled by a government commission in the Kuznetsk Coal Basin, Siberia, led by Nikolay Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ukraine Government Has No Part in Resolving Strike

LD1807214789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast: report by correspondent G. Kondaurov from the Donbass]

[Text] The number of striking miners in Donetsk Oblast has increased sharply in the last 24 hours. By the end of the day nearly 30 mines in the oblast had joined the strike. Even one of the largest mines in the Ukraine, the Stakhanov Mine, had stopped work. Miners form long columns and walk toward the centers of their towns and settlements. Many thousands of people gather in some places. Miners are sitting for the 3d day in a square in the Sovetskiy Rayon of Makeyevka. The generally reasonable call to gather in their own mines and to continue the strike action there is not as yet, unfortunately, finding any support. The strike committees everywhere are putting forward their own demands. The strikers are usually

met by oblast and town leaders, and representatives from associations and ministries. But they sometimes turn out to be powerless to solve the many difficult questions posed by the miners.

For some reason, the government of the Ukraine is still taking no part in resolving the acute labor and social conflict. The fact that there is still no competent commission in the Donbass to negotiate with the miners makes the situation worse.

[First miner] We have decided to continue the strike until our demands are fully met. The main demands that we are demanding are substantial demands like, let's say, reducing the period spent underground to 25 years, as the Kuzbass miners have. Then there is the payment of allowances for working evening and night shifts, so that it doesn't depend on the funds of the mine, on the mine's profits, because our mines are poor and unprofitable. In short, the mines are a complete shambles.

[Second miner] We demand that underground workers should be given at least 45 days' leave.

[First miner] We have sent our demands to Moscow.

[Kondaurov] To the Supreme Soviet?

[First miner] Yes, to the Supreme Soviet, and we will wait for them to be met.

[Kondaurov] The miners continue their heated discussion of the industry's problems: the infringement of the principles of social justice, working on off-days, imperfect labor remuneration, housing, kindergartens, and pensions, and the high accident rate that leads to deaths. The miners talk about everything heatedly and frankly. I have not heard anyone rejecting their demands. They are fair. How important it is now, both to the miners and to those who are listening to their demands, to act sensibly, to achieve a just solution and to avoid depriving the country even more.

Karaganda Miners Say Strike Report Inaccurate

LD1807133689 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Alma-Ata July 18 TASS—By TASS correspondent Azamat Autalipov:

Karaganda miners in Soviet Kazakhstan, hundreds of miles from strike-hit pits in Siberia's Kemerovo region, were very much surprised this morning to hear a national television commentator report they had staged a walkout too.

The work stoppage claim, twice made by host Sergey Slipchenko of the "120 Minutes" news and entertainment programme, unleashed an avalanche of phone calls to Karaganda authorities from the nearby coal-mining towns of Abai, Saran and Shakhtinsk.

The only thing people wanted to know was whether 110,000 miners were really on strike in the city, as reported.

Workers from the 60 years of the October Revolution mine sent a cable to Moscow to their team leader Yaroslav Donchak, a Supreme Soviet deputy, asking him to take the floor in parliament to deny the Karaganda miners strike report.

It is believed in Karaganda that a slip of the tongue was probably to blame, confusing Kemerovo with Karaganda. But this is a lame excuse for the resulting commotion.

Nikolay Drizhd, general director of the Karaganda Regional Mining Association, told TASS that Karaganda miners take developments in the Kemerovo region close to heart.

"We are only too familiar with many of the problems that made our colleagues go on strike, but today we have only one way of supporting their just demands, and that is devoting ourselves to work so that nobody could accuse Karaganda miners of irresponsibility.

"I think that the events in the Kemerovo region will force the coal-mining ministry finally to face up to the miners' pressing problems," Drizhd said.

Miners Dissatisfaction, 'Impulsiveness' Cited

PM1807150189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 89 Second Edition p 6

[PRAVDA correspondent A. Bogachuk report: "Will Prudence Take the Upper Hand? Strike Continues"]

[Text] Kemerovo, 17 Jul—Last Sunday Kemerovo's beaches and miners' recreational areas were not crowded as usual. But the squares in the mining towns did not empty for a single hour. Hundreds and hundreds of people—many in their special clothing and mining helmets—stood by the loudspeakers waiting for news.

Public attention yesterday centered on a meeting between the representatives of the strike committees from 11 mining towns, which was broadcast on the oblast radio. It was held in the Artem culture center in Prokopyevsk, and it certainly did not go smoothly. The disputes in elaborating the strikers' set of unified demands sometimes went too far.

Dissatisfaction with the current pace of restructuring, departmental diktat, which has reduced enterprises' rights and economic independence to a minimum, the social neglect of mining towns, particularly Prokopyevsk and Kiselevsk, that has built up over decades, and the worsening environmental situation—all these, the strikers say, requires urgent solutions. The strikers' leaders are increasingly seeing for themselves from personal experience that a reasonable and feasible solution to all problems cannot always be found in 4-5 hours.

They can also see something else—impulsiveness, quick temper, and extreme measures, which only kindle social tension are not the best helpmates in such matters. Patience, a well-considered approach, and advice from competent specialists are needed. Especially when thousands of people are waiting on municipal squares for such solutions and people in other coalfields are following the development of events in the region with trepidation and concern. Bearing this in mind, the mining cities' delegations elected a united strike committee, instructing it to prepare a set of unified demands and proposals.

After the meeting at the Artem culture center we talked with miners first in Prokopyevsk and then in neighboring Kiselevsk. People did not rush home despite the lateness of the hour, but asked trenchant questions and demanded an answer. For instance, at a rally in Kiselevsk, one speaker asked: Where did the trade union leaders get to on the strike days? M. Srebnyy, chairman of the Union of Coal Industry Workers' Central Committee, who was there at the rally, answered him. He replied that the trade unions are with miners at this time—organizing food for the strikers on the squares and supplying them with refreshing drinks.

I recalled a conversation with miners from the "Severnaya" mine in Kemerovo.

"If we are given the status of a state enterprise along with economic independence," the miners said, "that will eliminate almost half our current demands from the agenda. There is no need to convince us that the state is not a milch cow! We want to manage for ourselves, work better, and live a better life."

True, a great deal is not to the liking of the Kuzbass miners today, but that does not mean that anyone can feather his nest at others' expense. I have already written before that miners resolutely rebuff such people who "love to feather their nest."

For instance, a local activist from the so-called "Democratic Union" forced his way to the microphone at the rally in Kemerovo, but people refused to listen to him. Half an hour later someone pasted sheets of drawing paper on the platform bearing the laconic parting words: "Democratic Union—on the rubbish heap!"

Having failed to obtain an exhaustive answer to their demands from local leaders and sectoral leaders, the miners are preparing for constructive dialogue, as the saying goes, at the highest level. This dialogue is already beginning. A commission headed by N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, arrived in the Kuzbass today.

He met with workers from the city of Kemerovo gathered on Soviet Square and spoke about the program for the commission's work and answered questions. M.I. Shchadov, USSR minister of the coal industry, informed miners from the Kemerovo mine about the results of the examination of their demands, which have been put forward in the course of the strike. S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, also answered questions put by the people of Kemerovo.

In the afternoon the members of the commission flew to Prokopyevsk. They teamed up with the combined oblast strike committee to tackle the task of examining the urgent problems in the development of the Kuzbass set out in the strikers' demands.

L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is taking part in the work of the commission.

Lukyanov Addresses Soviet on Strikes 19 Jul

LD1907084389 Moscow TASS in English 0830 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The USSR Supreme Soviet, having heard information by President Mikhail Gorbachev concerning the coalminers' strike in Kuzbass (Siberia) and Donbass (Ukraine), this morning moved on to the discussion of the next item in the agenda—the organisation of work for the carrying out of assignments given to the Supreme Soviet by the Congress of People's Deputies.

A report on the item was delivered by Vice-President Anatoliy Lukyanov.

TASS on 18 Jul Nationalities Commission Session

LD1807223289 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent reporting from the Kremlin:

The session of the commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the nationalities policy and relations was notable for the acute nature of the problems raised and the desire to find an early solution to them.

On the proposal of Georgiy Tarazevich, chairman of the commission, it was decided to refer the appeals by Soviet Germans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and also on Nagorno-Karabakh to respective commissions which were set up especially to tackle these issues.

As to problems related to the national-territorial and administrative-territorial structure, deputies decided to examine them first in respective republican bodies and only after that, mindful of their view, to put them to discussion in the commission. Appeals concerning the

destiny of small peoples will be submitted for consideration to the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the commission will engage in elaborating its own proposals on this question.

People's deputies Yuriy Blokhin and Nikolay Kostishin from Moldavia, drawing the attention of those present to the situation in the field of ethnic relations in that Soviet Union republic, voiced the proposal to form respective commissions to prevent clashes rather than investigating their consequences. Nikolay Medvedev, a member of the commission, supported this point of view. Our task is to prevent tragic events rather than dealing with their consequences, he stressed. The proposal was also put forward for elaborating a state-legal status for autonomous republics.

Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan emphasised that nationalities problems should not be simplified. It is wrong, in his view, to delegate a solution of all issues related to this matter to the republican authorities only, since this frequently brings about an infringement of the rights of other nations residing in the national republic.

Georgiy Tarazevich noted in this view that it is republics and peoples living there who should, first and foremost, tackle their matters. They should deal with them sensibly, correctly and by democratic methods. But if problems are not limited to their frameworks and legal standards are violated, central authorities should interfere. Questions of local importance should be solved locally, this is the truth which does not require to be proved, he stressed. However, if there emerges inequality, the public of the entire country should interfere.

The session of the commission also attended some organisational matters.

Supreme Soviet Committees, Commissions Meet 18 Jul
LD1907025389

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 18 July broadcasts a 22-minute report presented by Lyudmila Semina summing up the work of the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions today. After listing a few of the committees that sat, she mentions the discussion that took place at "a joint sitting of several committees and commissions" of the candidate for chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices: Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Senchagov, an economist by education and currently deputy minister of finance.

Abalkin's contribution, urging against reducing the apparatus at the price committee, is broadcast. He says: "There must be a reduction in the number of industrial ministries; there is even a need to eliminate some of them completely after a certain time. But if we are carrying out economic reforms, then the central economic departments, such as the State Committee on Labor, the State Committee on Prices, and the Ministry of Finance must, on the contrary, be increased.... The question has arisen today with regard to the State Committee on Prices. I am taking the central apparatus—I'm not taking the other apparatuses, for they are a particular issue.... My position is that it must not be reduced, and it is dangerous to do so. Raising the scientific standard and the qualifications of the officials is another matter. But, secondly, the further we go in pulling down the administrative and command system, the more the role of economist departments and committees will grow—as distinct from industrial departments, which should both be cut sharply in the future and die away."

Semina introduces an interview conducted with Senchagov himself by Vladimir Korablev. Senchagov admits that "the system has grown obsolete...but this system needs to be touched very, very carefully." He talks in general terms about the need to match supply to demand, to restore public confidence in the monetary system, and to increase the output of consumer goods and service. Overall, "we must restore to the population confidence, confidence in the ability of our state to get the measure of the economic problems which we have. Of course, this is not the task of one committee, but, rather, the task of the whole government, the task of the new commission headed by Academician Abalkin, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers." Asked about the high prices charged by cooperatives, Senchagov feels that the low quality of their goods is at least as important in explaining people's attitudes to them. Without going into any detail, he believes that "much needs to be done by the state, in both taxation, pricing and structural policy." Competition for the coops, in the form of small state enterprises on a leasing or joint-stock basis, would be a good thing, he says.

Moving on to the subject of taxation and cooperatives, Semina reports that the committees and commissions discussed the decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on taxation of cooperatives—"The decrees of 14 March, 23 February, and 28 March, which prompted an explosion of emotions on 14 March last year." She broadcasts the contribution of Viktor Nikolayevich Yaroshenko, chairman of the Subcommittee on Taxation. He explains that those responsible for drawing up the decrees have been invited to appear, to say whether the situation requires prohibitive taxation or encouragement for business activity; representatives of coops have been invited to put their side of the issue too. Mentioning shortages, he adds that "the absense of sports clothes, of clothes for young people, can also push young people towards thoughtless actions. And we know that the chain of social and economic consequences from each step of ours can be unpredictable. Fergana is one example where one cause was high unemployment. As for the events in the miners' settlements, the causes and consequences have still to be studied properly; one of the causes there, evidently, was half-empty shelves, lack of facilities, and so on."

The draft law on the economic independence of the Estonian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic's was discussed by the Committee on Issues of the Economic

reform and a number of commissions. Semina reports that "the draft was approved by a majority of votes, although there were also opponents of that decision." She interviews Igor Nikolayevich Gryazin PD, from the Estonian Academy of Sciences, who outlines known views in favor of economic independence, such as the importance of living according to your earnings and the freedom to choose trading partners without interference from some "uncle" above.

The Committee on Ecology dealt with a local issue in the area near Moscow, where an industrial zone is being set up on a national park. (Lidiya Nikolayevna Shelest), head of the Central Ecological Directorate of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic State Committee for Nature, was invited to the sitting, and is heard answering a question from a deputy, stressing that ecology cannot exist in isolation from the economy and social development and urging a comprehensive national economic approach.

The Committee on Science, People's Education, Culture, and Upbringing discussed a variety of issues, Semina says, and "Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, doctor of biological sciences, a member of the committee, asked us to promulgate this decision adopted by the committee." Vorontsov states: "We are discussing in our committee problems connected with legislation on science, culture, education, and upbringing, and we also have to tackle some current, urgent issues connected with this set of problems. I want to draw your attention to the fact that on the 13th, our committee unanimously adopted a draft decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, cancelling decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted in the period between 1967 and 1986 depriving figures from science, culture, literature, and art of USSR citizenship. Those decrees, which were adopted in the so-called Brezhnev period, or the period of stagnation, contradict the Human Rights Declaration signed by the Soviet Union. The second point is, perhaps, private in character, but I believe that it is essential. We are establishing that persons deprived of citizenship and members of their families can have Soviet citizenship restored up to 31 July 1990 for the period which they spent abroad from the moment when the cancelled decision—I mean decree—concerning that person and members of his family was adopted. I stress this date, because many people who did not end up abroad by their own choice are tied by contracts and cannot take a decision immediately. That period is counted in the term of service for retirement on pension in the USSR and the transfer of pensions to members of families which have lost their bread-winner." Asked when the committee plans to put its decision before the Supreme Soviet, Vorontsov replies that "we are hoping that it can be examined at this session of the Supreme Soviet". In his final remarks, he explains that "culture cannot be restored without renouncing immoral actions, without rejecting immoral and illegal decrees or laws".

Consider Taxes, Cooperatives

LD1807211689

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 18 July broadcasts a report from the Kremlin on work by Supreme Soviet commissions.

Olga Vasilenko reports that the deputies spent exactly 4 hours discussing V.K. Senchagov's nomination for the post of chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices. The deputies discussed the program to improve the committee's work on price formation.

The two committees and three commissions taking part in the present session will discuss the problem of taxes and cooperatives.

Vasilenko interviews Viktor Ivanovich Korchagin, president of the All-Union Association of Cooperatives on this issue. Korchagin says his aim is to convince the deputies that the cooperatives should not have to pay any more tax, because they already pay twelve types of tax. The first type is income tax from their gross revenue, which is approximately three times as high as profit tax. Wages, the production development fund, and the fund for social deductions are subject to income tax. "by the 6 June 1989 decree of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, taxes on cooperatives were raised as much as twentyfold. This is an unprecedented case in tax policy." Korchagin says that the second tax is that on wages—13 percent. Vasilenko lists other taxes mentioned by him—bachelors' tax, land tax, bank tax, trade tax, criminal racket tax, bureaucratic racket tax. "I'll start with bureaucratic racket. In principle that also takes the form of tax, because when a member of a cooperative goes to get raw materials, he has to pay—he also pays for other materials and equipment. Thus, that is in fact just like a tax. Moreover, although trials are taking place regarding criminal rackets, nothing is being done about bureaucratic rackets. They don't bring bureaucrats to trial anywhere for extracting that tax." Korchagin says that the Ministry of Justice has already passed a law against criminal rackets, but the cooperative members are defenseless when it comes to bureaucratic rackets.

Korchagin talks about the negative attitude toward cooperatives and their prices, which he regards as stemming from a lack of understanding of market mechanisms and the way that price is determined by supply and demand.

Commission Discusses Culture Minister Candidates

LD1807150189 Moscow TASS in English 1428 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The commission for the development of culture, language, national and international traditions and protection of the historic heritage at the Council of Nationalities intends to help the Soviet prime minister find a candidate to the post of minister of culture.

At today's sitting, members of this parliamentary commission expressed the view that this department should be headed by a personality enjoying authority in the intellectual community rather than a bureaucrat.

In the course of preliminary hearings, the commission rejected Nikolay Ryzhkov's choice of Vasiliy Zakharov.

"The times when ministries looked infallible and impregnable by public opinion are gone," author Chingiz Aitmatov, who is chairman of the commission, told the sitting.

"It has become clear that the activity of the Ministry of Culture does not correspond to present-day requirements, that is why our commission denied Zakharov confidence," Aitmatov said.

"No doubt, our decision will have a considerable effect on the stance of republican agencies as well."

The commission has decided to draft a concept of the activity of the Ministry of Culture in the present-day conditions and present it to a new candidate.

Speakers at the sitting observed that the Ministry of Culture should be preserved, but its functions must be changed so as to replace command management with efforts to consolidate republican agencies, creative unions and non-governmental organisations.

Another important function of the ministry is to facilitate international cultural exchanges. Its activity in this field should be based on parity cooperation with republican organisations, non-governmental bodies and creative unions, commission members believe.

Commission Endorses Senchagov as Price Chairman

LD1807213489

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 GMT on 18 July broadcasts a report on the work of the morning session of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee and Commissions in the Kremlin today. Correspondent Marina Novitskaya reports that almost all the committees and commissions are meeting today; nearly all the government posts have now been filled except for the post of chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices. USSR Deputy Finance Minister V.K. Senchagov has been nominated for that post. In his speech to the deputies, Senchagov recognizes that the job is not an easy one. He talks of the possibility of offering guarantees against rising prices to people on pension and fixed incomes. He also reiterates the importance of increasing the role of the republics in determining prices, stating that he favors encouraging cooperatives "although in the current situation, of course, cooperatives are not playing the best of roles; there are many negative aspects but we must not lurch off in the opposite direction. That would only strengthen monopolies again. So I am in favor of developing them." He praises GDR bookkeeping and says that Soviet cooperatives could learn a lot from that.

In his address, Academician Abalkin cautions against trying to save money by reducing the apparatus at the State Committee on Prices: "There must be a reduction in the number of industrial ministries. After a specified time, there is even a need to eliminate some of them completely. But if we are carrying out economic reforms, then the central economic departments, such as the State Committee on Labor, the State Committee on Prices and the Ministry of Finance must, on the contrary, be increased." He goes on to say that the function of the Committee on Prices must be to coordinate pricing policy in general "while the rest must, of course, be resolved by market forces and the broad development of democratization."

Novitskaya says: "The debate today was stormy. But here is the result. All the members of the committees and commissions who took part in the session decided to recommend that the USSR Supreme Soviet approve Comrade Senchagov in the post as Chairman of the State Committee on Prices. Only one person voted against him."

Following is an interview with Valintin Afanasiyevich Tetenov, head of the Soviet of the Union Commission on Transport, Communications, and Information Technology. He says: "I have to say something about what happened in the Supreme Soviet. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov gave an interview in which he said that some of the deputies and members of the Supreme Soviet were overcome with emotion. That is probably true, because there are many shortcomings in rail transportation. But I must say straight out that they are not all the fault of Comrade Konarev." He continues: "We are receiving telegrams both in favor of Comrade Konarev and opposing him. These telegrams also nominate candidates and we are ready to present them to the Council of Ministers and its chairman." The commission has a great deal of work ahead, he says. He expresses the hope that Comrade Tolstykh will bring the benefit of his experience to the Committee on Information and Computer Technology as there is a great deal of work to do there as well.

Concluding the report, Novitskaya says: "The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will continue work tomorrow. Deputies from both chambers will gather for a joint session at 1000."

R500 Million Allocated for Health Needs

LD1807202389 Moscow TASS in English 1949 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondents:

500 million foreign exchange roubles have been allocated to the public health service for its pressing needs, it has been learned at the USSR Supreme Soviet's public health committee. That the government's response to several committees' request for urgent allocation of money to purchase abroad medicines which are in short supply here. The money will be spent already this year to purchase above all most essential preparations for treatment of children sick with diabetes, branchial asthma, cardio-vascular and other grave diseases, Deputy Committee Chairman Yuriy Belenkov told TASS.

A short supply of vital preparations, irregular supplies of even the most elementary medicines are giving rise to rightful indignation of the Soviet people and discredit the government's public health service development programme, Belenkov said. A shortage of drugs necessary for treatment of children, pregnant women, invalids and veterans is particularly inadmissible.

The USSR Council of Ministers promptly responded to our request, and this is evidence of the fact that Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and his colleagues understand the importance of solution of the medicine problem which from a pure medical is becoming political. [sentence as received]

We, the deputies, are certainly displeased with the fact that the long disregard for the development of the up-to-date technological basis of the Soviet pharmacological industry now leads to such hasty measures. But one cannot do without them and it is good that our leaders understand that. Besides, the cause of our serious concern is that the situation is worsened by a chaos in planning medicine production. Ministries and enterprises are responsible for implementation of their intra-departmental assignments and nobody is responsible for adequate supplies of medicines for the population of the country. We proposed to the government to draw up, starting from 1990, as part of the state plan of economic and social development of the USSR, a balance-sheet of the requirements in medicines and medical-purpose commodities, and sources to fully meet these requirements, the deputy committee chairman said in conclusion.

Commentator Notes Debate on Cooperatives' Future
LD1807215189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Commentator Olga Vasilenko report from USSR Supreme Soviet sessions of committees and commissions in the Moscow Kremlin]

[Text] The evening sessions of the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet were devoted to discussion of the Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 23 February 1989 on the income taxation of cooperatives. Thus, specific, practical work by deputies has started on decrees and draft laws. I would remind you that there are two committees working in the hall of the sessions of the chambers, on issues of economic reform and on veterans and invalids' affairs, and three commissions: Planning, Budget, and Finance; Labor, Prices, and Social Policy; and Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts, and Okrugs—that is, a committee under the Soviet of Nationalities.

The dispute here over whether cooperatives are needed or not is not dying down, but, on the contrary, is running high, because there are more and more cooperatives, and this means that there are more and more people with high incomes, and we notice this first and foremost, given the low levels of pay. And how many conversations are there about corruption, growing on the basis of development of cooperatives, about the flow of endless money into the pockets of the cooperative operators, in cash. However, I have noticed that these conversations are conducted mostly at a narrow-minded level, and when I talked to academics and economists I heard only one thing: the cooperatives must be developed and supported, not abused, without any understanding of what is happening. In that way we are damaging our economy. It is approximately in this vein that discussion of the decree is proceeding. The discussion is debating whether to recommend this decree for the endorsement of the Supreme Soviet or to repeal it.

So the deputies are trying to understand just what our cooperatives are like, how they can help to straighten out our economy. Therefore they invited here to the Kremlin well-known finance experts, economists, and cooperative operators themselves. For more than an hour Mikhail Vasiliyevich (Pilko), deputy head of the Department of State Incomes and Taxes of the USSR Ministry of Finance, answered the deputies' questions. In the main, all the questions concerned excessively high prices. Detailed answers were given to all the questions, but nonetheless I feel that the deputies were somehow not very satisfied, and there were therefore many speeches and strong rejoinders. Here some of the deputies even made some graphic comparisons: the cooperatives are simultaneously both gamekeeper and poacher. I think that the meaning of this is clear—the gamekeepers make us turn round and clean up our economy, while the poachers—there are some cases demonstrating that the cooperatives have not yet become the significant phenomenon, the postive phenomenon in our life that they should.

One more thing: We need an agent—here I am also quoting from one of the speeches—to act to reduce cooperative prices, and this agent should be the state, but on this level the state is not doing anything. Thus, the decree on income taxation of cooperatives is a way of attracting more money into the local and the state budgets, but is in no way a solution to economic problems.

Deputies invited to the rostrum Aleksandr Andreyevich Panin. We journalists know him well—he was in at the origins of the cooperative movement, being on state service in the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee.

Panin is now chairman of the board of the (Mosintek) State Cooperative Association of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee. He is a candidate of technology. In 3 years, he said, I have not entirely understood what we, the cooperatives, are. The economic and legal status of the cooperatives still remain undefined, and they—the cooperatives—year by year are generating a gigantic increase in output. For example, in Moscow in 1987 output worth R22 million was produced, yet in the first quarter of 1989 alone this was already R854,000. The cooperatives are changing qualitatively. The building cooperatives are appearing in large numbers. Is that good or bad? Let's look at that fact: Yield per worker in a cooperative is R43,000, and in the state system the yield in construction per worker is R8-12,000. Labor productivity is quadrupled, but what about state prices?

There is now another kind of cooperative, the scientific innovation cooperative, and these are also appearing in large numbers here. They work six times faster. And there are 2.5 times fewer people engaged in that work. Mikhail Yakovlevich Ioffe also addressed the deputies. He is Professor of the Plekhanov Institute of the National Economy and a Doctor of Economics. He has long been working on the problem of the cooperatives. He voiced the idea that were all science in our system turned into cooperatives, it would be possible to cut 400,000 scientific workers in scientific research institutes. And to save R1,500 million on their pay.

One more fact, before I move on to sum up. I am again quoting one of the deputies: We have a shoe-shiner sitting here, but there are six levels of superstructure above him. The fact is that the cooperatives have no need of these six levels of superstructure. Perhaps this is why there is this nonacceptance of cooperatives on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus. That's the kind of conversation which is going on at the sessions of the commissions and committees, but the deputies are increasingly inclining towards the view that the decree which they are discussing as yet falls outside the solving of economic problems. Nonetheless, the decision on this decree lies ahead. The session continues after a short break, and ther I'll finish for now my report about the work of the commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Soviet Meets, Discusses Draft Laws 17 Jul

LD1707064889 Moscow TASS in English 0641 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

After two days off the USSR Supreme Soviet holds today a joint session of the two chambers—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. It is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy president of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Much remains to be done by parliamentarians during three weeks that are left before the summer vacations. After they complete the formation of the government and other central bodies, which has been going on since late June, they will discuss the schedule of the fulfilment of instructions given to the parliament by the recent congress of the USSR People's Deputies. The parliamentarians will analyse decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which will become laws only after they are endorsed by the session.

Draft laws submitted for the consideration of the session take up a major part of the agenda. There are over ten of them, including specially important ones, such as draft fundamentals of the criminal code and of the organisation of courts, draft laws on the press, on the association of citizens and on the imposition of taxes on the population.

Most probably, the parliamentarians will have time for a discussion only after the first reading.

Supreme Soviet on Republics' Economic Independence

PM1807151189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 2

[R. Lynev report under the rubric "At the USSR Supreme Soviet": "Draft Approved. Questions Remain"]

[Text] Friday evening [14 July], deputies assembled in the Malyy Hall of the USSR Supreme Soviet—members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Economic Reform (the chairman of this committee, V.M. Vologzhin, chaired the meeting), the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Questions of the Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs, and also two Soviet of the Union commissions: the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission and the Commission on Questions of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy. The agenda—the draft law "On the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic." In other words, the economic accountability of these republics. Its concepts, I should remind you, have been approved by the Lithuanian and Estonian Supreme Soviets. After this, they, these concepts, were submitted to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies as a draft law. On instructions from the Congress, the draft was discussed in detail and elaborated by a working group. Then the five pages of printed text were distributed to all the participants in the sitting.

Even a cursory glance at the text of the proposed document convinces you that the working group—headed by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences P.G. Bunich—has worked quite hard to reach a compromise on wording, wherever possible, and to bring together divergent—sometimes too divergent—viewpoints on the economic independence of the republics and their relationship with the center. So, what is the

result? The result is what usually happens in such situations: Some extremes give way to expressions so general that the need arises to clarify and specify all over again. This took over 3 hours of discussion rather than the intended 2 hours. And, we will be frank, a number of questions have essentially remained open-ended. I will discuss them in a little more in detail later. But now to the most important point, which the initiators of the law consider to be its earliest possible adoption.

Discussing this, K. Prunskene, a deputy from Lithuania, stressed, as she did at the Congress, that sectoral management of the economy has become too much of an absolute, which leads to a number of deformations; these deformations should be eliminated by decentralizing management and transferring some of its functions to the local level. But to the local level does not mean solely to the enterprises—their independence per se does not produce masters of the economy; it means to the republics and to local soviets, by broadening their independence and increasing the responsibility of the authorities to the people.

I.Kh. Toome, chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, said: Today the model of republic economic accountability has brought closer than ever before and, in a number of cases, united the aspirations of not only the Estonian people but also a substantial proportion of the republic's non-Estonian population who quite recently had a guarded, mistrustful view of IME [expansion unknown]. This has given rise to unprecedented enthusiasm that should be exploited, bearing in mind that the time factor is a decisive one for restructuring as a whole. To be more specific, preparation to transfer the republic's economic management to the principles of economic accountability will take 5-7 months. So there is not much time left until 1 January next year—that is, until the changeover to economic accountability, the speaker stressed.

Should this time be lost? By formulating the question in this way, representatives of the two republics—for obvious reasons a particularly large number of them had attended the meeting—did not transcend the bounds of traditional Baltic reserve. But it was obvious that many of them were finding it increasingly difficult to remain within these bounds.

But the crux of the matter lies in the questions left unanswered by the draft in its present form. And I am not talking about individual issues—I am referring to the fundamental issues already discussed in the press, including IZVESTIYA. The main question is that of ownership. Who will own the enterprises under union jurisdiction that are located in the republics' territory? Energy, transport, and other communications? How will ownership be transferred? Free of charge? Or on a lease basis?

Academician of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and People's Deputy V.A. Tikhonov defended the idea that all this should become the property of the peoples of the republics concerned. Without transferring the economic infrastructure to the republics, R.A. Otsason, a deputy from Estonia, pointed out, their economy will function but will not be managed, and without this their comprehensive development is theoretically impossible.

Or another question—the question of deductions from the profits of enterprises under union jurisdiction located in the republics. It is one thing when these payments are made directly to the state budget as they are now. It is somewhat different when these payments go first to the republic budget and only after that, as stated in the draft law: "Payments into the USSR budget...are to be made in agreement with the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the republic concerned on the basis of a progressive scale." In other words, the enterprise will receive a profit and the republic will pay tax to the state on the sum of this profit, and, what is more, progressive tax. But what does progressive tax mean to a republic? There is still no answer to this.

There were also a number of other questions and observations on the contents of the draft—far more trivial, but so numerous that Academician L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, present at the sitting, said: Would it not be better to meet again and discuss the document when all these observations have been incorporated, otherwise the Supreme Soviet session is likely to return it for revision. People objected to this, saying: What draft satisfies absolutely everyone and gets through on the first hearing?

Deputy G.I. Filshin, a scientist from Irkutsk and the sole representative at the sitting of the Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission, without particularly going into the details of the document under discussion, pointed out a shortcoming—namely, the absence of an alternative draft which should have been provided by the USSR Council of Ministers. But now we have a situation where the legislative body puts forward a draft law for itself, without any objections.... A number of deputies tried to dispel these doubts: The Council of Ministers is represented here by L.I. Abalkin, they said, so is there any point in wasting time clarifying details and particulars which will be clarified by real life and practice? The most important point now is to advance the reform, economic accountability, and self-financing, at least in the one area most prepared for this—the Baltic region, which, by its example, will point the way to the other regions and republics.

How can one fail to understand this impatience not only on the part of deputies from the Baltic republics but also among their colleagues from Russia, the Ukraine, and Siberia who support them?

While sharing their desire in principle to get things moving even if it means leaving some questions "for later," L.I. Abalkin reminded them that these questions will nevertheless arise and, what is more, in a form

possibly more inconvenient than their present one. For example, if the two republics are given independence in forming their system of state revenue, labor remuneration, and pensions and in establishing the price-setting system, what will happen when the Supreme Soviet adopts a package of laws on ownership, taxation, price formation, local self-government, pensions, and so forth? How will these future laws correlate with the draft currently under discussion? Should the draft Law on the Economic Independence of Lithuania and Estonia be passed on a provisional basis, pending the adoption of these basic laws? Or will they not affect Lithuania and Estonia? These questions, you must agree, are at present more the domain of theory than practice. But tomorrow?

Deputy I.N. Gryazin, a legal expert from Tartu, pointed out that union legislation and republic legislation generally needs to be clearly delimited. The former must draft the fundamentals and general principles of the laws, while the latter must draft the laws themselves, as applicable to specific conditions and traditions. Adopting the law on economic accountability in the republics is the sovereign right of the republics themselves. But the point, the deputy said, is that unfortunately the principle—in practice everything that has not been authorized is forbidden—is still alive here. Or, at least, can easily be forbidden and abolished by the departments. Wishing to protect the models of economic accountability adopted in the republics against this kind of encroachment, we have decided to pursue these models at union level, the speaker stressed.

In the end the draft law was adopted with the resolution to recommend it to the Supreme Soviet for consideration, with two votes against and one abstention.

Commenting on this decision to the author of these lines, deputy G.I. Filshin nevertheless remarked on the haste with which the draft had been prepared and adopted. I.N. Gryazin, on the other hand, said that the 6-month delay in reaching a decision, as shown by the entire 4 years' experience of various decisions connected with restructuring, will have an effect opposite to that desired.

If time is lost now, the present enthusiasm in the republic will be replaced by such depression and apathy that no belated economic accountability or subsidies will help, he believes.

Well, this is also a reasonable point to make: Everything must be done on time in the economy. The urgency of this demand only increases the drama of the present situation.

Supreme Soviet 16 Jul Committee Work Profiled
LD1607141389

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 16 July broadcasts a 30-minute program entitled "The Supreme Soviet at Work: In the Commissions and Committees." The program is presented by commentator Aleksandr Ruvinskiy.

Ruvinskiy begins the report by saying that the eight commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities and the 14 supreme soviet committees have been assembling during the days of the session. He notes that listeners know less about these bodies than about the joint sittings of the Supreme Soviet and says radio correspondents will try to inform them.

Correspondent Andrey Nikifirov talks to Eduardas Yonovich Vilkas, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Matters of the Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republic and of the Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs.

Vilkas says that in three evening sittings his commission has tackled, in conjunction with the Committee on Economic Reform, the problems related with financial autonomy for Estonia and Lithuania. He does not elaborate. Vilkas says that he has visited the Institute for Management and Prognosis of Scientific and Technical Progress, a USSR Academy body. He says "There, talking to scientists, I received most important information about the Tyumen projects. The institute has done an expert study on this subject; it transpires that the projects are very poorly developed and most risky. One thinks that, if the projects are really implemented, the country will get into major economic difficulties because the scale is one of several Baykonal Amur mainlines. In connection with this, there is a proposal that we should discuss that matter and, generally, adopt a law forbidding the initiation of major projects costing, say, more than R500 million without the knowledge of the Supreme Soviet and, consequently, without the corresponding deep analysis. For, in this case, the point is it will involve major hard currency resources. It means, in effect, to put the whole country on starvation rations."

Vilkas is asked about the ethnic flash points within the Soviet Union; Nikifirov says that in many areas there is no real reason for ethnic strife but that it has resulted from economic problems.

Vilkas agrees that this is an important sphere of activity for the commission he chairs. He says that each people must get the right conditions so they can live and work as they wish; then there will be no cause for envy between people. He says, "when everyone is living on what he has earned himself and is, moreover, given a helping hand by his neighbor from time to time but not constantly, then he, too, will assist that neighbor. That means indeed that there are normal economic relations. There is nothing more strong or dependable than normal economic relations in the sense of uniting the people."

Viktor Grigoriyevich Kucherenko, chairman of the Planning and Budget Commission of the Soviet of the Union, says that his commission is finding time short, compared with the volume of points for discussion. He notes the commission needs to work thoroughly on the budget and plan for 1990, which are to be debated at the next session. Kucherenko says his commission is drafting a

bill on tax reform and is discussing reductions in investments. He says further that other commissions are looking for allocation of large sums of money to finance new programmes; this is at a time when the Planning and Budget Commission is seeking to reduce spending.

Kucherenko says that the commission has studied matters related to Lithuania assuming greater economic independence and notes Lithuania's plans will serve as a prototype in many respects.

Nikolay Dmitriyevich Pivovarov, chairman of the Committee for Matters Relating to the Work of Soviets of Deputies Development of Administration and Self-Administration, says that he is currently combining his work as committee chairman with his previous job of chairman of the Rostov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. He notes he will be leaving the more minor post to concentrate on chairing the committee. His stresses that his committee will work to have more power exercised by local Soviets of People's Deputies.

Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko, chairman of the Committee on Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood, says that various anomalies exist in this sphere. More women than men work night shifts, women often have to perform manual labor, which is harmful to their health. Matviyenko says that her committee is proposing a number of measures.

Ruvinskiy says that the Supreme Soviet has since passed one measure which Matviyenko and her committee had requested: a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet has been made to send home for study any servicemen who are registered for full-time university courses.

TASS Lists CPSU 18 Jul Meeting Participants

LD1807201389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1850 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—A conference of first secretaries of the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, kray, and oblast party committees [obkom] took place at the CPSU Central Committee today. It discussed a few questions of party work in the conditions of perestroyka.

A report at the conference was delivered by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev.

The following spoke on the matter discussed:
S.G. Arutyunyan—first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party [CP] Central Committee,
L.N. Zaykov—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee,
A.M. Masaliyev—first secretary of the Kirghizian CP Central Committee,
A.S. Myakota—first secretary of the Poltava Obkom of the Ukrainian CP,
D.S. Yadgarov—first secretary of the Bukharo Obkom of the Uzbekistan CP,
I.G. Postoronko—first secretary of the Ivano-Frankovsk Obkom of the Ukrainina CP,
N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee,
L.F. Bobykin, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom of the CPSU,
V.I. Valyas—first secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee,
V.K. Mesyats—first secretary of the Moscow Obkom of the CPSU,
A.F. Ponomarev—first secretary of the Belgorod Obkom of the CPSU,
Ya.P. Pogrebnyak—first secretary of the Lvov Obkom of the Ukrainian CP,
Ye.K. Ligachev—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,
V.I. Mironenko—first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.
A.R.Kh. Vezirov—first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee,
N.I. Ryzhkov—chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,
Yu.A. Manayenkov—first secretary of the Lipetsk Obkom of the CPSU,
A.M.K. Brazauskas—first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee,
B.M. Volodin—first secretary of the Rostov Obkom of the CPSU,
V.A. Medvedev—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,
K. Salykov—first secretary of the Karakalpak Obkom of the Uzbekistan CP,
V.I. Vorotnikov—chairman of the presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet,
N.I. Malkov—first secretary of the Chita Obkom of the CPSU,
K.M. Makhkamov—first secretary of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee,
V.B. Temirbayev—first secretary of the Chimkent Obkom of the Kazakhstan CP,
Ya.Ya. Vagris—first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee.

M.S. Gorbachev made a concluding speech.

The conference unamimously supported the proposal to allocate R500 million worth of party membership dues to the USSR state budget to finance measures connected with raising pensions for poorly-off sections of the population.

Taking part in the work of the conference were:
Nikonov,V.P.;
Chebrikov,V.M.;
Shevardnadze,E.A.;
Shcherbitskiy,V.V.;
Yakovlev,A.N.;
Biryukova,A.P.;
Lukyanov,A.I.;
Maslyukov,Yu.D.;

Razumovskiy,G.P.;
Yazov,D.T.;
Baklanov,A.D.;

Also taking part in the conference were: deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, representatives of the mass media, editors of party publications, heads of the political departments of military districts, and senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

A report on the work of the conference will be published.

Georgian Deputy Assesses Criticisms of Yazov

PM1907095589 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 5 Jul 89 p 1

[Vitaliy Tsereteli account of interview with People's Deputy Valerian Advadze under the rubric "The Supreme Soviet Session: Commentary for ZARYA VOSTOKA": "V. Advadze: 'Heeding the People's Opinion'"—place, date not given]

[Text] [Tsereteli] The confirmation of Dmitriy Yazov's candidacy for the position of defense minister followed a different procedure from the discussion of other candidacies. The Supreme Soviet introduced amendments to its procedural rules and now, in order to win a vote of confidence, it is sufficient for a candidate minister to gain more than one-half of the votes of those present at the sitting rather than of all Supreme Soviet member deputies. We expected more activeness from the people's deputies from Georgia during the discussion of D. Yazov's candidacy, since everything concerning the army is at the focus of the republican public's attention. But on this occasion the floor was taken only by Valerian Advadze, who had already spoken at the session and has written for our newspaper under the rubric "Commentary for ZARYA VOSTOKA." The director of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic State Planning Committee Scientific Research Institute for the Economy, Planning, and Management of the National Economy began the second interview he has given to our special correspondent Vitaliy Tsereteli with a statement which explains our deputies' silence in the debate on D. Yazov's candidacy.

[Advadze] In the first place, I have to say that the discussion of the candidacy for USSR defense minister had not been planned for that sitting of the session but, in view of D. Yazov's travel plans, M.S. Gorbachev, who was chairing the session, proposed that his appointment to that position be examined. Consequently, many of us—myself included—were caught unprepared to speak on that particular day. And yet I had quite a few questions to ask the future USSR defense minister, including questions worrying my voters.

Perestroyka must not bypass our army. One of its manifestations is probably the open discussion of the candidacy for the position of defense minister and the alarm which could be heard in deputies' speeches when they spoke about the current position—at times pitiful—of the professional military. I emphasized in my speech: We all are unanimous that our army, above all its permanent cadres and officers corps, needs a sharp improvement in living and working conditions. Not only while on active service but also—and equally important—when servicemen retire on pension.

But I did not perceive anything in D. Yazov's statement to indicate how or where he intends to implement radical changes in the army or what his perception of the strategy of perestroyka is—I got the impression that he has no such strategy.

One of the main questions here is the creation of a professional army. I suggest that this should in fact be examined from a slightly different aspect, namely the possibility of providing employment for unemployed young men from different regions in the country. After all, it certainly cannot be ruled out that some of them would be willing to enter permanent military service. D. Yazov, judging by what he said, is against this. By way of substantiating his position, he used just one single argument—data on U.S. Army wages—and drew the conclusion that we cannot afford a professional army. But that is not a valid comparison! Do I as a professor, or he as a minister, earn as much as our U.S. counterparts?

And one more question. It worries very many people in our republic, and I raised it in my speech. The issue concerns the possibility of conscripts' performing their military service on the territory of the republic where they were conscripted. D. Yazov takes a negative position on this question, too, even though it seems to me that it is necessary to display tact here and examine this problem thoroughly. Leaving aside the 9 April events in Tbilisi, I would nonetheless note that tragic outcomes from quarrels on interethnic grounds in the army have become more frequent in the wake of the April events. This is why I said that if the peoples of the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia, or Armenia ask for their young men to serve in their own republics, this must be heeded. Of course it would create additional difficulties in Defense Ministry work. Despite that, I think that this wish of our peoples must be met. After all, we are not talking about teenagers' doing no military service at all. There can be no question of that: It is a constitutional demand. And we down here will always find people willing to serve, for example, in the north or abroad. A substantial number of young Georgians, when drafted for military service, volunteered to serve in Afghanistan at that time. We are talking about expanding the right to choose the place of service.

And finally, the third aspect where D. Yazov failed to convince me is the question of enabling the 175,000 students now serving in the army to resume their studies in higher education establishments as of 1 September. This is another problem which perturbs many voters in the republic. By raising this question at the session, I actually addressed D. Yazov on their behalf. I do not believe that, if the Defense Ministry were to do this, it

would weaken our army or diminish its combat ability. On the other hand, the people will be gratified by a positive solution to this question, and the prestige of the army and its leadership will only be enhanced.

These are the questions I raised in my brief speech, which was limited by the procedural rules adopted by the session. I do not consider the discussion of these questions closed. We must look carefully at everything once more, we must comprehensively discuss everything once more and find an acceptable solution.

Yeltsin Urges Reform of Entire Political System

LD1807113289 Hamburg DPA in German 1028 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Munich (DPA)—Moscow People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin, 57, spoke out in favor of a reform of the whole political system in the USSR. The living standard as well as social justice and environmental protection must be improved, Yeltsin said in an interview with QUICK magazine. Yeltsin, deputy chairman of the State Building committee, with the rank of minister, confirmed that in the Soviet Union today 48 million out of 282 million people were living below the poverty line. Despite differences of view in connection with the tactics of perestroika, he was at one with "Mr. Gorbachev" as regards the improvement of the living standard. The economy, the financial and pricing system, as well as the social level should be renewed. To this end the political system, being the foundation, should be changed.

Budapest Television Interviews Ligachev

LD1807035989 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1905 GMT 17 Jul 89

[From the "Panorama" program; interview by unidentified reporters with chairman of the Agrarian Policy Commission Yegor Ligachev; Ligachev speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation; recorded—no video available.]

[Text] [Announcer] Yegor Ligachev, who for years was the second highest man in the Soviet party leadership, now, first of all, deals with agricultural matters. Boris Yeltsin and the radical reformers of Moscow have accused him of having conservative views and hampering Gorbachev's reform endeavors. But let us see what Ligachev has to say about this himself.

[Reporter] We Hungarians are worried about the fate of perestroyka. Many people say that due to the worries, some representatives of the central power in Moscow may be tempted to put an end to this so-called dirty liberalism, silence the opposition liberal forces—that is, shut them up, and follow the example of Tiananmen Square—tidy up. Is there such a danger in the Soviet Union today?

[Ligachev] Regarding Tiananmen Square, this is the affair of the Chinese people and the Chinese Government. So let us put this aside.

[Reporter] Of course.

[Ligachev] Regarding the question of whether, let us say, not the liquidation of perestroyka but perhaps its considerable slowing down could come about, well, I would like to say the following: Name at least one fact that proves that the leadership, or some forces within the leadership, would attempt something similar to this. However, another phenomena does exist, and that is that persons or groups are trying to increase the tension by incitement, spreading fear, and arousing doubts. Now Gorbachev does not even have to go away for people to presume that a change could occur in the political situation of the country, that some sort of serious change could take place. Why do they do this?

In my view, the reason is that these people and groups would like to realize their ambitious goals in an atmosphere of doubt and insecurity so that they can get nearer to power.

[Reporter] Who do you mean?

[Ligachev] I think of those whom we call extremists, separatists, and nationalists, those who want to leave the Soviet Union, who want to destroy the Union and want to diverge from the road of the alliance system, the correctness of which I am fully convinced. What is more, I see the substance of my life in the unity of our power, in the unity of our people and our party, this is history's lesson.

[Reporter] So, are these political forces in danger of not being able to spoken about freely from now on?

[Ligachev] No, no, no, we, as you can also see, fight with political means. You cannot give a single fact which would prove that we have violated the law. We apply political means and in our decisions we take public opinion into consideration. If it is so, we support pluralism.

[Reporter] But the press published the appeal of Nina Andreyeva and (Gruber) only in the form of letters. These people, standing outside of the political leadership, say that it is time to tidy up, that liberalism must be obliterated and that power must be protected by military means. What is more, in the West they even add that in you, they can see a person who could create order and could put an end to this ugly liberalism.

[Ligachev] Ligachev must not be made to be seen as an omnipotent person who can do everything that other people concoct. Why? I work in the Politburo and I subordinate myself completely to the collective leadership. It is no hardship for me to endure the discipline and order prevailing in the Politburo. Thus, I work in a

community and I subordinate myself to the principles formed by the community, and I do this consciously, deliberately, and out of deep conviction.

[Reporter] It is difficult for me to talk to you sincerely without failing to mention Boris Yeltsin, who always talks about you. In your view, what is the difference between you, Ligachev, and Yeltsin?

[Ligachev] The first difference is that he keeps on talking about me all the time. However, I have never called him by name.

[Reporter] But you had an argument at the party conference.

[Ligachev] Yes, but in my opinion that was an exchange of opinions rather than an argument. This is what has to be pointed out first of all. I think that the principle of comradeship must always be observed between party members in every party, in our party as well. Secondly, tactics such as finding out something about our partner, attributing something to him, and then attacking him should not be used. This is not right.

[Reporter] But why?

[Ligachev] He often resorts to this method.

[Reporter] But why did he specially choose you as a target?

[Ligachev] Secondly, I would like to mention the not unimportant matter that one should not behave in such a way that when the party carries out its work together, united, and the work is carried out rather successfully, then one attributes the success to oneself. Lately he has been making remarks to the effect that he has submitted six demands, four of which have been granted already. This does not indicate modesty and loyalty to the party in the least.

Regarding the question as to why he chose me as a target for his attacks, well, you will have to ask him, since he made the choice, not me. But I think to a certain extent it can be explained by the fact that my position in many questions of principle, is clear and plain, something it seems, which does not appeal to this man.

[Reporter] In Bucharest, at the latest session of the Warsaw pact's Political Consultative Committee, a good resolution was made which completely rules out interference in the internal affairs of any Warsaw Pact country. On the other hand, President Ceausescu, while not naming Hungary, called for the need to examine the kind of processes taking place in certain countries. In other words, there are still certain people who feel the need to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. What is your opinion about this?

[Ligachev] To tell you the truth, I do not know what Ceausescu said, I simply have no information about it. However, in reply to your question I would like to say the following. Indeed, your comment is correct, in the Warsaw Pact declaration it was emphasized that every country has the right to independently resolve its own internal affairs. Really, this is the case because it is the parties themselves that constitute the determining political force of a given country, they are responsible for working out and implementing the decisions, and not in front of foreign governments but in front of their own people, in front of their party memberships. And I regard this as natural.

However, I would like to emphasize that it is not the first such declaration in this sense. Recently more than one statement similar to this has been made, and I must say, what's more, that not only have documents been borne which laid down these principles but that such policies are carried out, at least as far as our party is concerned.

[Reporter] But on 30 October 1956 similar statements were made relating to Hungarian events, and then on 4 November the troops marched in. It is understandable if people are suspicious regarding such declarations. They are afraid that if the 'pro-order' forces take the upper hand in the Soviet Union, for example, then perhaps the 1968 Czechoslovak events may be repeated, i.e. the military intervention. Many Hungarians are worried about this.

[Ligachev] Excuse me, but when I advocated that this was not the first such declaration, I had in mind the recent past and not the fifties and I repeat: We are not talking simply about a declaration. I think you agree with me in that the CPSU's policy, too, reflects this. Gorbachev himself has announced more than once that one must not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and that one must believe that the people themselves and their party can resolve the problems, and that everybody can decide freely on the path of development.

Therefore I support this policy in its complete entirety and if some individuals are still worried—history surely has given grounds for this—I still do not see [word indistinct]. Our people—I am now inviting you to Moscow, Siberia, or anywhere else and you can convince yourself that there is no need for anxiety whatsoever. It is out of the question that we are preparing for intervention because, after all, we ourselves have enough problems.

[Reporter] You have spoken about the people but the people never support military intervention in other countries. Look at what happened in Afghanistan. The Soviet people never approved intervention there. However, many people in Hungary worry because here there is a multiparty system and at the election the comrades' party may possibly become a minority—as has happened in Poland already. Then in these people the temptation might surface that assistance should be extended via the

well known or the methods [as heard]; provided that in Moscow, the balance of power may change and the pro-[word indistinct]—as the terms would have it—take the upper hand.

[Ligachev] Why are you so worried that in our country such a turning point may take place?

[Reporter] Is the anxiety unfounded?

[Ligachev] It is unfounded. It has no basis whatsoever and I think in recent years we have proved with deeds that we are not willing to carry out any interference whatsoever and that we fully trust that the people, the party, and the country can overcome the situation. For after all, no military force of any kind can alter the thinking and mood of a man and any problem surfacing in a country can be solved by politican means alone. I am fully convinced of this.

[Reporter] However, if this is the case, should the assessment of that intervention on the basis of which the Warsaw Pact countries (?went) into Czechoslovakia on the basis of that Brezhnev doctrine which you now reject not be reviewed. [sentence as heard]

[Ligachev] Well, I would like to tell you that according to our information, the events then took such a turn that the people's dissatisfaction brought about by the previous [name indistinct] government was used for aims that were far from the people's interests. Therefore, when the Prague request for assistance was voiced we were forced to extend help. What's more—well, I did not participate in the events of those days but I read a lot about it, I know about a lot of things and there are eyewitnesses among my acquaintances—events reached such a stage that terror and violence were raging and the civilian population's safety was endangered.

[Reporter] Still, who asked for assistance in Prague?

[Ligachev] In Prague it was (?also) the government that turned to us for assistance.

[Reporter] But neither Dubcek, (?Tatkowski), Czernik, nor Svoboda called in foreign troops.

[Ligachev] Such people asked for assistance who themselves were members of the Politburo, the leadership.

[Reporter] In other words, it is legitimate if anybody within the leadership, reaching over the heads of the president, prime minister, party first secretary, asks for military assistance from a foreign power?

[Ligachev] First of all it is their internal affair. But still I believe that the principle that we have now promulgated in the declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee is the only correct principle according to which we must not interfere in internal affairs, and the party of the given country is sovereign and independent. Still, I would like to emphasize that this does not mean that these parties cannot meet, exchange experiences, elaborate measures for the resolution of their problems, coordinate their endeavors for the establishment of peace and security, for coordination and dialogue, in order to ease international tension.

Election Result Prompts Gorkom Chief's Resignation

LD1807220989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1610 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Kiev, 18 July (TASS)—TASS correspondent Lyudmila Tkachenko reports: Aleksandr Maltsev, first secretary of the Krasnodon city committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Voroshilovgrad Oblast) has resigned ahead of time. His voluntary resignation is motivated by reasons ethical nature. The head of the city party organization stood as a people's deputy of the USSR, but at the elections he did not obtain half the votes. In this connection he considered it unethical to remain in the high post of first secretary.

Elections for a new first secretary were held on the basis of choice. The candidacies of Yuriy Moiseyenko director of a mining directorate and Sergey Shevchenko, second secretary of the Krasnodon city party committee which were proposed were discussed in all the grassroots party organizations of enterprises, mines, construction sites, and institutions. Then the discussion was continued at the council of secretaries of the grass-roots organizations and at a session of the members of the bureau of the city party committee.

At the plenum the candidates came out with their programs. There was a discussion of those aspiring to the post of city party leader. During secret voting Sergey Shevchenko got a majority of the votes. He was described by all as an energetic leader who enjoys great prestige among Communists and nonparty people.

'Special Regime' Declared in Abkhaziya

LD1807165189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1536 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] [Presenter] Now, to events in Abkhaziya. We have just learned that the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the council of Ministers of the Abkhaz ASSR have adopted a decision on the establishment, from 2300 on 18 July, of a special regime for the conduct of citizens [osobyy rezhim povedeniya grazhdan] in the cities of Sukhumi, Gagra, and Tkvarcheli, in rayon centers, and throughout the whole autonomous republic.

Leonid Lazarevich, our special correspondent, has arrived in Sukhumi today. He is on the line. I'll ask him to talk:

[Lazarevich] Even 15 minutes ago one did not want to say or to demand that a curfew was necessary here, that a special situation [osoboye polozheniye] was necessary

here. The situation in Sukhumi, the situation in Abkhaziya, is, indeed, truly tense. It is enough to say that I was not able to get here simply on an ordinary air or rail trip. I had to fly by aircraft to Sochi, and from there I got here by helicopter with the assistance of border troops—they helped me, thank God. I love this city, but I saw deserted streets and tension—tension. But do you know what? For 2 or 3 days, on Saturday and Sunday, it was significantly worse here. It has imporved because the internal troops have appeared here. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Ilichev, colonel of the internal troops, has been here since Sunday.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich, please tell me, when you arrived things were difficult, weren't they?

[Ilichev] When we arrived we saw a situation that truly served as a basis for the adoption of the relevant decision on the arrival of the internal troops here.

[Lazarevich] There were exchanges of fire, I believe.

[Ilichev] We saw clashes and fights between groups using firearms and metal objects, both in the city of Sukhumi and in other regions of the republic; and individual cases all this even escalated into armed confrontations.

[Lazarevich] And I believe many people were killed and injured.

[Ilichev] Seventeen people were killed, including one GAI [traffic police] officer today. Around 400 people sustained wounds and serious injuries.

[Lazarevich] Please describe the situation in these latest days, if that is possible.

[Ilichev] Since the introduction of internal troop sub-units the sitation has stabilized somewhat, particularly in the zone of the city of Gagra, in Gudauta Rayon, and in the town of Novyy Afon. Measures to confiscate weapons are being conducted actively. In the course of 24 hours 102 units of firearms have been confiscated, including over 10 rifled weapons and three automatic ones.

[Lazarevich] Evidently, the special situation is necessary, it is needed. What do you think? Today, I believe, the conversation at headquarters was about how much the curfew was wanted.

[Ilichev] That's not only at headquarters. I have to tell you straight that meetings with collectives of working people permitted us to say that at headquarters today. Individual citizens have expressed that desire, as numerous groups of vacationers, for our sub-units have had to solve the tasks of getting people out, because rail, air, and road transportation have been made difficult to a significant degree. It is enough to say that over 1,500 children have for 3 days and nights been completely unable to set of from the railway station in Sukhumi.

[Lazarevich] And so, a special situation has been introduced in Abkhaziya. A curfew has been put into operation here. We shall keep you informed on the situation in this autonomous republic.

Sukhumi Airport Operating Normally

LD1807141889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] In connection with the events in Abkhazi, inquiries are coming in from workers asking whether operations at Sukhumi Airport have been disrupted. A TASS correspondent was told at the USSR Civil Aviation Ministry that there was no flights only the morning of 16 July. Then they were resumed. Since then, the airport has been working around the clock, with aircraft of all types landing and taking off. The transportation of air passengers to Sukhumi was only temporarily stopped because there were extreme difficulties with the motor vehicle communications between the airport and the city. However, in consideration of the fact that there are at the airport many people who wish to leave Sukhumi, Aeroflot—regardless of the great losses—has sent to the capital of Abkhazia three empty Il-86 airbuses from Moscow and Leningrad as well as five aircraft of the Il-62, Tu-154, and Tu-134 types from other cities in the country. During the night of 17-18 July alone more than 2,000 people were transported out of Sukhumi. In addition, in connection with the interruptions in the operation of the Transcaucasian railway, additional flights have been organized between Sochi and Yerevan.

Sukhumi Situation 'Remains Serious'

PM1807151989 Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jul 89 p 4

[S. Mostovshchikov, G. Bochkarev dispatches under the rubric "Reporting Details" and under general heading "On Events in Sukhumi"]

[Text] It has been already reported that an extremely tense situation prevails in Sukhumi, associated with conflicts on interethnic grounds. A pretext for disturbing the peace on this occasion was provided by the opening of a Tbilisi State University branch in Abkhazia's capital.

Clashes between persons of Abkhazian and Georgian nationality were recorded in the city, caused by the submission of demands not to hold entrance examinations to the Tbilisi State University branch and to close the branch down. A mass brawl occurred on 15 July, with some 600 persons involved.

An attempt was made to seize republic Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] premises. Ministry staffers succeeded in repelling the attack. According to available information, a mob invaded the Tbilisi State University branch building.

Yesterday we got in touch with the USSR MVD Press Bureau. We were told that both sides in the conflict are using stones, sticks, edged weapons, and firearms. Internal affairs departments and paramilitary security guard subunits are being attacked. The militia has already confiscated several dozen firearms from the population. The clashes have resulted in 11 deaths and 187 people have been wounded. According to claims by USSR MVD spokesmen, the situation in Sukhumi and other regions in the republic is now controlled by militia forces and Internal Troops subunits.

But the situation remains serious. Air and rail links with the city are broken. O. Sitnik, shift supervisor at the USSR MInistry of Civil Aviation Central Air Traffic Control Service, informed us that Sukhumi Airport is handling neither incoming nor outgoing aircraft. The airport premises are cut off from the city by a shortage of transport and a communications breakdown. Passengers at the airport are experiencing difficulties with catering. They will be sent to their destinations at the first available opportunity.

Moscow's Intercity Telephone Communications Service announced yesterday that there are no telephone links with Sukhumi because lines have been damaged.

Sochi, 17 Jul—Following the exacerbation of the situation in the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, militia and State Motor Vehicles Inspectorate details have been reinforced at Psou checkpoint near the river which separates the two republics of Georgia and Russia. Staffers of internal affairs organs thoroughly inspect vehicles traveling in both directions.

I visited Psou checkpoint in the night of 17 July. There I saw the driver of a "Zhiguli" car come under shotgun fire on Abkhazian territory. The "Zhiguli's" passenger received slight shot wounds.

Trains traveling to the Transcaucasus were held at Sochi, Adler, and Veseloye Stations all through the day on 16 July and all through the night on 17 July. Some trains were re-formed and turned back. Some passengers were accommodated at Sochi's tourist facilities, while others were taken to Batumi and Poti by sea. Boys and girls from Chelyabinsk and Perm on their way to a vacation at one of Abkhazia's young pioneer camps were sent back home by train.

Abkhaziya Situation 'Complex,' 'Tense'

LD1907062689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0545 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 19 July—TASS correspondent Nikita Demidov reports:

According to information from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the situation in Abkhaziya, where interethnic clashes broke out over the weekend, remains complex and tense. Clashes are continuing among various groups of the populace. There have been cases of attacks by organized armed groups in motor vehicles on subunits of internal affairs bodies. In some instances the number of attackers has exceeded 100 people.

There has been an increase in the frequency of attacks on individual citizens and staff of internal affairs bodies with the aim of obtaining weapons and ammunition. According to information at 2400 on 18 July [2000 GMT], the number of people killed had risen to 18, including a traffic militiaman killed by a shot from a hunting rifle on the Leselidze-Sukhumi road.

In Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhaziya, unknown persons shot at two passenger trains. Luckily, no one was killed or injured. The majority of industrial enterprises in Sukhumi are not operating, and transport is not functioning; in this connection, there have been stoppages in supplies of bread and fuel to the city. Local newspapers have not been published since 16 July.

The internal affairs bodies are taking measures aimed at stabilizing the situation. Specially created groups are checking numerous statements from citizens about violations of the law on interethnic grounds. Active measures are being taken to take firearms away from the populace.

By decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaziya ASSR, a special regime for the behavior of citizens (curfew) has been in force on the territory of the republic since 2300 local time.

Interior Ministry Official on Situation

LD1807181989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Video report by V. Bakarinov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Bakarinov] The telephones are ringing practically nonstop in the operations section of the headquarters of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. At this minute, those on duty are taking calls from the region of Chkhorotsu where an armed group of 300 people is attacking the rayon internal affairs administration. Their aim: To seize arms. A decision must be made immediately. Here in the headquarters we met Ivan Fedorovich Shilov, deputy minister of internal affairs:

[Shilov] In spite of the holding [as heard] by party and soviet bodies and also by those forces of law and order present in Abkhazia, the situation in Abkhazia remains tense, although, to speak objectively, 2 or 3 days ago it was much more complex.

Unfortunately both the Abkhaz and the Georgian population are taking up arms. There was an exchange of fire during the night, and today 16 people have already been killed. Two hundred and thirty nine people have been

injured, and 188 people are in hospitals. It must be noted that there are specific hotbeds, specific territories where it is particularly difficult, especially, for example, in the region of Ochamchira, where a little river divides Georgian and Abkhaz territories and populations too. On the one side a lot of Georgians—several thousand—gathered, and on the other Abkhazes.

[Bakarinov] This confrontation between two nationalities, doesn't it look like a preparation for some sort of combat?

[Shilov] I wouldn't say like a preparation for some sort of combat, but more to demonstrate their strength, influence, and pressure on the other nation. Our forces of law and order are in that place too, and units [naryad] of workers of the internal affairs bodies, of our internal forces, who, as it were, are in the middle, or are a barrier, a shield, to prevent serious consequences in this place.

There are other very difficult places. Today we must say that the railway center is not working, many passenger trains have mounted up, and in some places they have taken the railroad track apart. Repair brigades have been set up which have now repaired the railroad, but nevertheless there is a large number of passengers now stuck waiting at railroad stations, where the situation is not simple either: People are getting worried and anxious. All of this together of course makes the situation more complex and tense.

Nevertheless, I must say that we will do everything to ensure order and to prevent any sort of serious consequences. The forces and means that have been dispatched and which are there now are sufficient to take, in the last resort, the most decisive measures to put an end to any extreme actions.

No Foreigners Injured in Unrest

LD1907095789 Moscow TASS in English 0951 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—There are neither Soviet nor foreign tourists among those who suffered during recent mass ethnic disorders in the autonomous republic of Abkhaziya in the Black Sea, officials at the Soviet Interior Ministry told TASS. The militia is protecting rest homes, sanatoriums and all those who happened to be in the zone of the conflict.

4,300 Troops Reportedly in Abkhazia

LD1807175889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Excerpts] Today a briefing took place at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at which Soviet and foreign journalists were given detailed information about events of recent days in Abkhazia. Here is what our correspondent was told by Vladimir Nikolayevich Prokopenko, acting head of the press office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Vladimir Nikolayevich, how many men of the internal troops are taking part in maintaining public order in Abkhazia?

[Prokopenko] About 4,300 men. [end recording]

'Nationalists' Call for Curfew

AU1807130689 Paris AFP in English 1212 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Pierre Glachant Report]

[Excerpt] Moscow, July 18 (AFP)—Nationalists called Tuesday for a curfew to be clamped on the Soviet autonomous republic of Abkhazia, where inter-community clashes left 16 dead at the weekend, and in neighbouring Georgia.

Sources on both sides contacted by telephone said tension was still very high. They blamed each other, trading charges that the other community was arming heavily.

A spokesman for the Abkhazian Popular Forum, Alexey Gogua, said the situation was "dangerous" because of the weapons the Georgians had, notwithstanding the stationing of 3,000 Interior Ministry troops in the region.

He alleged that 180 habitual criminals freed by demonstrators from a detention centre in the Georgian town of Zugdidi had been deliberately let out. They had seized arms and were now in Abkhazia, he said.

The incident was first disclosed to parliament on Monday by Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin.

A curfew throughout Abkhazia was the only way to prevent more violence, Mr. Gogua insisted.

He repeated the Forum's call for Abkhazia to be separated from Georgia, complaining it had become merely a "region of Georgia".

Abkhazians wanted their "minimum rights" to preserve their identity.

A 1979 census put the Abkhazian community, mostly Moslems, at 83,000, compared with 213,000 Georgians in the autonomous republic, which is formally attached to Georgia.

The Communist Party paper PRAVDA, in a brief report on the situation which it termed "complex", noted that the majority of Abkhazians wanted a curfew for the protection of old people, women and children.

In the Georgian capital Tbilisi, which was reported calm, Manana Gamsakhurdia, wife of nationalist chief Zviad Gamsakhurdia, also raised the possibility of a curfew in Abkhazia.

She said the Akhazians were armed and threatening Georgians.

Her husband and Merab Kostava, another nationalist leader, had left by car on Sunday for Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital, but had been unable to get in because access roads were closed, she said.

The original violence flared last Saturday in Sukhumi when demonstrators demanded that the university in the Black Sea resort be separated from the university in Tbilisi. [passage omitted]

Bakatin Comments on Abkhazia

LD1807142789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1950 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Report by unidentified correspondent on a statement by USSR Internal Affairs Minister Vadim Bakatin, with interjections from Anatoliy Lukyanov and an unidentified speaker, at the Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 17 July; from the "Special Program on the Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] [Begin recording] [Lukyanov] I would like to remind you, comrades, as we have agreed, that a request has been received from Deputies Sychev and Biryukov in connection with the alarming reports that are coming in from the Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], we ask USSR Internal Affairs Minister comrade Bakatin to report to deputies on the current situation in this region. [indistinct voices] Well, we will agree now whether to convey this or not to convey this. Go ahead, this is of interest to the people, comrades. Comrade Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, has the floor.

[Bakatin] As far as I know, the Soviet of Nationalities sent to Sukhumi a special commission made up of deputies who tried to somehow allay passions there. Unfortunately, they did not succeed in this. A pretext was found for escalating tension recently; this was, of course, only a pretext: the struggle around the branch of Tbilisi University which had been set up in Sukhumi. This Monday—actually today, I think entrance examinations are due to begin there. The Georgians are in favor of this branch, to which they have allocated school No 1, but the Abkhazians are against. This is a pretext, this is an example of a loss of a sense of proportion and of a sense of responsibility. Whether the branch is needed or not, this is quite another matter, but it is not in any case worth even one of the human lives which was lost because of it. And on 15 July, in the evening—it was in the daytime that these outrages began—in the evening and in the early hours of the 16th, mass clashes were provoked in Sukhumi, fights between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians. On that night 12 people died, including 4 Abkhazians and 5 Georgians. About 200 people were injured and 130 people were hospitalized. This happened early on Sunday morning.

On Sunday, 16 July, the situation deteriorated abruptly, deteriorated insofar as the area affected spread: The disorders essentially spread to virtually all of Abkhazia, virtually all of it, as well as a part of western Georgia, in particular Zugdidi. True, I have to say that yesterday 1 person was killed: Only 1 person, which sound blasphemous, but 1 person was indeed killed and about 40 people were injured yesterday. The work of the railway was completely paralyzed; this was also the case before. A strike was declared by train and locomotive teams. This, as I will say later, is having a very negative effect on the situation as a whole throughout the Soviet Union, in particular in regard to people wanting to vacation on the coast. There have been refusals to service aircraft at the airport. And a number of attacks have been carried out on rayon internal affairs departments and on guard premises—all sorts of tunnels are guarded by the guard department there—and DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] premises with the aim of seizing weapons.

The solitary confinement investigation block in Zugdidi was seized and 180 detainees were released; 15 submachineguns [avtomat] were seized and so on.

It should be said that the Internal Affairs Ministry organs both in Georgia and in Abkhazia—I mean, of both Georgian and of Abkhaz nationality, since this is all...[incomplete thought as heard]—offered very weak resistance to such raids, even facilitated them to some extent. We have now sent a special commission to sort out these facts. But the fact remains that yesterday the public received 4,520 firearms, mainly hunting weapons. Hunting weapons should not be any particular source of fear, since the Georgian population has in its possession considerably more hunting weapons. These were weapons previously confiscated from the population; they have been taken back.

The most terrible thing is that 188 weapons from the Internal Affairs Ministry system were seized, namely 80 sub-machineguns and 100 pistols. [numbers as heard]

The government of Georgia, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, and the leadership of Abkhazia have appealed to the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry to give emergency assistance to the republic and send internal troops there in order to somehow stabilize the situation.

It is a correct observation that every republic—this is the principle—that every republic must itself establish order on its territory. That is correct. And bearing in mind that we do not have sufficient legal foundation with regard to the introduction of a state of emergency and questions connected with the dispatch or the sending in of the internal troops, the minister of the union, who in general does have the right to send the internal troops anywhere—whether it's in response to a request is another matter—is always faced with the serious fact that a choice has to be made, and the burden of responsibility rests with me personally.

Well, I have to say that I did make such a decision, because it was a very insistent request; my telephone was ringing until 0300. I was told that installations were being seized, indeed attempts were made to seize 23 facilities, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and so on, with attempts at arson, using explosives there, explosive packets of some kind; real warfare was taking place. When the chairman of the [Abkhazian] Supreme Soviet Presidium telephoned and said that he was virtually a hostage there and that he had to be rescued and helped, there was no one with whom I could consult. You can't get the Supreme Soviet together at that hour. Therefore, I made the decision and in 24 hours 3,000 men of the internal troops were moved in there by military transport aircraft. A large group of investigative workers was also sent in, leaders of our services. They are now asking for more to be sent. We could discuss this issue, and I would be very grateful if the Supreme Soviet would express its opinion on this, whether we should send more or not. But that night, Saturday, no—Sunday night, was relatively quiet—if one can use that expression—in the sense that there were no casualties, although the situation is very bad, the tension is enormous, people have had virtually no sleep, and the railway line is not working. Comrade Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Central Committee, spoke personally with the strikers there until 0300 this morning, that I know. Apparently some of them agreed to resume work; however, those who nevertheless hold extremist views, went and dismantled the tracks. Today the internal troops participated in repairing the tracks, but trains have not yet moved.

The situation is now very tense in Ochamchire. The situation which has come about is virtually one in which large masses of people who are generally well armed are confronting each other; among them there are extremists, and provocations are certainly possible. The situation is very complex. We do not rule out these provocations by either side, and I have no doubt that under these conditions there will certainly be political speculators who will use these events in their own interests and, in particular, against the internal troops, and so on.

The leadership of Abkhaziya is now asking...[changes thought] and such a telegram has been sent here to the Supreme Soviet. I don't know whether you have received it, have you?

[Unidentified speaker] I got it at 0200.

[Bakatin] They are asking for a special situation to be introduced. You know, we have no legislative basis to introduce a special situation at all. This is still a very vague matter. They are asking for a curfew to be introduced but, judging by established practice, this is their affair. They themselves can either introduce or not introduce this. But I believe that the measures of party and soviet organs have not yet been totally exhausted and that they must carry out more work on this level. The Georgian leadership is there...[changes thought] I mean that the party and soviet leadership and the government are all there now. They are working very intensively there. The main thing is that people must be reassured somehow. I can now...[changes thought] I have literally just now been on the telephone and I arrived here late. Today also is relatively [calm]. Relatively in the sense that no one has been killed or wounded; there has been no shooting. So everything is calm so far, but the tension is terrible. All this could spring up at any moment. So we have to follow some kind of difficult path from mutual suspicion, from mutual hostility to understanding and harmony. I think that Supreme Soviet deputies, especially because there are deputies here from Georgia and from Abkhaziya...[changes thought] they could use the great prestige which they have in the republic in order to facilitate to some extent, surely, a solution to this problem with bloodshed. The troops have been given the task of containing violence and nothing more, that is to form a buffer between these groups, as it were, and to attempt to contain this violence and to facilitate, to create certain conditions for this work of the republican organs.

At the same time—I have already said and I wish to repeat it—I would like the Supreme Soviet to express its opinion on this matter, on whether the Internal Affairs Ministry is acting correctly. Comments have alrady been heard about this. We do not yet have the necessary legal basis for such extraordinary situations and perhaps one realistic contribution the Supreme Soviet could make is to adopt appropriate legislation rapidly.

And I would like simply to dwell once again...[Bakatin changes thought] perhaps I somehow have not focused attention on what has come about around this. From Rostov and beyond, and from Krasnodar trains are at a standstill. Trains are at a standstill with people who have earned money with the sweat of their brow and who have been waiting for this vacation for a year. They are with their children and it is hot. Tens of thousands of people are at a standstill without water and they are literally in torment, spending their vacation in these...well, I am sorry that I...in such terrible conditions, as it were. I cannot understand this. I believe that trains are not coming from there either. There are all kind of obstacles and the lines have even been taken up. I understand that some problems certainly can and must be solved between Georgia and Abkhazia, but why at the expense of others? Why through the suffering of other people? Today there was a discussion on the problems of the Kuzbass miners who...indeed, there may also be various demands there too...but the main thing is not to solve them at someone's expense. They should probably be solved by themselves. Therefore, I would simply like to use this rostrum and the microphone in this case to appeal to the railwaymen who are still continuing to strike that this will lead to nothing good. Just think about those people who are blameless, as it were, who are innocently suffering. The trains should run according to the timetable without any political tensions, without any conflicts between nationalities. [end recording]

[Correspondent] After discussion of this information by the deputies, Comrade Lukyanov, who was in the chair,

proposed the following decision: [Begin Lukyanov recording] I propose that note be taken of the information given by Comrade Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, and that he be instructed to take urgent measures to establish order and to ensure socialist legality in the Abkhaz ASSR. First: [indistinct shout from the floor] No, let us put urgent and resolute. Second: I think it would be right to address ourselves to the population living in the Abkhaz ASSR: those of Georgian nationality, Abkhaz nationality, and of other nationalities. We should call on the population living in the Abkhaz ASSR to make every effort to stabilize the situation and to establish peace, calm and order in the region. I think it would be correct to request or to instruct USSR people's deputies who have been elected from the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Abkhaz ASSR to call their voters to settle all contentious issues by peaceful means on a basis of the principles of internationalism and the friendship of the Soviet peoples. At the same time, we must instruct the authorities there to make every effort to restore railway traffic immediately in the region in question. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted this decision with a majority of votes.

NKAO Military Commandant Replaced

NC1907085589 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1600 GMT 18 Jul 8

[Text] Friends, we have just received an ARMENPRES report on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The subunits of the troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the local militia are supervising the NKAO situation. Relative calm prevailed on 17 and 18 July.

In view of the fact that the basic services for maintaining public order are rendered by the Ministry of Interal Affairs, it has been decided to replace Colonel (Mishadov), the USSR Army commandant of the special district with Major General (Shakhtonov), of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Regrettably the oblast's television service was unable to air its program because the Shushi relay station workers did not connect the relevant TV channel. KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH newspaper is not appearing.

The joint regular meeting of the Stepanakert Party City Committee Bureau and the city soviet executive committee of the people's deputies discussed the forthcoming visit to the oblast by the USSR Supreme Soviet commission dealing with the NKAO problem. It was stressed that conditions must be created for it to function normally.

Boris Dadamyan, USSR people's deputy, told ARMENPRES that he has many expectations for the commission's conclusions. Time has shown that the NKAO problem has been further postponed [words indistinct] concerning the interethnic relations over the entire (?map) of the country [word indistinct]. I gather that under the present situation the leadership of the country is showing considerable concern about the essence of the question raised by the Karabakh people; The problem must have a political solution. The efforts exerted to solve the socio-economic problems of the oblast cannot in themselves achieve success because our movement is exclusively national though it is basically free of nationalistic ideas. In declaring their (?will), the NKAO people have and are proceeding from the right of national self-determination; that is, we are not insisting that we do not want to live with the Azerbaijanis. The question is why we, the Armenians of Artsakh [NKAO], have no right to live in the same family with Soviet Armenia. I am optimistic, said Dadamyan. He added that if justice really exists, then it should manifest itself in solving the NKAO problem. I would like to hope that the commission will be able to grasp the justness of the NKAO people's demands. In my view, at the present phase, at the least a presidential [presidentakan] administration should be introduced in the oblast; this should be suitable for both the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Stepanakert People 'Frightened'

LD1807181989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the "Vremya" Newscast; report by Dmitriy Kiselev from Stepanakert in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]

[Text] The weekend was calm in Stepanakert. Actually, this is all rather relative, for the idea of days off has not existed here since May. But there are not any working days either. A strike has been going on now for 2 and ½ months—not a general one, but not a single industrial enterprise is working. The main slogan, as the Artsakh movement says, is meatsum—reunification. Calm is also a relative concept. Building materials were burned today in the cellar of the housing committee on (Ekimyan) Street, and shortly before that a car was stopped; it contained weapons and incendiary materials. The Internal Affairs Directorate refused to say who was at the wheel: they invoked secrecy.

A curfew is in force. There are military vehicles in the streets, and the troops—in temperatures of 30 degrees—are getting hot in their bullet-proof jackets. The market is simply stagnant. There were tomatoes yesterday, which for some time have been a great rarity in local shops. People are frightened to sell things at the roadsides, and the Baku-Stepanakert train travels almost empty. [video shows street scenes, including fire engines, troop carriers, empty market, train with broken window]

[Kiselev addresses railway employee] How many tickets have you sold today for the Stepanakert-Baku train?

[Employee] So far today we have not sold any for that train.

[Kiselev] And yesterday?

[Employee] Yesterday was Sunday, so there were 46 passengers.

[Kiselev] Who goes mainly?

[Employee] Mainly they were troops, people from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Azeris.

[Kiselev] Tell me, does the train go every day?

[Employee] Yes, our train goes every day.

[Kiselev] The oblast paper has not been published for several days now. There is no oblast television broadcasting either. They say the technical capabilities [word indistinct] but the relay station there does not permit it. Everyone is awaiting the arrival of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet here. The optimism connected with its creation is somewhat cautious: the Karabakh problem will remain a problem for too long.

New 'Skirmishes' Reported

PM1807114389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 89 Second Edition p 3

[TASS "Reportage from Nagorno-Karabakh": "The Hallmark of Calamity"]

[Text] Stepanakert (Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]), 17 Jul—The "rock-throwing" war on the roads of Nagorn-Karabakh has noticeably abated over the last few days: Mobile Internal Troops patrols in armored vehicles and trucks are in control of the situation, on the whole, along the most important sections of highways within the oblast. They are preventing interethnic "skirmishes" from breaking out and dispersing suspicious gatherings of people. It is impossible, however, to provide reliable cover for the entire road network....

A group of Azerbaijanis near Malybeyli Village halted the car in which B., an Armenian and a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet army, was traveling on leave to join his family. The father and mother were mercilessly beaten up before their children's eyes, and the ensign driver also got his share. They were hospitalized with concussions and other injuries. The car body was damaged, its windows were broken, and the children were badly cut by the splinters. And just think of the stress they went through!

Children, women, and old people—the weakest and the innocent—are more often than not the ones to suffer during the outbursts of interethnic hostility. Armenia's "Mercy" charitable society is worried about the future of Armenians living in the villages of Karin Tak, Tsakhkadzor, Yegtsaok, Berdadzor, and Kirov in Shushinskiy Rayon. These villages are isolated from the outside world and have no means of defense against possible attacks by bandits. "We ask for effective measures to be taken to ensure the population's safety," the society's presidium appeals to the commander of the special district. Azerbaijanis also feel uncomfortable in the oblast's villages and in places with high population concentrations. Passions are already overinflamed. Interethnic hostility, which has turned into downright enmity, has crossed over the danger line.

The situation is especially difficult for international families, where one of the parents is Azerbaijani and the other Armenian. Neither of the sides in the conflict fully accepts them as its own, and they are showered with threats and insults. Many such visitors have attended reception sessions by A.I. Volskiy, chairman of the Special Administration Committee. Some of these families wished to move to the country's central regions and they were helped to do so, while others begged for protection against attacks. Everything possible is being done to that end. But even a militiaman on permanent guard duty outside a house offers no protection against the alienation and ostracism which rend a family's living organism in two different ethnic parts....

Wooden doors in many of the homes of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] residents have been replaced by steel ones offering better protection against pressing crowds. But people cannot opt out of life even inside "strongbox apartments." So the men lie awake nights, jumping up at the slightest noise to rush out into the street and, together with their neighbors, meet the creeping danger. Inside many homes there are knives, axes, sticks, and even something more serious within easy reach. Patrols at highway checkpoints confiscate weapons and even home-made explosive devices from passing Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The night is the most anxious period of the 24 hours, so residents patrol until dawn in the cities while self-defense guard units mount a vigil in the villages. Troops are all very well, but God helps those who help themselves. On the face of it, life in Stepanakert proceeds normally in daytime: People walk the streets, food stores, pharmacies, and "Soyuzpechat" kiosks are all open, children are at play. Nonetheless, there are two features: the watchfulness and suspicion typical of the life led by the NKAO's population today.

A woman turned to the Internal Troops Operations Group Staff in Nagorno-Karabakh for help: Her father left on a trip to Baku but never reached his destination. The old man had been taken off the train, badly beaten, at Barda in the Azerbaijan SSR, and hospitalized there. The daughter was worried: Her father is Armenian, she was sure that he would not obtain treatment in an Azerbaijani hospital, and she was asking for a vehicle with a platoon-strength escort to bring the old man home.

An Azerbaijani wounded in Stepanakert City's Kirkidzhan settlement 11 July was sent to Shusha for treatment; the reason was that the local hospital would not offer the full treatment he needed.

For a long time now there have been virtually no Armenians to be seen in the streets of Shusha, while Azerbaijanis are afraid to travel to Stepanakert.

The split in interethnic relations is the hallmark of calamity in all aspects of life. "For the third day running it has been impossible to deliver mail to the oblast's rayons because of the complex situation and road blocks. Please assign transportation and detail troops to ensure deliveries"—so read an appeal to the Special Administration Committee from R.B. Mkrtchyan, chief engineer at the NKAO Production and Technical Communications Administration. And here is a request from the Azerbaijani side: "There are increasingly frequent breakdowns in communications with Kelbadzharskiy Rayon. The damage is not being repaired despite repeated applications to the NKAO Communications Administration. We ask for your intervention...." These telegrams are the direct result of the deteriorating situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Many people here cannot even imagine what it would be like to travel on the roads without military escorts. Yeast for a bakery was delivered by a military vehicle crewed by an ensign and three men armed with assault rifles. The market in the oblast center is deserted: The transportation of vegetables and fruit involves considerable risk. To top it all, the Armenian population refuses food supplies arriving from Azerbaijan.

The alarming atmosphere is fueled by rumors. Every now and again the Military Commandant's Office and the Internal Troops Operations Group Staff receive telephone calls to say that a village has been attacked, someone has been killed, the crowd is getting ready for a pogrom, or suspicious lantern lights can be seen in the mountain forest. We immediately check out every reported incident even though we receive reports at the rate of several dozen every 24 hours, Colonel V.A. Skorobogatov, deputy chief of the Troops Operations Group, said. Most reports are not confirmed. It must be noted at this point that the population is in a state of extreme excitement and easily falls into the trap of any misleading information that is circulated either for provocative purposes or carelessly. All this complicates the situation further still.

It would seem that, in today's extreme conditions, every citizen ought to display the utmost restraint, discipline, and awareness of the need to rigorously obey the curfew demands. But, in the heat of emotions, some hotheads wanted to convene an unauthorized rally in Stepanakert on Friday, 14 July. It was very well that they failed—it is hardly proper to hold rallies at a time when thought should be given to the restoration of public order and tranquility. But the daily gatherings of people outside the city party committee and in the oblast center, just like in Shusha's main square, in no way help to make the situation any healthier. Gatherings which occur periodically in other population centers in the NKAO and the special district, at times numbering several hundred persons, are in an explosive mood.

The situation in the oblast sharply deteriorated right at the time when the USSR Supreme Soviet, on instructions from the Congress of People's Deputies, was preparing to set up a commission on Nagorno-Karabakh. This can hardly be described as coincidental: Events are now unfolding over too large a territory. And the actual development of events and details about them confirm the existence of forces which direct and organize not only psychological pressure but also specific unlawful actions. These forces are not in favor of a constitutional examination of the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, and they are striving to destabilize the situation and thwart the parliamentary commission's work. The party and soviet aktiv has proved unable to counter their policy, which has ultimately resulted in unbridled interethnic dissension. Meanwhile, the sober-minded majority of the oblast's population advocates nothing but peaceful, constitutional settlement of the problem.

Subunits of Internal Troops and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are working under tremendous pressure to prevent clashes and to maintain law and order. Temperatures in the thirties, dust, and water shortages in themselves are enough to make service more complex. Add to this the permanent nervous and physical tension, with details "shouldering arms" every day. At the height of the events the soldiers did not sleep for 48-72 hours. Furthermore, they still have to maintain their composure, even when at times they come across a lack of understanding among those whom they are called on to protect.

The usual kit worn by military detachments serving in Nagornyy Karabakh comprises helmet, bulletproof vest, rubber billy, and a walkie-talkie, with the senior man also carrying an assault rifle. The population has gotten used to this equipment, just as it has gotten used to the armored vehicles on the hgihways and in the population centers. But helicopters are still something of a marvel, especially in an outlying rayon center like Kelbadzhar. This is why so many children were attracted by the rotor-winged craft which landed inside the stadium—one of those monitoring the situation in population centers and along the highways from the air and promptly landing details of men in any hot spots.

The kids were chased away from the aircraft prior to takeoff, and they sat down on the stadium benches. But something irreparable happened when the helicopter left the ground and started gaining altitude. It banked to one side, got caught in some high-voltage power lines, and crashed. Eight children were killed as a result of the accident, whose causes are under investigation.

An absurd incident, a fatal coincidence. But there is a nagging thought that the tragedy need not have happened, had it not become necessary to use troops to contain interethnic conflict.

If only the adults had paused to think and halted in good time....

It is still not too late for the two sides in the conflict to come to their senses, to offer each other the hand of reconciliation, and to solve the Nagornyy Karabakh problem peacefully, without shedding any more children's or old people's, women's or men's blood, in a way that befits civilized people.

Council of Ministers Workers, Journalists Meet

NC1907105389 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Text] Meeting at the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee:

A meeting at the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee was held between the responsible workers of the USSR Council of Ministers and correspondents of the republic's newspapers and radio and television network. They examined the current development of the republic's construction industry and the cooperative movement and how the mass media organs can shed light on that development.

The journalists were significantly briefed on housing program progress in a number of the republic's cities and rayons and on problems concerning the organization and development of cooperatives in the production, [word indistinct], and agricultural fields, including the construction domain. An interesting exchange of views was held on arranging [words indistinct] in the construction field, securing adherence to the principles of social justice in housing areas, and creating the necessary conditions for (?working people) in Azerbaijan in the cooperative movement on a broader scale.

The meeting's particip... ...ghly assessed the role of the mass media organs in the realization of the new economic concept and the application of contemporary economic measures, including channeling economic measures toward fulfillment of the people's demands. However, the participants also drew the attention of the journalists to the unrealized opportunities in the cooperative and individual housing construction field. Attention was focused on the [words indistinct], the need to (?broaden) the housing fund to provide for the sale of state-owned houses to the citizens as personal property, and the need to strengthen the role of the local soviets in that regard.

(?Dinova), chief expert of the USSR Council of Ministers Social Development Department, and Sokolov, a deputy department chief in the USSR Ministry of Finance, replied to the journalists' questions.

Correction to Report on Situation in NKAO

NC1907103789

The following correction to the item headlined "Strikes Causing 'Deplorable' Situation in NKAO," published in the 18 July Soviet Union DAILY REPORT on page 54, is supplied by a rebroadcast of the item by Yerevan International Service in Armenian at 1800 GMT on 18 July:

paragraph one, first sentence reads: ... about stability. Boris Nesedov, assistant chairman of... (clearing name)

same paragraph, second sentence reads: ... commandants office for guaranteeing the security of the population. (clearing indistinct word)

same paragraph, last sentence reads: ... be resolved through democratic and constitutional means.

Despite that watchfulness, suspicion and expectations of a suprise development and the same feelings [words indistinct] of each Karabakh citizen. Many people in Stepanakert... (clearing indistinct words)

second paragraph, last sentence reads: ...interesting news items, a place of heated debates.

The citizens are refraining... (clearing indistinct words)

Baku Radio Notes Refugees From Uzbekistan

NC1807110189 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0340 GMT 18 Jul 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] About 40,000 Turks [as heard] have left the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] as a result of [word indistinct] incidents. About 10,000 of them are now in Azerbaijan. M. Kholmukhamadov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, has visited Azerbaijan along with a group of responsible workers affiliated with a number of the Uzbek SSR's administrative bodies for 7 days in connection with the question of having the refugees return to their own homes.

The newspapers published an interview with Kholmukhamadov today.

Moldavia To Examine Stalin Repression

PM1807122589 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 2 Jul 89 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "At the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has adopted a resolution "On Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of Repressions of the Thirties and Forties and the Early Fifties."

Revolutionary restructuring and its associated processes of democratization, glasnost, and consolidation of legality, the resolution says, persistently demand the restoration of historical truth and justice in the historical appraisal of past events, and the discharge of moral obligations to the memory of the innocent victims of the Stalinist tyranny.

The repressions of the thirties, forties, and early fifties, engendered by the atmosphere of tyranny and total license during the years of Stalin's administrative edict system which implanted lawlessness, hostility, and suspicion, became a tragedy for many peoples. The wave of political accusations and repressions also extended to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The main target of the Stalinist illegalities were leading officials of party, soviet, and economic organs, the mass media and propaganda, and literary and art figures. Innocent workers, peasants, employees, representatives of young people, Communists, and nonparty people were among the victims of the terror.

Mass repressions began in right-bank Moldavia in 1940-1941. They were aimed primarily against so-called socially alien elements. Specifically, there was a mass deportation 13 June 1941. Some 4,500 families were subjected to exile and repressions. A study of the cases of repressions shows that many people were groundlessly accused together with those who were really guilty.

The abuse of power and violations of socialist legality continued during the postwar years. The exile operation during the night of 5-6 July 1949, when more than 11,000 families were deported, was a blatantly arbitrary act. The unjustifiably cruel and inhuman dekulakization was a grave crime not only against the peasantry but also against the whole people. In the struggle against the kulaks unjustifiable violence was used against the huge mass of middle and even poor peasants.

The practice of mass repressions and arbitrariness had tragic consequences for people of all nationalities and ethnic groups living in Moldavia's territory had a ruinous effect on the republic's socioeconomic development, and established in people's minds scorn for the norms of law and human morality. This is why the restoration of historical justice has acquired tremendous political importance.

The Central Committee Bureau has instructed the Moldavian Communist Party city committees [gorkom] and rayon committees [raykom] and the city soviet executive committees [gorispolkom] and rayon soviet executive committees to carry out organizational and political work to perpetuate the memory of the victims of Stalin's repressions. The necessary measures must be taken to identify possible places of burial in the republic's territory, to recognize them as official cemeteries, and to erect obelisks and monuments.

Support was expressed for proposals by working people and public organizations that 6 July be dedicated to the memory of the victims of Stalin's repressions.

Note was taken of the fact that on 10 April 1989 the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On Repealing the 28 June 1949 Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers Resolution 'On the Expulsion of Kulaks, Former Landowners, and Big Merchants From the Moldavian SSR.'" It was emphasized that it is necessary to step up the work of social commissions set up in the republic and at the local level to examine applications by former special migrants [spetsposelenets] for compensation for material damage, and to show utmost attention and concern for people who were illegally repressed.

It was deemed expedient to erect in Kishinev City a monument to the victims of illegalities and repressions during the personality cult years. Ye.V. Sobor (Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture) and V.G. Dobrya (Kishinev Gorispolkom) were instructed to submit the relevant proposals.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute, the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute named for Ya.S. Grossul, and the Moldavian SSR History Museum were instructed to embark on the creation of a republic book to commemorate the victims of the Stalinist tyranny. It is intended to prepare an anthology of materials and a cycle of works, articles, and exhibitions revealing the causes of the emergence and violence of Stalinism, its consequences and inhuman psychology.

The Moldavian SSR Prosecutor's Office and the republic KGB, the resolution notes, must engage in more active work to review the cases of persons repressed in the thirties, forties, and early fifties regardless of whether applications and complaints have been filed by citizens, while the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Committee and party gorkoms and raykoms must take measures to promptly examine questions concerning the rehabilitation of groundlessly repressed party members.

Editorial offices of newspapers and journals and the Moldavian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting have been recommended to provide consistent and objective coverage of the dramatic pages of the history of socialist building in Moldavia in personality cult conditions.

Ice Reconnaissance Plane Crashes in Arctic

LD1907112489 Moscow TASS in English 1115 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—A damaged AN-26 plane of the Kolyma-Indigirka air transport organisation (Yakutiya) was found by a rescue party today on the shore of the East Siberian Sea 80 kilometres away from Pevek.

The crew of the plane and ice reconnaissance operators on board died in the crash, according to the State Commission for Air Flight Safety Supervision (Gosavianadzor) under the USSR Council of Ministers.

A search for the plane, which left Cape Schmidt Airport at 00:02 for ice reconnaissance in the East Siberian Sea, was launched immediately after contact with the crew was lost at 03:00 Moscow time [18 July].

The cause of the crash is being investigated by a Gosavianadzor commission.

'Prominent' Military Commander Dies

LD1807150689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1419 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jul (TASS)—A prominent Soviet military commander, Army General Aleksandr Terentyevich Altunin, hero of the Soviet Union, died on 15 July 1989 after a grave illness.

He was born on 14 August 1921 in a Siberian village. He joined the Army as a volunteer in 1939; he began as a student at an infantry college and worked his way up to army general. During the postwar period he worked in senior positions in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and was head of the main cadres administration of the USSR Defense Ministry, head of USSR civil defense, and USSR deputy defense minister. Recently he was a military inspector and adviser to the group of general inspectors of the USSR Defense Ministry.

Gen Altunin was awarded many orders and medals. His obituary is signed by Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and other government and party leaders.

Student Arrested Firing Machinegun

PM1807162589 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 19 Jul 89 p 4

[Own correspondent A. Pavlov report under the rubric "Reporting Details": "Two Against a Machinegun"]

[Text] Voronezh—The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has awarded the "For Personal Courage" Order to Militia Lieutenant Colonel K. Kulakov and Militia Captain M. Sidorov, staffers of the Voronezh Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration, for valor and selfless action displayed while detaining dangerous criminals.

The duty officer at the Internal Affairs Administration treated the telephone call received in the night as a bad joke.

"Firing a machinegun, you say? Fine, we'll look into it..."

Two criminal investigation staffers were dispatched to the large forest park from where machinegun fire was reportedly heard. The duty officer had transmitted the alarm signal to them over the radio.

...Having switched off the engine of the militia UAZ [Ulyanovskiy Motor Vehicle Plant] vehicle, Lt Col Kulakov and Capt Sidorov listened: Indeed, a burst of machinegun fire shattered the silence of the night almost right next to them. They went a few meters and saw the outlines of a machinegun and two male figures next to it. What to do next? Get in touch with the administration? Time will be wasted when every second is precious: The unknown persons were firing a terrifying weapon. For what purpose? There was no telling how events might develop. On the other hand, the militia staffers were not prepared for action, they had arrived unarmed. What to do?

Now, with hindsight, one could let one's imagination loose on what the detectives thought when detaining the criminals and the alternative moves they might have considered. But, as the officers themselves recall, they had no choice, there was only one thing to do: Detain them! Composed, calm, having on several occasions encountered problems when capturing especially dangerous criminals, they banked on surprise. And their experience and intuition did not let them down. The "machinegunners" literally froze stiff when they heard the authoritative words: "Hands Up!" from behind their backs. With help from N. Bocharov, driver of the militia UAZ who hastened to join them, the officers quite swiftly tied up the criminals.

They proved to be an habitual criminal and... a final-year student at the Voronezh Medical Institute who, it was established, headed the criminal group. A search of the detainees' apartment resulted in the confiscation of a large quantity of various firearms: A portable machinegun, rifles, three homemade pistols with silencers, a grenade launcher, over 1,000 combat bullets, swords, knives, daggers... The weapons just about fitted on a 4-meter long table.

Taking the extraordinary nature of the crime into account, the investigation was assigned to KGB staffers. The results of the investigation give grounds for asserting that the group headed by the student was preparing to commit an especially dangerous state crime. The investigation established that the persons detained when the machinegun was being fired had previously committed two murders. The final assessment of the criminal group's deeds will be made by the court.

Semchagov Views Need for New Price System

LD1807131789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0800 GMT on 18 July broadcasts a 3-and-1/2 minute report noting that although there is no joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities 18 July, intensive work is under way in the Supreme Soviet commissions and committees. Some 800 people's deputies are members of eight standing commissions of the chambers and 14 committees of the Supreme Soviet which have become permanent working bodies of the Soviet parliament, the radio adds. Their main functions

at present are the budget, the drawing up of draft laws, as well as monitoring the activity of the government. The radio notes that deputies began discussing the nomination of Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Senchagov as chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices during the 18 July joint session of the committees for economic reform and veterans and invalids, as well as the commissions for labor, prices, and social policy and for questions of socioeconomic development of the union, autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs. An economist by education, Senchagov is at present deputy USSR minister of finance, the radio continues. He was presented to the people's deputies by Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, it adds.

The radio cites Senchagov as stating to the deputies: "The system of retail prices and tariffs that is in effect in the economy is much neglected and does not correspond to the modern demands of economic perestroyka. It has taken shape over decades under the impact of administrative-command methods as a result of which voluntarism and subjectivism have been allowed to creep into price formation. This has led to prices and tariffs in the main becoming divorced from the socially necessary expenditure on the production level and from the demands of the market."

Speaking about perestroyka in the system of prices and tariffs, Senchagov says it should be implemented in a comprehensive manner and its ultimate goal should be eliminating distortions and creating a new system of price formation which would not be based on excessive centralization, but would be more flexible, allowing for contract prices that are formed directly by the producers and the consumers, taking into account the state of the market.

Alekseyev Says Law Reform Must Avoid 'Mob Diktat'

PM180716038 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jul 89 p 2

[Interview with S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, by L. Nikitinskiy under the rubric "A Law Is Born": "Parliament Square: The Will of the People or the Emotions of the Mob?"—date and place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The ordinary one-room apartment in the Moskva hotel hardly lived up to my idea of a congressman's residence, even one of ours. Nor did its occupant—Professor, Dr Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and a corresponding member of the Academy—look as impressive either. Now he more resembled a worker who had just unloaded 10 freightcars in a day but felt neither satisfaction nor triumph at that fact. The days ahead contain the prospect not of tens but of many hundreds of such freightcars. It was a tired, low voice that was recorded on the tape:

[Alekseyev] I never used to link my future with the drafting of laws. My main interests remain in the sphere of science. However, we have no right to fail to take advantage of the historic opportunity and the unique situation for our country whereby jurists now hold crucial posts and juridical science has for the first time been given a real opportunity to influence the shaping of a civilized body of laws.

[Nikitinskiy] Was it a sense of social duty that prompted you to head the committee?

[Alekseyev] It is more appropriate to talk about my moral duty to my friends and colleagues, whom I am now involving in the heavy task of drafting laws. I see my task in putting the work on a scientific basis, after which I shall probably leave this honorable but, for a scientist, onerous post.

[Nikitinskiy] In the early eighties you were quite a solitary voice in the choir of demagogues and eulogists of the status quo in jurisprudence. Are there people you can rely on in the committee now, people with whom to build a rule of law state?

[Alekseyev] I do not think that the voices of honest juridical scientists were all that isolated. It is a different matter that the possessors of real political power perceived them more often as an irritating mosquito buzz.

There are many like-minded people on the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. Disputes are inevitable, but on the whole we understand each other well. Working in conjunction with other Supreme Soviet committees and commissions we will make extensive use of the best non-deputy specialists in drafting of laws. My long-standing friendship with leading scientists is already helping me in assembling teams of this kind to work on individual draft laws.

[Nikitinskiy] Aren't you afraid of being accused of clannishness?

[Alekseyev] In contrast to the way things used to be, we do not intend to surround law-drafting work with a veil of secrecy. After each major draft law has been discussed within our committee and the appropriate Supreme Soviet committee and, after a preliminary reading in parliament, it will be submitted to nationwide discussion.

At the same time, I consider that a high-quality draft law can be prepared only by a quite narrow group of like-minded people. A good law is always a work that bears its

authors' signature and is then approved by parliament. The authors' names must be personally known, whether the law is a success or a failure.

The committee is prepared to examine alternative drafts and all reasonable proposals but they must be submitted through deputies or organs which have the right to initiate legislation. This mechanism (here I mean the legislative initiative) was devised in order to provide protection against amateurism—otherwise the committee's work would become disorganized. The mass of people, including those who hold a certain position, think that there is nothing easier than scribbling off a new law. Many newspapermen also adhere to that naive belief, which permeated deputies' speeches at the congress. And often they do not simply give us advice but blatantly pressure us and interfere...

[Nikitinskiy] The status of a USSR Supreme Soviet Committee, we hope, will protect you from departmental pressure. But tell us, will the draft laws compiled by specialists continue to go by way of the Staraya Ploshchad [CPSU headquarters], where mysterious and inexplicable changes used to befall them?

[Alekseyev] Of course they will. But relations between parliament and the Central Committee are different now. The party apparatus will not be able simply to shelve a draft law or rewrite it as it likes without considering the specialists' opinion. If the people on the Staraya Ploshchad have their own political considerations, they must convince us and we will try to convince them. This must be a professional and amicable dialogue between ideologists and politicians, on the one hand, and jurists, scientists, and practical workers on the other.

I have a far greater number of misgivings about the next stage of legislative work—the examination and adoption of laws at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions article by article (and I favor no other way). We on the committee, together with our colleagues from the other committees and commissions, of course, will try to bring draft laws to such a state of readiness that they do not lead to very great debates in parliament. But I am not sure that this is feasible given the prevailing mood and level of discussion.

At the moment the least question here gives rise to many hours of discussions. A certain proportion of the deputies came to the Supreme Soviet straight from the hurly burly of the pre-election struggle. Don't get me wrong. I am not against rallies, but the solution of serious questions in a representative organ of power demands not so much militancy and uncompromisingness as the ability to hold a meaningful and proper dialogue and the desire for mutual understanding and consensus.

[Nikitinskiy] In your view, how far are deputies subject to the influence of public opinion? And is that good or bad?

[Alekseyev] Of course it is good that people elected by the people and dependent on the people have finally been involved in the management of the state. But as much as I respect public opinion it is often shaped under the influence of the interests of the moment and emotions which diminish common sense. In the Supreme Soviet, in my view, there are a number of deputies who won their seats by playing up to the voters. Quite a few promises were made which in the short term cannot be kept. If the Supreme Soviet, in turn, follows the lead of those deputies in the choice of legislative strategy, our ship will simply run aground. Thinking about the priority areas in the development of legislation I personally would place the solution of social questions third on the list.

[Nikitinskiy] Are we to take it that the implementation of the promises made at the congress to increase pensions and on other social programs should be deferred, in your view?

[Alekseyev] Minimum pensions will be raised. I am not talking about that now. I am embarrassed even to mention it. These are degrading handouts, soup kitchen fare. The implementation of real full-blooded social programs needs resources and in vast amounts. But legislative promises without economic backup are worthless, even less than worthless in view of the inevitable disappointment caused among the people.

So first I think it necessary to embark on a comprehensive legal reform in the economy directly linked with the creation of a new USSR Constitution. Why are we all skirting round the question of political power? Political structures are the product of economic relations. The main question now must be not so much political power as the very basis of economic life and indeed all our life, that is, ownership.

Given the dominance of state and bureaucratic ownership, the rule-of-law state and political freedoms in principle are impossible but the appearance of a progressive and democratic leader such as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is more a happy paradox of the lottery of history. Overconcentrated state, that is, bureaucratic ownership requires its own political formation in the form of the command and administrative system, and we will not overthrow it until we conduct a radical reform in the economy and create a multilayered, self-regulating socialist economy.

I think that the excesses of democratization which we are seeing today stem to a certain extent from the attempts to resolve the question of democracy as an exclusively political question. But meanwhile, both market abundance and true political democracy are unattainable without economic emancipation and the appearance of a section of people who feel that they are not simply day laborers in the service of an all-powerful state employer but also valuable producers and people of free labor. Therefore, I would place the comprehensive legal reform in the economy second in my plan of legislative work.

[Nikitinskiy] So what is first, then?

[Alekseyev] Number one is the enshrinement of Soviet citizens' rights and freedoms in law rather than in mere rhetorical statements. The exercise of rights and freedoms must be safeguarded by a mechanism of legal requirement and protection. Rhetoric and hypocrisy must be categorically rejected here. However, we have a constitutional right to housing yet we are still far from the really accessible housing. But the basic human rights must be above the bureaucratic interests of the state and departments.

I am not afraid of seeming too pragmatic, and I shall explain why I place this legislative action first. Because it can be undertaken in the very near future and its implementation requires no economic investments even though it is capable of giving a powerful impetus to political and, most importantly, economic activity by liberating Soviet man. To paraphrase the salesman's slogan, nothing is as cheap or as highly prized as political freedoms.

It is from that angle that I would begin to build the rule of law state without undue haste but without delay either. On that foundation we will begin work on the USSR Constitution. But I repeat that a well considered legislative strategy is possible only if a section of deputies in the Supreme Soviet do not give in to and do not try to make us give in to those voters who en masse want it all at once and want the benefits without thinking of where they are to be found.

[Nikitinskiy] Sergey Sergeyevich, at the law department in the seventies they told us that Soviet laws express the will of the people. That was a cliche which, of course, no one believed or even examined. Today we look at that question more realistically and say that in a socialist rule of law state the law must only express the will of the people. But in order to express that will it is necessary first to find out what it is. Does the USSR Supreme Soviet express the will of the people through the corps of deputies? And what is the will of the people exactly? Is it the same as public opinion?

[Alekseyev] No, it isn't the same. Public opinion, as I have already said, is subject to fluctuations, the interests of the moment, and emotions, which may be influenced by rapidly succeeding events. Public opinion, finally, can be manipulated for selfish interests. But the will of the people is something deeper, it is a more stable and constant force, it is more the expression of the people's profound needs and interests including those not always perceived by the people. It must be molded, understood, and crystallized through the mechanism of representative democracy and be expressed primarily through the mouths of the most worthy and intelligent representatives of the people who ideally are people's deputies.

[Nikitinskiy] Do you think in that case that parliament's decisions and the laws could go against public opinion?

[Alekseyev] Yes, I do. For example, the idea that rigorous punishment is highly effective is deeply rooted in the people's knowledge of the law, which, unfortunately, is quite low standard. However, historical practice and much scientific research show that unduly rigorous punishment not only does not lead to the eradication of crime but possibly even promotes its spread. I hope that when the people's deputies come to examine the Fundamentals of Criminal Law they will heed informed scientific opinion more than the emotions of the mob.

[Nikitinskiy] Sergey Sergeyevich, we are approaching, are we not, ideas developed by Socrates, who believed, as is well known, that the people do not know what is good for them and that therefore direct democracy is the road to the abyss. The true good of the state, according to Socrates, means rule by the wisest, most far-sighted, and competent statesmen....

[Alekseyev] Be that as it may, the problem raised by Socrates 2,400 years ago has not lost its topicality. If we entrust the law entirely to public opinion, especially with the present level of knowledge of the law, we may be making a great mistake. At the same time to simply break contact with public opinion and elevate oneself above it is contrary to the very idea of the parliamentary system. Objectively speaking, if you will, deputies are to a certain extent hostages of public opinion. Especially since the economic disorders and the forthcoming reforms are creating a tense social background in the country and very great restraint and balance in decisions are needed here.

[Nikitinskiy] In moving away from the apparatus diktat, how are we to avoid moving toward the mob diktat....

[Alekseyev] A wise chess player does not look for problems at the start of the game. On the contrary, we must now move toward compromises and seek the golden mean. Parliament, on the one hand, must heed the voice outside the Kremlin wall. (It simply cannot be ignored, and we have no right to ignore it!) But, on the other hand, it must pursue its own scientifically validated line and bring public opinion step by step toward a higher level of understanding of those problems facing our society. [end of interview]

At this point (a discussion on links between the economy and glasnost) the batteries in my tape recorder "died." On behalf of all the readers I thanked Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev—a scientist who once turned down the leadership of a very important legal institute in Moscow, preferring to speak from the Urals if only to avoid catching cold in the changeable political currents—who by evening was "drained." Now, too, he continues to direct his brainchild, the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Department, on social principles.

This discussion prompted me to think that it is hardly correct to associate democracy solely with street processions and joyous din. Democracy is hard work, akin to that of the architect. There sits a man expressing his humble thoughts in a hotel room ill-suited to this purpose. Let us not shout out under his window. Let us respect the labor of a professional and not mob him when he emerges onto the square.

Moscow Soviet Discusses Ecological Problems

LD0507153789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Text] The regular session of the Moscow City Soviet on 4 July dealt with the ecological situation in the capital. Additional and urgent efforts are needed to fundamentally improve the situation, the session concluded. First and foremost it is necessary to put an end to the extensive increase of the production potential of the capital, to the growth of its population and territory. The withdrawal from the city of ecologically harmful and unsuitable enterprises should be speeded up, and the capital's science should be involved to a greater degree in solving this problem. Another way is the technical reequipment of industry, the accelerated development of the social sphere of the city, the planting of trees and gardens all over the city, and providing the city with amenities.

Zaykov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, took part in the work of the session.

Bakatin Interviewed on Crime 'Crisis'

PM1807144589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 89 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin by A. Chernenko and A. Chernyak: "On the Letter of the Law and the Breath of Life"—place, date not given]

[Text] [Correspondents] It is 1 week since your approval for the post of minister by the Supreme Soviet. What is your assessment of such an "examination"?

[Bakatin] This is a complex but undoubtedly a useful matter.

When I returned to the ministry after the session as minister and was able to study calmly all 50 notes with questions put by deputies, I was sorry that there had been insufficient time to reply to the majority of them.... The point is that I have not yet met elsewhere more topical or necessary questions of use to the militia and society, although it is not all that rare for me to make speeches. This attests to the deputies' great competence and knowledge of life.

What did I take away with me? Confidence that we have taken the right course of resolutely democratizing and decentralizing our system's functions. Order No 1 for this year delegated to republic ministers and internal affairs administration chiefs a significant proportion of the rights with regard to resolving cadre and financial questions and staff and structural changes. This is a blow to the bureaucratic legacy. And this is only the beginning. In the light of the debate which developed at the congress and the current (agonizing) processes of sharing functions between the center and the provinces (particularly in connection with the upcoming adoption of the Law on Local Self-Management), in the future the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] will transfer to local soviets a considerably greater degree of management of the maintenance of public order, the patrol service, traffic safety, and so forth. These measures will encourage the initiative and responsibility of local soviets in strengthening law and order. And this will, at last, enable the USSR MVD to concentrate all resources on operational-investigative areas of the fight against crime.

[Correspondents] The situation with regard to crime and various antisocial manifestations is extremely complex today. You have only to summarize newspaper reports of particular extraordinary incidents to recognize the alarming temperature of the situation. Sometimes it seems, figuratively speaking, to be already approaching 100 degrees.... How do you personally assess the situation, the development of trends in the sphere of crime, and, so to speak, the vector in the sphere of the state's crime policy?

[Bakatin] In order to answer this question I must paint the whole picture that has taken shape in our society today. The spring of 1985 set our entire life in dynamic motion. And the processes which have stirred up society could not fail to affect crime and the criminal subculture, so to speak, as well as the attitude to it of society, law-enforcement organs, and political institutions. It is bitter to acknowledge it, but it is a fact that until recently textbooks on criminology mentioned only "birthmarks of the past" or "rudiments of social antagonisms of the exploiter system...."

Crime, including organized crime, is also inherent in the socialist society—at least at the stage where we now are. But it is not enough to restructure our views on the genesis of crime. In practice we have so far done very little for the real perestroyka and strengthening of law-enforcement organs themselves.

It is paradoxical, but, once again, it is a fact that at first it seemed to many people that the MVD was in no need of any cardinal modernization. The atmosphere of renewal during the 1st 2 years of perestroyka, the strengthening of discipline, and the campaign to combat drunkenness had led to a drop in crime. In 1987 ,3 percent fewer crimes were recorded than in 1985. However, the real influence of complex processes on the

crime situation in the country proved far more complicated and contradictory, insofar as the processes of society's renewal were themselves contradictory. The law-enforcement organs did not notice in time or were unable to understand the whole ambivalence of these processes.

[Correspondents] What do you mean?

[Bakatin] Legal, financial, and contractual discipline has fallen. Embezzlement and shortages have increased. At times glaring mismanagement has made itself felt. The reduction in the auditing apparatus has produced not quite the result on which we were reckoning. The cooperative milieu has provided new opportunities for criminal elements. The buying up of goods and speculation have intensified. Inflation is growing. Free money has appeared. A sharp stratification of the population according to income has begun.

There is another fundamental aspect. The policy of humanizing justice has led to a halving of the use of measures to secure defendants' appearances and punishments connected with direct imprisonment. People have been released from colonies virtually "to nowhere," without a guaranteed abode or job. When trying to find a job, they encounter more painfully than before the mentality of group egotism, which is increasingly frequently making itself felt since enterprises are going over to rigid economic accountability. Over the past year the section requiring social preventive work increased by 1.4 million and now stands at 6 million people. On the other hand, traditional forms of social control have been weakened. The result is obvious: The breeding ground for recidivism and parasitism is increasing.

[Correspondents] People's Deputy V. Belov, the writer, expressed the opinion that the lifting of all bans in art, the cinema, and television has not only revealed highly humanistic, honest, and profoundly moral works that were unjustly hushed up but also flung open the floodgates for a stream of inferior hackwork propagandizing total license, violence, depravity, the cult of money and force, a nihilistic attitude toward the law and toward law and order, and worship of Western models—not always the best ones and sometimes ones which they themselves rejected long ago. All this contributes to the growth of crime....

[Bakatin] I agree with Vasiliy Ivanovich. Our analysis, an analysis by a dozen authoritative sociological groups convinces us that these far from harmless "creative experiments" contribute to disorder and to outbursts of cruelty and violence in an emotionally immature and morally unstable milieu. There are no rigid connections here. It is a question of shaping a certain moral microclimate. But this could not but affect the growth of prostitution and drug addiction. The growth rate for crime among minors has doubled. In 1988 it increased 11 percent, and during the 1st 6 months of this year it was up 22 percent.... This is on the one hand, while on the other we are hemmed in by the old, obsolete, conservative system of ordinances, bans, and infringement of citizens' interests. These include limits on residence rights (in 70 cities!) for previously convicted persons, absurdities with regard to hunters and motorists, and much besides. There is also the archaic passion for administrative sanctions with regard to "trifles," to which as many as 44 million citizens are subjected in a year! This humiliates people, devalues the very system of these measures, and promotes antimilitia feeling.

All this combines to create an atmosphere in which a person feels alone and unprotected.

[Correspondents] Is this not the source of certain extremist and antisocial forces and groupings which hide behind very different slogans? Readers' letters—and they are daily becoming increasingly angry—attest to the impunity of hooligans in nationalist plumage, to the existence of very cohesive forces....

[Bakatin] Such antisocial forces do exist. What is their source? A complex question. There is a multitude of very diverse factors, including those of which we have spoken. And add to this the public shock stemming from the broad glasnost given to tragic pages of our history, a shock from which society is still finding it difficult to recover.... For this cannot fail to affect both directly and indirectly the moral state of us all on the one hand and the activeness of legal institutions on the other. We cannot fail to see the growth of direct, overt pressure aimed at limiting the capability of the law-enforcement system. The growth in hostage taking, attacks on and deliberate insulting of militia workers, prosecutors, and judges, and ultimatums from excited crowds camouflaging criminals and demanding the release of criminals is no accident.

At any rate, unstable workers of law-enforcement organs have begun to display passiveness, confusion, overcautiousness, and fear of employing legal sanctions. It is no coincidence that the number of people detained and arrested in recent years has almost halved—from 749,000 in 1986 to 402,000 in 1988. At the same time, one in six persons under investigation once again commits dangerous crimes while at liberty! The fight against crime has been adversely affected by the considerable diversion of militia resources, means, and attention to the localization of interethnic conflicts and the safeguarding of public order when rallies and demonstrations are held and in the increasingly frequent cases of refusal to obey the authorities. The source of the sharp growth in street crime is right here, in the gaps and voids that have formed in our links.

[Correspondents] At the same time we are still lagging badly behind in real lawmaking. There is overwhelming speculation, minor and major. The law on unearned income has plainly died without ever working. There are dangerous anomalies in the moral and sociopolitical

spheres. This is borne out by the latest series of pieces by PRAVDA special correspondents S. Bogatko and Yu. Kazmin on the work at 38, Petrovka Street [Moscow militia headquarters] ...

[Bakatin] We are undoubtedly faced with a need for large-scale legislative reforms. But it would be a very great mistake to consider that they can be realized in any way other than under conditions of strict observance of the laws already or, if you like, still in force. Otherwise we risk ending up with the arbitrariness of anarchy in the present instead of the arbitrariness of power in the past, which is condemned by the people and the party.

The growth in crime is marked by a very high rate. The growth was 32 percent during the 1st 6 months of this year....

However, I must stipulate that the growth in crime is nothing extraordinary. On the whole this trend is stable, with individual deviations. After we declassified criminal statistics for the first time in 70 years of Soviet power, everyone can see for himself that the 1988 crime level is far from the highest in our history and that MVD organs have begun covering up crimes less (although the statistics still remain extremely incomplete). This level was far higher during the stagnation years. The fact that we may exceed it now is another matter....

The worrying point is this. Increasingly dangerous trends are emerging clearly in the dynamics and structure of crime, and its gravity, character, and criminal parameters are intensifying.

First, there is sharp growth in serious acts of violence and increased aggressiveness and cruelty on the part of criminals. The rate of increase in murders with aggravating circumstances is 100 percent greater and in grievous bodily harm resulting in death 350 percent greater than the increase in crimes against the person as a whole. Instances of the use of firearms have increased 22 percent.

Second, there is a galloping rate of increase in mercenary crime. Violent attacks on cash offices have increased 28 percent, and burglaries 52 percent. Last year 176,000 thefts from apartments were recorded, and this year there have already been more than 100,000.

Third, the processes of the merger between crime and slick operators in the "black economy" and the development of organized crime have become more active. "Rackets" are growing fast, with the criminals having more technical equipment than we do, even modern electronic equipment....

And this convinces us yet again that the effectiveness of the law and of measures taken by law and order organs is inadequate for the dangerous growth in crime. These are the figures: The load on operational staffers and investigators has increased 36 percent. The rate of growth for the residue of uncleared crimes outstrips the rate of increase in recorded crimes by 240 percent.

[Correspondents] But this attests to a crime crisis....

[Bakatin] Yes. We have no right to conceal what is obvious. The mass of crime has now exceeded the possibilities or, if I may put it like this, the "capacities" of the operational and investigative apparatus. The organs of inquiry and investigation have, figuratively speaking, become choked.

[Correspondents] But are not the sharply increased demands on justice and on the fullness, quality, and strict legality of investigation a factor here?

[Bakatin] Undoubtedly. The volume of crimes has increased and crimes have become more complex, but the MVD's resources and means have remained the same. Hence a quite unnatural situation: Serious crime is growing, but convictions are falling.

[Correspondents] Where is the way out, Vadim Viktorovich?

[Bakatin] Only by way of perestroyka. I see it, above all, in the acceleration of perestroyka processes and in better health for the whole of society, starting with the economy. Commonplace words? But how can it be otherwise...? On the other hand, the people can wait no longer, and so we are obliged urgently to take measures to strengthen law-enforcement organs. We cannot manage without increased spending on the law-enforcement system. As I understand it, the deputies agreed with this thesis. Jurists must work more intensively to propose variants—several!—to reduce the disproportions that have arisen between the practice of the criminal and the practice of the law-enforcement organs. In order to select the optimum variants, lawmaking must proceed from life and have the nature of a social imperative.

Finally, the most important thing for us is to do away more quickly with the internal shortcomings in the MVD system itself. I well remember how we, conversing 6 months ago, touched on problems of percentage mania.... The task seemed impossible. And yet during these 6 months we have succeeded in advancing somewhat along the path of eradicating deception, show, and percentage mania in the militia's work. With what did this begin? With the party Central Committee and the government managing to ensure full glasnost and openness in criminal statistics and in the results of the fight against crime. It became pointless to "pull the wool over people's eyes"....

There is no more important task for us now than to activate the work of militia and investigation personnel, above all in the most acute areas of the fight against crime: the operational-investigative and preventive areas.

It is necessary, in short, to restore confidence in the militia. And for this it must, on the one hand, sharply eradicate indifference, boorishness, rudeness.... On the other hand, decisive, firm, and uncompromising actions founded on the law are required of the militia and MVD organs in the active fight against crime. There can and must be no confusion, not a hint of liberalism in suppressing antisocial encroachments and violations of law and order or in safeguarding citizens' rights and interests. The people and the party demand this of us.

[Correspondents] What is the role of the public here, and what is your attitude to the present level of the militia's relationship with the region's party committee?

[Bakatin] My opinion is unequivocal: The militia alone will do nothing; the crime wave can be overcome and a breakthrough achieved only by relying on the people. And the measures that are working today are those which have been specially elaborated in close contact with party organizations—in Gorkiy, for example, in the Oktyabrskiy Rayon of Frunze, the capital of Kirghizia, in Irkutsk.... Such a large-scale comprehensive operation to stop the spread of drugs is being carried out for the first time in Central Asia and in regions of Kazakhstan and the Far East. And the party committee has a tremendous place in this struggle. I will remark that without it the struggle which is at last being intensified against criminal encroachments in the economic sphere could peter out. The system being set up to combat organized crime is also designed for broad support from party organs. The struggle against speculation and racketeering has been activated within a short time at the "bidding" of the party Central Committee. The number of cases of speculation brought to light this year is already in excess of 30,000; whereas there were 45,000 cases during the whole of last year. But we are obliged significantly to intensify the struggle against distortions in the sphere of cooperatives and against secondhand dealers and covert speculation.

Almost 900 racketeers have already been detained and arrested. In all, approximately 2,000 such manifestations have been brought to light, or 3 times as many as during the whole of last year.

[Correspondents] But people are arrested and...released. And they start to slight their victims, to intimidate others.... Sometimes they do this to the public, to the investigator, to courageous journalists.

[Bakatin] I will remind you again that approximately 900 racketeers have already been arrested. And yet deficiencies in criminal and procedural legislation and in the system of evidence permitted by the court tell in the struggle against organized crime. There are weaknesses in the work of inquiry and investigation organs. Therefore organizers of the system of bribes and speculative and embezzling schemes frequently evade liability. And yet this year we have succeeded in breaking the 3-year trend of a drop in the number of detentions and arrests of dangerous criminals from this milieu, recidivists who have adapted skillfully to the humanization process. In the majority of regions the use of measures to secure defendants' appearance has increased 25 percent. Incidentally, we have become more resolute in the struggle against hostage takers.

[Correspondents] Nevertheless, the number of these hostage-taking incidents is depressing. It is also a depressing fact that the criminal sometimes goes unpunished, unfound, and undisarmed. Perhaps, all the same, the professionalism of our workers leaves something to be desired? How, in general, have we taught them the complex trade of militia worker? How does their professionalism compare with that of foreign counterparts?

[Bakatin] It is not even a matter of counterparts. The growth of professionalism has begun to fall in connection with the high cadre turnover. But you are right. Just one example: In Japan a police private is trained for 21 month., whereas here it used to take...4 months. We have now gone over to 9-month training for militia workers in training centers. In other words, the question of training and retraining cadres remains probably the most urgent one. The problem of the fundamental technical reequipping of MVD organs is no less acute. More than 67 percent of the communications equipment is obsolete. One-third of the motor pool is operated for longer than the normative times.

[Correspondents] Mafia and drugs business dealers are probably pleased to read these revelations by a minister....

[Bakatin] Never mind. We will solve these problems. But in order to solve them, they must not be concealed. What is needed is the truth.

The legislative base of the organization of the activities of internal affairs organs is also undergoing substantial renewal. Much has to be done. The USSR Law on the Militia is very important. We hope for a broad discussion of this draft. And then the Supreme Soviet will have the last word. I am convinced that the law will be what society and the militia need.

[Correspondents] In our last conversation you advocated hiving off investigation as an independent subdepartment. Has your viewpoint changed over the past 6 months?

[Bakatin] It seems to me time to end the protracted debate over the place of investigation in the law-enforcement system. All the talk of the minister's lack of attention to the MVD investigative apparatus is absolutely groundless. I advocate strengthening it in every possible way, and I am directly responsible for this. It is another matter that **I still believe that the transfer of all jurisdiction from the Prosecutor's Office to the MVD is feasible only with the corresponding transfer of the entire**

complement of skilled Prosecutor's Office investigators. If a legislator considers it necessary in the future to hive off investigation to an independent committee, the MVD will have no objections.

[Correspondents] You are an obvious champion—many people have already recognized this—of creating a nationwide program to combat crime....

[Bakatin] Why only I? The exceptional significance of this task is universally recognized.

This will undoubtedly require expenditure and resource provision. These are more advantageous morally and materially than the tremendous harm done to society and the people by crime. Cheap justice costs more. Clearly, **this targeted expenditure on the fight against crime must be provided for on a separate line, as it were, in the socioeconomic development plans.**

But there is one problem that the USSR MVD will never solve on its own. This is the problem of interethnic conflicts and public safety. It is not a question of "tightening screws," of a return to repression. Political problems can only be resolved by political means. But lawlessness and violence can and must be countered with force. With force underpinned by the law and in defense of democracy. Democracy cannot be allowed to fall into the deep rut of interethnic conflicts.

[Correspondents] And yet people are striving increasingly frequently and persistently to push it into it....

[Bakatin] There are many legal questions here. Evidently, there is a need for a permanently functioning committee (or council) for questions of public safety—under the Supreme Soviet or its chairman or under the government. **What is needed is criteria for the juridical recognition (or nonrecognition) of sociopolitical organizations, a legal basis for strikes, a state of emergency regime clearly defined by law, and rights of internal troops.**

Real interethnic tension is increasing in a number of regions today. A great social danger is also posed by thousands-strong rallies, where, owing to their electric nature, we never have any guarantee against provocations and subsequent outbreaks of violence. The scale of mass disturbances and the number of casualties are increasing.

[Correspondents] But, unfortunately, in Sumgait, in Armenia, and in Fergana the MVD is accused of belatedly transferring internal troops to the disaster region.... Their equipment too is really bad.... We throw people into the crowd without elementary protective equipment.

[Bakatin] Yes, you are right, our protective equipment and special equipment are simply bad, and their provision is unsatisfactory. But the chief point, if you proceed from our scale, is that we virtually do not have internal troops. Throughout the country there are just 18,000 personnel in operational units which can be used outside the places where they are stationed permanently.

[Correspondents] Is that all?

[Bakatin] And some people urge us to eliminate even these! In all countries (Italy, the United States, France) there are such forces, which are used in mass disturbances. And we will not get away from the need to have forces of order against contempt for the law and the undermining of democracy.

The forces of order will fulfill the set tasks and their duty to the people. But what is most important in interethnic relations is consolidation, the peoples' profound respect for each other, consideration, tact, and culture of relations. No economic, social, and territorial questions can be resolved by fueling emotions and fanning passions or by force. Feuds will not increase earnings, material benefits, housing, water, or land. You will not strengthen your well-being at the expense of refugees, at your neighbor's expense, and you will lose a great deal: honor, conscience, respect.

[Correspondents] But these generally are principles common to all mankind.... And they demand protection, Vadim Viktorovich. Otherwise they give way to wolfish principles....

[Bakatin] And the USSR MVD will do everything to ensure this protection in all spheres of social life.

Economic

Economic Crisis Blamed on 'State Monopoly'

18270122 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by R. Khasbulatov, doctor of economic sciences: "Ration Cards: For a Time or Forever"]

[Text] "We received a phone call from the house manager's office, and we were asked to pick up a ration card for sugar," were the words my son met me with recently, not comprehending the regrettable content of this "news," and not suspecting that the "institution" of ration cards was recently approved in many cities of our Motherland.

It has been coming to this for a long time. Sugar has disappeared, whose shortage it would seem would not be felt. Soon perfumes, eau-de-Cologne, toothpaste, detergent, clothing, and shoes—not to mention television sets and refrigerators, of which there were plenty in stores 2 years ago. The problem with prices, whose threat of increasing terrified us just yesterday, was put aside by the impact of complete scarcity.

The basic official explanation can be summarized in the following idea: The wage fund is increasing at a faster rate than the growth in the productivity of labor. As a result, "unearned money" piles up in people's hands which cannot be offset by needed commodities. The situation, however, is not quite that simple.

The main reason, it seems to me, can be found in the strategic miscalculations of economic reform itself. The main reproduction ratios of the economy during the 4 years of restructuring did not change one iota, and they continue to develop in accordance with the law of inertia. And just as it was earlier, the economy is not oriented on the individual. A qualitatively different philosophy underlies it: "production for the sake of production." Thus, if one can say this, is the situation—"the basis" of the economy—of commodity-producing industries, of the construction complexes, and of the service area.

But what is in the "superstructure"—in the economic management mechanism? It is precisely here that substantial and qualitative changes are taking place. The new economic mechanism, with all of its discrepancies, undoubtedly, brought the human factor into play first and foremost. It stimulates business activity, it compels people to work more, better, and more attentively. The money that they receive is honest money, earned by right. It is untrue to say that the money is "unearned," as representatives of the financial and economic departments are trying to convince us. But if this money is earned, the reader asks, where is the new product of the labor, and the new service?

And it is here that the hoax of "production for the sake of production" is concealed. A person worked honestly, made an input to volume and quality, but there is no product. He received a salary, and he expended materials, resources, and finances. That is, he practically caused a loss, but he has an honest salary. This is where our main trouble is, which, I will say frankly, is the fault not of the performer but of the managers, those officials who sit in the headquarters of ministries, Gosplan [USSR State Planning Committee], Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], Minfin [Ministry of Finance], and so forth. They are all alike. We have thousands of enterprises that have been under construction for years. And the condition of the market is only getting worse from the fact that people at these construction sites are working by the sweat of their brow.

The reform, as a matter of fact, did not affect the main element: general investment practice. No significant infusion of capital investments in the "B" group ministries is observed.

In the meantime, the new economic mechanism also requires a new economic basis: tens of thousands of small enterprises that react flexibly and effectively to the needs of the population and to the economic policy of the "leadership." There have not been any and there still are not any enterprises that provide mass products. Therefore, even a modest increase in the income of people in some industries and spheres (with the continued low standard of living of the population) literally led to the collapse of our feeble retail market.

Balance the market without a structural restructuring? Is it really not understood that this is simply utopia? I am extremely alarmed by the circumstance that, while reacting sensitively to one or another private event in our life, public opinion does not see the threatening danger that is hanging over the foundation of restructuring—economic reform. And this danger consists of the failure of the economic mechanism to join up with the organizational structure of the national economy.

The powerful monopolies continue to act as full-fledged owners in economic empires. The ministries are openly obstructing the shift of "their" enterprises to the new conditions of economic activity, and they are literally squeezing them by the throat and, at the slightest vain attempt to free them, they "turn off the oxygen" of supplies, deliveries, sales conditions, disposition of profits, etc.

If such an unnatural situation will continue in the future, the economic situation, unquestionably, will worsen. And, consequently, the ration card system in everything, which has quit the historical stage under conditions of modern capitalism, will become firmly embedded in our life, discrediting the theory and practice of socialism....

Only a structural restructuring of the economy will be able to bring the country out of a crisis. And it can be accomplished only by rejecting the state monopoly of property. There simply is no other way.

Higher Customs Duty Imposed on Computers

18001358 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jul 89 p 9

[Article by Yaroslav Skvortsov: "A Barrier. But For Whom?"]

[Text] Since early July, our fellow countrymen and foreigners who have happened to deal with the Soviet customs this month have been approaching our editorial office. All of them were concerned with the new customs duty imposed on computers imported to our country.

...The customs station at the airport Sheremetyevo-2—this very address was mentioned most frequently by those who called the editorial office.

Chief of the Sheremetyevo customs station G.D. Shadrin said: "New customs dues were introduced effective 1 July 1989. Previously, a customs duty of 300 to 400 rubles was imposed on a computer imported to the USSR (100 rubles for every assembly unit); the volume of the new duty is 5,000 rubles for every complete computer. There is a 100-percent surcharge for every computer after the first one.

"Citizens returning to the USSR from business trips abroad are a special category. For them, duty-free imports of one set, purchased with legally issued hard currency, are envisaged. If such a person is transporting two or more sets, general rules apply to him.

"The introduction of new rules has brought about the accumulation of about 100 computers here which await the payment of the sums requested. This is not too many: More than 60 computers are cleared through the customs daily.

"As far as complaints by those arriving are concerned, they are successfully settled. At present, a majority of those undergoing customs inspections pay 5,000 rubles without much ado."

Indeed, the passions at the customs were not at the high pitch expected: Arriving airline passengers quickly underwent inspection, and customs personnel went about their business with dispatch. Only in the room of the dispatcher the phone was ringing off the hook, and the girl was repeating the same text into the receiver: "Yes, 5,000... Effective 1 July... For gifts, too... Five thousand..."

Still, the situation appears very strange. Our "computer hunger" is well known. Our domestic industry will not be able to relieve it any time soon, but we strive to block a highly significant source of receiving computer technology. It is known that some countries which badly need modern computers have not only canceled customs duties on their imports but provide financial incentives for this process by paying monetary rewards to those who come to the country with such merchandise.

We would have liked very much to receive answers to the questions which arise in this regard. However, at the Main Administration for Customs Inspections they told us that we will not be able to satisfy our curiosity without approval by the management, which was absent. For the time being, the staff ventured a suggestion that the new rates were to hit the speculators. However, practice shows that these 5,000 rubles will be compensated for by raising prices in the "black market," and the speculators will hold their own anyway. In their turn, honest citizens will have to think twice before they buy something that expensive.

In whose way is the barrier being placed? We admit thinking that, maybe, the introduction of elements of economic accountability has made the customs personnel jack up the duties. However, at the Ministry of Finance they told us very authoritatively: The customs give everything to the state budget to a penny.

Well, the state certainly needs money. What about computers?

Agricultural

Supreme Soviet Committee Meets Soil Scientists

LD1807230289 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Agrarian Matters and Food have stepped back down to earth from the high parliamentary rostrum. They met for a visiting session in the Dokuchayev Soil Institute located in the very centre of Moscow. Its problems are undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of everyone to whom soil is bread-giver above all. Agrarian deputies have taken up most impatiently questions directly linked with the future of our countryside.

These questions were keenly raised by the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, which believed that proper decisions should be taken without delay by the new parliament exactly on that problem. Without that it is difficult to expect a fast and efficient implementation of the agrarian reform.

A thorough exchange of information was underway at the Soil Institute with scientists whose specialty is care for soil. Without this information it is difficult to create any legislation on that very acute problem.

Alexander Nikonov, Soviet people's deputy and president of the All-Union V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, characterised the country's plough land resources and said that there had been 1.11 hectares of plough land per person in the country 30 years ago, and now—no more than 0.8 hectares. People leave villages where plough land disappears. Almost 140,000 villages disappeared over the same period.

The drawing up of the bill, which will be submitted in the first reading to the committee members at the end of the week, did not start from a scratch. But "the basic principles of land legislation", which were adopted decades ago, have become hopelessly outdated, despite some supplements made. A fundamentally new approach is now needed, that would take into account present-day countryside realities, and in the first place a diversity of the forms of property.

A subject for thought, by the way, is the text of the Lithuanian SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] Law on Farming in the republic, which was distributed at the meeting. The committee is striving to approach consideration of the draft of the most important legal act of contemporary agrarian policy exactly with due account for a diversity of opinions of scientists, specialists and practical workers.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2031' in Orbit, Functioning Normally

LD1907084789 Moscow TASS in English 0825 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—The USSR blasted off another satellite, Cosmos-2031, with a booster rocket Soyuz on Tuesday. It carries research instrumentation to continue space explorations.

The satellite was put into orbit with the following parameters: initial revolution period - 89.0 minutes, apogee—283 km, perigee—200 km, orbital inclination—50.5 degrees.

The satellite also carries a radio system for precise measuring of orbital elements and a radio system to transmit data on the operation of instruments and research equipment.

Instruments aboard the satellite function normally.

'Resurs-F' Satellite Launched 18 Jul

LD1907064689 Moscow TASS in English 0818 GMT 19 Jul 89

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—The Soyuz booster rocket lifted into orbit on Tuesday a Resurs-F artificial satellite developed in the foton designing bureau at the Soviet Glavkosmos. Equipment is installed on board the satellite for various scale multi-zonal and spectre-zonal photographing for purposes of continued research of earth's natural deposits in the interests of different branches of the Soviet economy and international cooperation.

The satellite's orbit has the following parameters: the initial period of revolution - 88.6 minutes, maximum distance from earth - 253 kilometers, minimal distance - 195 kilometers, inclination - 82.6 degrees.

The equipment on board the satellite functions normally.

Data is fed to the state production-and-research centre "priroda" of Glavkosmos for processing and use.

Together with the Resurs-F, two passive detachable satellites of the Pion series have been launched for a study of the density of the upper atmospheric layers. The satellites were developed by a student design bureau at the Kuibyshev aviation engineering institute named after Sergey Korolyov.

AES's May Reduce 'Greenhouse Effect'

18220160 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Jul 89 p 3

[Interview with Hans Blix, general director of the IAEA, by I. Belov: "A Realistic Alternative. Nuclear Power Engineering is Slowing the Growing Threat From the 'Greenhouse Effect'"]

[Text] **The problems of nuclear power engineering are worrying millions of people throughout the world. The most varied and sometimes contradictory opinions are expressed: some favor its further development, others are for halting the construction and even the operation of AES's [nuclear power stations]. In an interview with a TRUD correspondent the general director of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Hans Blix shares his own viewpoint on nuclear power engineering today and in the future.**

[Belov] How do you characterize the present situation in nuclear power engineering in the world?

[Blix] The more than 5,000 reactor-years of operation that have now been accumulated in the world represents a considerable industrial experience. I venture to assert that the service safety record of nuclear power engineering is just as good as the records for the sectors that generate electricity using coal, oil, gas and hydropower. It nevertheless remains a fact that the accidents at the Three Mile Island (in the United States) and Chernobyl AES's confirmed many people's misgivings about nuclear power engineering. Only many years of AES operation everywhere without serious accidents will remove the public skepticism.

The approximately 430 AES's now being operated throughout the world account for 16 percent of world electricity generation. The statistics available to the IAEA indicate that the overall indicators for world nuclear power engineering are constantly improving. The operational readiness of AES's is growing, the number of unscheduled shutdowns is being reduced, and the radiation dose is falling. Before Chernobyl, and since, there has been no accident in which people were killed.

Of course, as before major differences exist in the economic indicators for AES's, and for unscheduled shutdowns and levels of radiation doses. But these differences are connected not with the types of reactor used but primarily with the quality of management and operation.

[Belov] What is being done to improve precisely these avenues of AES operation?

[Blix] The governments of the IAEA member states are concerned not only with developing energy but also establishing the conditions in which AES's can be operated in each particular country. Accordingly the IAEA, which does not itself operate any AES's is, in addition to

questions of the efficient and economical operation of nuclear power stations, engaged with many other problems, including approval of the so-called nuclear safety standards.

But responsibility for achieving this end rests primarily with those who work at the AES's. All elements of the global network of operators should be sound and reliable. This is precisely why they decided in mid-May to unite themselves here, in Moscow, in a World Association in order to to learn from each other and achieve in practice universal compliance with the safety standards. This exchange of experience, which is being conducted within the IAEA framework at the level of government officials, leading experts and scientists, will thus be supplemented by the extension of operational and direct contacts between people working in the equipment halls of nuclear power stations.

[Below] After decades of silence, scientists and the mass media are talking increasingly about the problem of the "greenhouse effect." What do you think about this problem?

[Blix] Until now the rapid growth in industrial development in many countries has been taking place through enormous increases in the scales on which hydropower and the fossil types of fuels are used—coal, oil, gas. Over time it has become obvious that this has caused local damage first and foremost to rivers and cities, and harm has also been inflicted on forests and lakes. And we recently discovered that the enormous emissions of carbon dioxide, formed in the combustion of all kinds of fossils fuel, is almost 50-percent responsible for the "greenhouse effect."

This is a real threat to the world in which our children and grandchildren will live. It is quite rightly attracting increasing attention from scientists, political leaders and the mass media.

[Below] What steps can be taken to counteract global warming?

[Blix] One essential step is already being taken. In accordance with an agreement, recently reached, during the next decade the use of hydrofluorocarbons, which, it has been established, are the cause of the destruction of the Earth's ozone layer, "guaranteeing" about 20 percent of the "greenhouse effect," will be halted.

But the main attention must be focused on emissions of carbon dioxide. These emissions cannot be prevented with the help of technical devices but only reduced by restricting the combustion of coal, oil, and gas.

Moreover, additional scientific research is needed to clarify what amounts of emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere may be considered permissible. However, we might take under advisement the conclusion of a conference on changes in the atmosphere that was held in Toronto last year. This conclusion is that we should set a target of a 20-percent reduction in present levels by the year 2005. Since the present volume of emission is about 20,000 million tons annually, in line with this proposal it should be cut by about 4,000 million tons.

[Below] The advocates of environmental protection suggest a combination of more efficient and better-considered use of energy, and also the development and use of renewable energy sources, such as wind power or solar energy. What is your opinion on this score?

[Blix] These proposals deserve attention and support but they are inadequate as answers to the question of how we shall reduce carbon dioxide emissions on a global scale. I am certainly not in any position to propose that this may possibly be done through the use of nuclear power engineering. However, I nevertheless do assert that the use of nuclear power engineering is helping us to avoid the burning of a considerable quantity of fossil fuels. In the modern world nuclear power engineering is still the only real alternative to an increased "greenhouse effect."

Problems in Disposable Syringe Production

18400548 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 15 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by I. Shomakhova: "Will There Be Disposable Syringes?"]

[Text] The problems of health care are well known to every one of us, not just from hearsay. Who if not we, the clients, should know what we need?

Providing health care organs with disposable syringes and needles has literally become the talk of the town. The central newspapers just reported the sad fact, registered by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Health: In Naberezhnyy Chelny a 22-month old child died from AIDS. Who is guilty? People are fed up with living in constant fear that undisciplined medical workers, due to their own carelessness, are not observing even the most elementary professional rules. The issue is sufficiently serious, since it involves human life.

As the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics reports, the introduction in 1988 of the capacity to produce 1.4 billion syringes and 3.5 billion needles was disrupted. In violation of the established dates (only in March of 1989 instead of 1988) capacity for the production of 100 million syringes was brought on line at the Tyumen medical equipment and instrument plant. At the Leningrad plant for medical polymers, instead of the planned capacity of 200 million units in 1988 only output of 100 million was brought on line. Because of this the planned output for this year is threatened, due to the fact that at a number of facilities at this time construction work has not been started. But in Mtsensk, Tyumen, Yaroslavl and Gorkiy oblasts it should be going at full speed.

Military

Admiral Kasatonov Interviewed Before U.S. Visit

PM1807154789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 89 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Vice Admiral I. Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet, by Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak: "On Visit to Norfolk"—no place or date of interview specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] As already reported, a detachment of Soviet Navy ships comprising the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov," the destroyer "Otlichnyy," and the tanker "Genrikh Gasanov" will pay an official visit to the U.S. port of Norfolk [Virginia] 21-25 July. The ships are now sailing toward the U.S. shores. Before they set sail, our stringer Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak met with Vice Admiral I. Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet and commander of the detachment.

[Gromak] Comrade Vice Admiral, what are the visit's tasks and what preparations were made for it?

[Kasatonov] The main task of the official visit by the detachment of Soviet warships is to continue the dialogue between representatives of the USSR and U.S. Armed Forces. Such meetings have been taking place on a regular basis recently. True enough, contacts between representatives of the navies are still rare. As a matter of fact, the forthcoming visit by Soviet warships to the United States will be only the second throughout the post-October period (the first took place in 1975), and only the third throughout the entire history of relations between our countries. Therefore I think one can understand the lofty responsibility borne by those participating in the visit. I believe that we shall be representatives not only of state diplomacy but also of people's diplomacy, and we are looking forward with tremendous interest to our meetings with U.S. citizens.

Preparation of the ships for the visit was in the hands of the Northern Fleet Staff and Political Directorate. A voyage staff was set up, as well as groups on attachment comprising the Northern Fleet Song and Dance Ensemble, the Navy Orchestra, military journalists, and interpreters. We put together reference material, movies, photography exhibitions, and literature about the Soviet Union in English, souvenirs, and documents which might come in useful in a foreign port. Much attention was paid to rehearsals of salute ceremonies, the organization of receptions, meetings, and visits to the ships, and the training of sports teams.

During the preparation for the visit, lecturers delivered to the crews a series of talks on U.S. history, art, and culture. Special attention was paid to the history of relations between the two states and their close cooperation during World War II. Incidentally, our route will take us through seas and parts of the Atlantic Ocean where Soviet and U.S. seamen fought shoulder to shoulder and shipboard to shipboard. We really value the memory of all this.

[Gromak] Did everything run smoothly during the preparations for the visit?

[Kasatonov] Of course, as with any other large and complex job, there were quite a few complications. But ultimately they were all overcome. If there is anything that might be slightly worrisome, it is the actual lack of a precise and clear idea of the visit's program. On the basis of previous experience, all we can do is make some more or less realistic assumptions about it. We would certainly like to know the visit's program in advance, even if only in basic outline, so as to embark on targeted preparation for the forthcoming events. According to information at my disposal, the relevant program for the visit by a detachment of Soviet warships to Boston in 1975 was handed to our detachment's commander by U.S. officers just a few hours prior to arrival in the U.S. port. We hope that this will not happen again on this occasion...

[Gromak] Our newspaper's readers would be quite interested in at least a few details about the man who has been entrusted with commanding the detachment of ships. Tell us briefly about yourself, please.

[Kasatonov] There is actually nothing to talk about at any length. I was born in a naval seaman's family in Vladivostok in 1939. My childhood and adolescence were spent in the naval garrisons of the Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, which largely predetermined my choice of vocation. I joined the naval school at 17 years of age. I became an officer, served on destroyers, missile cruisers, and large antisubmarine ships in the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets, and subsequently commanded the large antisubmarine ships "Provornyy" and "Ochakov," as well as ship task forces. This is my 2d year as first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. I graduated as a correspondence student from the Sevastopol Instrument Making Institute, and afterwards from the Naval Academy and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy.

My wife and I have three children. Our daughter graduated from secondary school with a silver medal this year (just as my wife and I did in the past), and our twin sons are still at school and dreaming of going to sea.

[Gromak] During such lengthy service with the fleet, you have obviously had numerous occasions to meet U.S. warships at sea. What is your opinion of U.S. seamen and how do you appraise their professional training?

[Kasatonov] I have spent over 30 years in naval service and have been on numerous long voyages with frequent opportunities to meet U.S. Navy ships. What can I say about them? U.S. warships easily and freely enter into

radio contact. As a rule, talks are held in Russian. If the communications officer does not speak Russian, the ship normally offers apologies and talks are held in English.

Having observed U.S. warships at maneuvers, I have drawn the conclusion that they are good at studying and analyzing the situation at sea, and any maneuvers to avoid clashes are executed intelligently and skillfully. In the overwhelming majority of cases, U.S. seamen rigorously adhere to the demands of the agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea. I have also noticed that U.S. ships are excellent in performing the maneuver of approaching and departing from tankers for refueling in any weather.

In short, I have a good opinion of the professional background and sea training of the crews of U.S. warships.

[Gromak] It is well known that navies have a major offensive potential, and any serious dialogue about expanding confidence-building measures in the military sphere would be simply impossible without taking this into account. Why is it that confidence-building measures have so far failed to cover naval activities?

[Kasatonov] For a long time now the Soviet Union has proposed beginning consultations between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO on reducing naval and air force military activity, including activity in the waters of the Baltic Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, and the Greenland Sea. Furthermore, there are proposals to examine the question of banning naval activity in busy shipping lanes and international straits. For our part, we have taken certain steps in this direction. For example, since 1 January 1988 the Northern Fleet has conducted exercises only in USSR coastal waters so as to minimize the likelihood of accidental conflicts, which still occur, even though their number is declining. Unfortunately, as far as I know, there has been no positive response to the Soviet proposals by the U.S. side so far.

[Gromak] And one last question. How do you perceive the role of navies, primarily those of the USSR and the United States, in maintaining security in the world?

[Kasatonov] In my view, we primarily need to strengthen confidence-building measures and to strictly fulfill the agreements between the two sides on preventing incidents at sea and the recently signed agreement on preventing dangerous military activity.

The best proof of our good mutual intentions will be provided by the exchange of visits and meetings between delegations and leaders of both states' armed forces. This process is already under way.